Cover -- Half-title -- Title -- Copyright -- Dedication -- Contents -- Preface -- Audience -- Content -- Number of chapters -- Acknowledgements -- 1 Introduction: some background -- 1 Developments in philosophy of mind -- 1.1 Dualism -- 1.2 Logical behaviourism -- 1.3 Identity theory -- 1.4 Functionalism -- 1.5 The theory-theory -- 2 Developments in psychology -- 2.1 Freud and the folk -- 2.2 Methodological behaviourism -- 2.3 The cognitive paradigm and functional analysis -- 2.4 Cognition as computation -- 2.5 Connectionism and neural networks -- 3 Conclusion -- SELECTED READING -- 2 Folk-psychological commitments -- 1 Realisms and anti-realisms -- 2 Two varieties of anti-realism -- 2.1 Davidson -- 2.2 Dennett -- 3 The case for realism about folk psychology -- 3.1 The Turing test -- 3.2 Paralysis and other ailments -- 3.3 Inner commitments -- 3.4 Varieties of realism -- 4 Realism and eliminativism -- 4.1 Churchland: elimination now -- 4.2 Stich: elimination in prospect -- 5 Using folk psychology -- 6 Conclusion -- SELECTED READING -- 3 Modularity and nativism -- 1 Some background on empiricism and nativism -- 2 The case for nativism -- 3 Developmental rigidity and modularity -- 3.1 Developmental evidence -- 3.2 Dissociation evidence -- 3.3 Brain-scanning evidence -- 4 Fodorian modularity -- 5 Input systems versus central systems -- 5.1 The case for conceptual modules -- 5.2 Is central cognition unencapsulated? -- 5.3 Folk versus modular psychology -- 6 Conclusion -- SELECTED READING -- 4 Mind-reading -- 1 The alternatives: theory-theory versus simulation -- 1.1 Theory-theory -- 1.2 Simulation-theory -- 2 Problems for simulationism -- 2.1 Simulation and explanation -- 2.2 Simulation and self-knowledge -- 2.3 The problem of mutual cognition -- 2.4 Cognitive penetrability? -- 3 A hybrid view -- 4 Developmental studies -- 4.1 Normal development.

4.2 Abnormal development -- 5 Accounting for autistic impairments -- 5.1 Pretend play -- 5.2 Executive function deficits and counterfactual reasoning -- 6 Conclusion -- SELECTED READING -- 5 Reasoning and irrationality -- 1 Introduction: the fragmentation of rationality -- 2 Some psychological evidence -- 3 Philosophical arguments in defence of rationality -- 3.1 The argument from interpretation -- 3.2 The argument from content -- 3.3 The argument from reflective equilibrium -- 4 Psychological explanations of performance -- 4.1 Cheater detection: a module for monitoring social exchange -- 4.2 Relevance theory -- 5 Practical rationality -- 5.1 Two notions of rationality -- 5.2 Against the Standard Picture of rationality -- 6 Conclusion -- SELECTED READING -- 6 Content for psychology -- 1 Introduction: wide versus narrow -- 2 Arguments for wide content -- 2.1 Externalist intuitions -- 2.2 Arguments for externalist folk psychology -- 3 The coherence of narrow content -- 3.1 Specifying narrow content -- 3.2 Contents and that-clauses: undermining an assumption -- 4 Explanation and causation -- 4.1 Illusory demonstrative thoughts: the case against -- 4.2 Same behaviour, same causes? -- 4.3 Do mental states supervene on local facts? -- 4.4 Content in explanation: how can reasons be causes? -- 5 Folk-psychological content -- 5.1 Two kinds of content -- 5.2 Semantic content -- 6 Conclusion -- SELECTED READING -- 7 Content naturalised -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Informational semantics -- 2.1 Misrepresentation and the disjunction problem -- 2.2 The problem of causal chains -- 3 Teleo-semantics -- 3.1 The case for teleo-semantics -- 3.2 Two distinctions -- 3.3 The disjunction problem strikes again? -- 3.4 The Swampman objection -- 3.5 A-historical functions revisited -- 4 Functional-role semantics -- 4.1 In support of functional-role semantics.

4.2 Elaborating functional-role semantics -- 4.3 Two-factor functionalism -- 4.4 The charge of holism -- 5 Naturalisation versus reduction -- 5.1 Reduction and reality -- 5.2 Naturalisation without reduction -- 5.3 The future of naturalised semantics -- 6 Conclusion -- SELECTED READING -- 8 Forms of representation -- 1 Preliminaries: thinking in images -- 2 Mentalese versus connectionism -- 2.1 The case for Mentalese -- 2.2 Some common (mostly bad) arguments for connectionism -- 2.3 Connectionism and folk psychology -- 2.4 Connectionism and systematicity -- 2.5 Connectionism, holism and the frame problem -- 3 The place of natural language in thought -- 3.1 The options -- 3.2 Linguistic scaffolding -- 3.3 Language and the conceptual mind: Dennett and Bickerton -- 3.4 Conscious thinking 1: learning and inferring -- 3.5 Conscious thinking 2: two-level theories -- 3.6 Explicit conceptual thought: LF and inferential promiscuity -- 4 Conclusion -- SELECTED READING -- 9 Consciousness: the final frontier? -- 1 Preliminaries: distinctions and data -- 1.1 Distinctions -- 1.2 Conscious versus non-conscious mental states -- 2 Mysterianism -- 2.1 Perspectival and subjective facts? -- 2.2 What Mary didn't know -- 2.3 Cognitive closure? -- 2.4 More explanatory gaps? -- 2.5 Real inversions? -- 2.6 Are there any non-representational properties of experience? -- 3 Cognitivist theories -- 3.1 FOR theories -- 3.2 Distinctions lost -- 3.3 The explanatory power of HOR theories -- 3.4 Conscious states for animals? -- 3.5 Two objections -- 3.6 HOE versus HOT accounts -- 3.7 Actualist versus dispositionalist HOT-theories -- 3.8 HOD-theory -- 3.9 The independence of HOTs from language -- 4 Conclusion -- SELECTED READING -- References -- Index of names -- Index of subjects.