Cover -- Half-title -- Title -- Copyright -- Contents -- Preface -- 1 Introduction: ethics out of economics -- 1.1 Economics and ethics -- 1.2 The preference-satisfaction theory -- 1.3 Liberalism versus a theory of good -- 1.4 The formal techniques -- 1.5 Think comparatively -- 1.6 The value of life -- 1.7 Outline of the volume -- Part I Preference and value -- 2 'Utility' -- 2.1 Usefulness -- 2.2 Axiomatic utility theory -- 2.3 Expected utility theory -- 2.4 Sen's usage -- 2.5 The best usage -- 3 Extended preferences -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 Ordinalism -- 3.3 Extended preferences and interpersonal comparisons of good -- 3.4 Harsanyi's causal argument -- 3.5 The causal determination of extended preferences -- 3.6 The causal determination of good -- 3.7 Ordinalism and goodness for a person -- 3.8 From individual orderings to interpersonal orderings? -- 4 Discounting the future -- 4.1 Introduction -- 4.2 The pure method of evaluation -- 4.3 The market price method of evaluation -- 4.4 The present prices of future commodities -- 4.5 Discounting in the market price method -- 4.6 Commodities that should not be discounted -- 4.7 Disenfranchised generations -- 4.8 Imprudence -- 4.9 Conclusion -- 5 Can a Humean be moderate? -- 5.1 Moderate and extreme Humeans -- 5.2 A difficulty facing moderate Humeans -- 5.3 A Non-Humean response -- 5.4 A Humean response -- 5.5 The nature and epistemology of preferences -- 5.6 Knowing preferences by perception -- 5.7 Knowing preferences by their effects -- 5.8 Knowing preferences by evaluation -- 5.9 Conclusion -- Part II The structure of good -- 6 Bolker-Jeffrey expected utility theory and axiomatic utilitarianism -- 6.1 Introduction -- 6.2 The utilitarian theorem -- 6.3 The ex-post approach -- 6.4 Introduction to the Bolker-Jeffrey theory -- 6.5 Decision versus valuation.

6.6 The utilitarian theorem in the Bolker-Jeffrey theory -- 6.7.Conclusions -- 7 Fairness -- 7.1 Choosing between candidates -- 7.2 The facts about fairness -- 7.3 Claims -- 7.4 What claims require -- 7.5 Claims and lotteries -- 7.6 Other accounts of fairness -- 8 Is incommensurability vagueness? -- 8.1 Indeterminate comparatives -- 8.2 Standard configurations -- 8.3 No indeterminacy -- 8.4 Hard indeterminacy -- 8.5 The collapsing principle -- 8.6 Soft indeterminacy -- 8.7 Incomparable truth values -- 8.8 Supervaluation -- 8.9 Ordinary comparatives are softly indeterminate -- 8.10 Other views -- 8.10 Conclusion -- 9 Incommensurable values -- 9.1 The idea of incommensurability -- 9.2 The standard configuration -- 9.3 Definitions -- 9.4 Is there incommensurability? -- 9.5 Rough equality -- 9.6 Vagueness -- 9.7 Practical decision making -- 9.8 A puzzle -- 9.9 Bayesianism -- 9.10 Reasons and intentions -- 10 Goodness is reducible to betterness: the evil of death is the value of life -- 10.1 Utility theory and betterness -- 10.2 The idea of absolute goodness -- 10.3 Reducible senses of goodness -- 10.4 Naturalism -- 10.5 The evil of death and the value of life -- Part III The value of life -- 11 Trying to value a life -- 12 Structured and unstructured valuation -- 12.1 Introduction and an example -- 12.2 The unstructured approach -- 12.3 The structured approach -- 12.4 Arguments for the two approaches -- 12.5 What is best and what ought to come about -- 12.6 Valuing existence -- 13 Qalys -- 13.1 Introduction -- 13.2 Individual preferences -- 13.3 Quality adjustment factors in the representation of preferences -- 13.4 A cardinal measure of good? -- 13.5 Qalys as a measure of good -- 13.6 Quality adjustment factors in the measure of good -- 13.7 Comparisons between people -- 13.8 Problems of existence -- 13.9 Summary -- Appendix to Chapter 13.

Derivation of the discounted-qaly maximizing equation (1) -- Comments on Pliskin, Shepard, and Weinstein -- 14 The value of living -- 14.1 Examples -- 14.2 The problem -- 14.3 Two mistaken views -- 14.4 The principle of personal good -- 14.5 Conclusion -- 15 The value of a person -- 15.1 The basic intuition -- 15.2 The constituency principle and counterexamples -- 15.3 Intransitive betterness -- 15.4 Conditional betterness -- 15.5 Relative betterness -- Notes -- 1 INTRODUCTION: ETHICS OUT OF ECONOMICS -- 2 'UTILITY' -- 3 EXTENDED PREFERENCES -- 4 DISCOUNTING THE FUTURE -- 5 CAN A HUMEAN BE MODERATE? -- 6 BOLKER-JEFFREY EXPECTED UTILITY THEORY AND AXIOMATIC UTILITARIANISM -- 7 FAIRNESS -- 8 IS INCOMMENSURABILITY VAGUENESS? -- 9 INCOMMENSURABLE VALUES -- 10 GOODNESS IS REDUCIBLE TO BETTERNESS: THE EVIL OF DEATH IS THE VALUE OF LIFE -- 11 TRYING TO VALUE A LIFE -- 12 STRUCTURED AND UNSTRUCTURED VALUATION -- 13 QALYS -- 14 THE VALUE OF LIVING -- 15 THE VALUE OF A PERSON -- Bibliography -- Index.