Cover -- Half-title -- Title -- Copyright -- Contents -- Preface -- 1 The problem of phenomenal consciousness -- 1 What is phenomenal consciousness? -- Examples -- Rough synonyms -- Just do it -- 2 The scope of 'There is…' -- 3 What is the problem of phenomenal consciousness? -- 1 Abused scientists -- 2 Zombies -- 3 Deviants -- 4 Demons -- 4 Explaining consciousness -- 5 Vertical strategies I: the mind-body problem -- 6 Vertical strategies II: the mind-mind problem -- 7 Horizontal strategies -- 8 The shape of things to come -- 2 Consciousness and supervenience -- 1 Logical supervenience: ontological and epistemological interpretations -- 2 (Merely) natural supervenience -- 3 The incoherence of (Chalmers' versions of) supervenience -- 4 Natural supervenience and weak supervenience -- 5 Natural supervenience as an epistemological concept -- 6 More on 'reading off' -- 7 Logical supervenience and reductive explanation -- 3 The explanatory gap -- 1 Intuitions and arguments -- 2 Analysing the intuition -- 3 Truth and adequacy -- 4 Explanatory adequacy and epistemic satisfaction -- 5 Proto-epistemic satisfaction -- 6 Mechanistic explanations and correlations -- 7 Explaining consciousness -- 4 Consciousness and higher-order experience -- 1 HOR models of consciousness -- 2 The structure of HOP theories -- 3 Presuppositions of the HOP model -- 4 The independence condition -- Mindblindness -- False positives -- 5 The explanatory primacy of vehicles -- 6 The primacy of transitive consciousness -- 7 What has gone wrong? -- 5 Consciousness and higher-order thoughts -- 1 HOT models -- 2 The problem of circularity -- 3 The problem of regress -- 6 The structure of consciousness -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Consciousness as object of consciousness: empirical apperception -- 3 Transcendental apperception -- 4 Consciousness as experiential act -- 5 What it is like.

6 The ubiquity of objectualism -- Explanatory gap arguments -- Knowledge arguments -- 7 Summary -- 7 What it is like -- 1 Against objectualism -- 2 What it is like as a phenomenal particular -- 3 What it is like as a phenomenal property -- 4 What it is like as a representational property -- 5 For actualism -- 6 Phenomenology by proxy -- 7 Objections and replies -- 8 Summary -- 8 Against objectualism II: mistakes about the way things seem -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Three mistakes about experience -- 3 The objectualist gloss: qualia -- 4 Perceptual completion and neural filling in -- 5 Dennett's criticism of filling in -- 6 Change blindness and the richness of experience -- 7 Category (2) mistakes: how an experience seems and how it really is -- 8 Mistakes of category (3) -- 9 Why the way an experience seems cannot be explained as awareness of qualia -- 9 Consciousness and representation -- 1 Brentano's thesis -- 2 Consciousness as revealing and as revealed -- 3 Phenomenal revealing -- 4 Consciousness of and consciousness that -- 5 Representationism -- 6 Object representationism -- 7 Mode representationism -- 8 Actualism and representationism -- 10 Consciousness and the natural order -- 1 What it is like and reductive explanation -- 2 Consciousness and materialism -- 3 Consciousness and causality -- 4 The epiphenomenalist suspicion -- 5 The standard problem of epiphenomenalism -- 6 The epiphenomenalist suspicion allayed -- Bibliography -- Index.