Cover -- Half-title -- Title -- Copyright -- Dedication -- Contents -- Preface -- Table of government documents -- INTERNATIONAL TREATIES -- STATUTES -- BILLS -- LEGISLATIVE HISTORY -- REGULATIONS -- CASES -- ENGLAND -- AMERICA -- COURT BRIEFS -- 1 Pollution and property: the conceptual framework -- I Things that are unowned receive the least care -- II If the absence of property rights explains pollution, what explains the absence of property rights? -- III Property and pollution in an ideal (nonexistent) world -- IV Property and pollution in the real, second-best world -- The tragedy-of-open-access model -- Property-based solutions to the tragedy -- A digression on the conventional typology of property systems -- Regulatory instruments as property-based regimes -- Criticisms of Hardin's allegory of the "tragedy of the commons" -- Which property-based approach? -- V Structure of the book -- 2 Public property/regulator solutions to the tragedy of open access -- I Public ownership of environmental goods -- II Prima facie justifications of public/state wnership Making the case for public/state ownership -- Making the case for public/state ownership -- Scale economies and transaction costs in wildlife management -- III State regulation as an implied imposition of public property rights -- Early efforts to assert public rights in environmental goods by regulation -- Public nuisance regulation as an assertion of public property rights -- Modern environmental regulation -- IV Problems of public/state property in environmental goods -- Problems of explicit public ownership -- Problems of implicit public ownership by regulation of private access and use -- 3 Mixed property/regulator regimes for environmental protection -- I Transferable pollution rights in theory -- II Transferable pollution rights in practice -- Early experiments.

The Clean Air Act's transferable emissions allowance program for sulfur dioxide -- Other transferable pollution rights schemes -- III Assessing pollution rights trading schemes as a method of environmental regulation -- IV Partial publicization through conservation easements and land trusts -- Preserving resources with conservation easements and land trusts -- The increasing popularity of conservation easements and land trusts -- The land trust as a mixed property regime -- 4 Institutional and technological limits of mixed property/regulator regimes -- I Institutional and technological determinants of instrument choice for environmental protection -- II "Empirical" studies of environmental instrument choice -- Institutional context -- Technological context -- III Instrument choice for the US Clean Air Act, 1970-1990: institutional and technological perspectives -- The 1970 Clean Air Act: instituting command-and-control -- The 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments: retaining the regulatory status quo -- The 1990 CAA Amendments: an incremental shift toward a mixed property/regulatory approach -- IV Institutional and environmental policy implications -- 5 The theor and limits of free-market environmentalism (a private property/nonregulator regime) -- I The worldwide trend toward privatization -- II What constitutes privatization -- III The theory of free-market environmentalism -- IV Public ownership, bureaucratic mismanagement, and government failure -- The theory of government failure -- Evidence of government failure in natural resources management -- V The complete privatization "solution" -- VI The limits of free-market environmentalism -- Searching for first-best solutions in a second-best world -- Private discount rates and time horizons -- Market values, information, and economies of scale in environmental ownership and management.

The transaction costs of common-law solutions to environmental problems -- Are environmental goods just like other economic goods? -- VII Realistic privatization -- Public goods sometimes become private goods -- Weak vs. strong free-market environmentalism -- 6 The limited utility of common property regimes for environmental protection -- I What is common property? -- II Averting the tragedy of open access with common property regimes -- The open field system -- Commonfield agriculture in Andean mountains of Peru and Bolivia -- Japanese Iriachi -- Common rights in Turkish fisheries -- III The limits of common property solutions -- IV Elinor Ostrom's theory of common property systems -- Applying Ostrom's framework to consensus-based resource management regimes -- V A final caveat: "success" may not be all it's cracked up to be -- 7 The complexities of property regime choice for environmental protection -- I Modeling property regime choice: what counts as "best"? -- Coordination costs + exclusion costs = total costs -- Alternative approaches -- II Taking complexity seriously -- Simple cases and complicating factors -- Stonehenge: public or private property? -- Returns to scale in resource conservation -- History and culture matter -- III Still "in the nature of social experiments" -- 8 When property regimes collide: the "takings" problem -- I An introduction to takings law -- Permanent physical occupations -- The police power/nuisance exception and its problems -- The diminution-in-value test for regulatory takings -- Substantive due process review for "exactions" -- Perspectives on takings law -- II Takings as conflicts between public and private property regimes -- Public and private property rights in the air -- Where private lands meet public waters -- Public wildlife on private lands -- III Jurisprudential and policy implications -- IV Conclusion.

9 Final thoughts -- References -- GOVERNMENT REPORTS -- PERIODICALS -- Index.