Cover -- Half-title -- Series-title -- Title -- Copyright -- Dedication -- Contents -- Figures -- Tables -- Preface -- 1 Introduction -- The argument -- The restraining effect -- The confirmatory effect -- Alternative approaches: democratic peace theories and neorealism -- Normative theory -- Institutional constraints -- Neorealism -- Information versus preferences -- The plan of the book -- Part I Theory -- 2 Information and signaling in international crises -- The structure of an international crisis -- The distribution of information -- Responding to threats under asymmetric information -- Strategic misrepresentation and the search for credibility -- Making costly threats under asymmetric information -- Information, preferences, and the probability of war -- Conclusion -- 3 Democratic politics in international crises -- The nature of democratic competition -- Publicity -- Legitimacy -- Institutionalization -- Access to information -- Opposition parties and international crises -- Political incentives in international crises -- Conclusion -- 4 Domestic competition and signaling in international crises -- A bargaining model with a strategic opposition -- The international crisis -- The electorate's evaluation -- Solution to the bargaining model -- Characterization of equilibrium strategies -- The effect of the opposition party -- Extending the basic model -- Democracies as targets -- Domestic opposition and the costs of war -- Hawks and doves: the effects of policy preferences -- The public interest versus partisan interest: the effects of national welfare concerns -- Conclusion -- Part II Empirical analysis -- 5 Selective threats, effective threats: the initiation and escalation of international crises -- From theoretical model to empirical predictions -- The informational perspective -- Alternative theories.

Democracy and the initiation of international crises -- The dependent variable: crisis initiation -- The independent variables: defining democracy -- Additional independent variables -- Estimation technique -- Results -- Alternative explanations -- Democracy and the reciprocation of international crises -- Dependent variable: crisis reciprocation -- Additional independent variables -- Results -- Alternative perspectives -- Democracy and the probability of war -- The dependent variable: escalation -- Results -- Conclusion -- 6 Credibility confirmed: the implications of domestic support -- Domestic support and success in extended-immediate deterrence crises -- Fashoda revisited -- Shortcomings of neorealism and democratic peace theories -- Incomplete information and the onset of the crisis -- Domestic politics and signaling in Great Britain -- Domestic politics and signaling in France -- Conclusion -- 7 Credibility undermined: the implications of domestic dissent -- The Boer War, 1899 -- The Rhineland crisis, 1936 -- The Suez crisis, 1956 -- The crisis over Rhodesian independence, 1965 -- Conclusion -- 8 Conclusions and implications -- Implications for international relations -- Implications for national welfare: is transparency in the national interest? -- Appendices -- Appendix A Solution to the basic crisis bargaining game -- Appendix B Solution to the crisis bargaining game with opposition -- The effects of the opposition party -- The effects of policy preferences -- The effects of national welfare concerns -- Appendix C Data and methods -- Coding of the dependent variables -- The probability of initiation: INITIATE -- The probability of reciprocation: RECIP -- The probability of escalation: WAR and FORCE -- Coding of the independent variables -- Power Status -- Balance of military capabilities -- Initiator's share of capabilities -- Contiguity.

Similarity of alliance portfolios -- Status quo evaluations -- Estimation considerations: the fixed-effects treatment -- Correction for temporal dependence -- Appendix D Coding and sources for opposition stances -- References -- Index.