Cover -- Half-title -- Title -- Copyright -- Contents -- Acknowledgments -- PART I Introduction -- CHAPTER 1 Political Science's Dilemma -- 1.1 The Problem -- 1.1.1 Sophisticated Methods without Theory -- 1.1.2 Strong Theory without Data -- 1.2 Source of the Dilemma -- 1.2.1 The Behavioral Revolution -- 1.2.2 Effects on Political Science -- 1.2.3 Political Science Today -- Sources of Today's Political Science. -- 1.2.4 The Gap between Theorists and Empiricists -- 1.3 Goal of This Book -- 1.3.1 Bridging the Gap -- 1.3.2 Non-Goals of the Book -- 1.4 Examples in the Book -- 1.5 Plan of the Book -- 1.6 Using the Book -- PART II Formal Models in Political Science -- CHAPTER 2 What Makes a Model Formal? -- 2.1 There Are Many Different Types of Models -- 2.2 The Scientific Process and Model Building -- 2.2.1 Observations about the Real World Suggest Research Questions -- 2.2.2 Nonformal Model Building as a Start in Answering Research Questions -- 2.2.3 Formal Model Building -- 2.2.4 Choosing a Formal Model -- 2.2.5 Nonformal versus Formal Models -- 2.2.6 Applied Formal Models versus Pure Theory -- 2.2.7 Solving a Formal Model -- 2.2.8 Numerical versus Analytical Solutions -- 2.2.9 Empirical Analysis of Applied Formal Models -- 2.2.10 Further Theoretical and Empirical Study -- 2.2.11 Models and the Scientific Process: A Summary -- 2.3 Mathematics in Formal Models -- 2.3.1 Income and Voting -- 2.3.2 Formal Models and Intuition -- The Line-Item Veto and Government Spending. -- 2.4 Conclusions -- CHAPTER 3 The Variety of Formal Models -- 3.1 Rational Choice-Based Models -- 3.1.1 Rational Choice as an "As If" Assumption -- 3.1.2 Rational Choice as Prescription -- 3.1.3 Myths of Rational Choice -- 3.2 Game Theoretic Models -- 3.2.1 Types of Game Theoretic Models -- 3.2.2 Solutions in Game Theory -- 3.3 Rationality Relaxed -- 3.3.1 Individual Choice Models.

3.3.2 Other Nonrational Choice-Based Formal Models -- 3.4 A Typology of Formal Models -- 3.5 Mathematical Techniques -- PART III Empirical Evaluation of Formal Models -- CHAPTER 4 Fundamentals of Empirical Evaluation -- 4.1 Types of Empirical Evaluations of Formal Models -- 4.1.1 Evaluating Predictions -- 4.1.2 Evaluating Alternative Models -- 4.2 The Model, the Truth, and Randomness -- 4.2.1 Option 1: Re-solving the Model -- 4.2.2 Option 2: Complete DGP -- 4.2.3 Option 3: Partial DGP -- Pitfalls of a Partial DGP. -- 4.2.4 Summary -- 4.3 Other Implementation Issues -- 4.3.1 Using Qualitative Data and Case Studies -- 4.3.2 Dealing with Strategic Behavior -- 4.3.3 Parameter Estimation and Variable Measurement -- 4.3.4 Individual versus Aggregate Data -- 4.4 The Value of Multiple Evaluations -- CHAPTER 5 Evaluating Assumptions -- 5.1 Justifying Assumptions -- 5.1.1 Justifying Unverified Assumptions -- 5.1.2 Justifying False Assumptions -- 5.1.3 Why Evaluate Assumptions? -- 5.1.4 Is Assumption Evaluation Possible? -- 5.2 Examples of Assumption Evaluation -- 5.2.1 Expected Utility Theory -- 5.2.2 Separability of Preferences -- 5.3 Assumptions, Complexity, and Pure Theory -- 5.4 Implications of the Examples -- CHAPTER 6 Evaluating Predictions: Equilibria, Disequilibria, and Multiequilibria -- 6.1 Evaluating Equilibrium Point Predictions -- 6.1.1 The Paradox of Point Predictions -- Desirability of Unique Point Predictions. -- 6.1.2 Effective Evaluation of Point Predictions -- 6.2 What Does Disequilibrium Mean for Empirical Predictions? -- 6.3 Multiple Equilibria Predictions -- 6.3.1 Examples of Formal Models with Multiple Equilibria -- Games of Coordination. -- 6.3.2 Theoretically Reducing the Number of Equilibria -- 6.3.3 Multiple Equilibria: Types of Empirical Evaluation -- 6.3.4 Multiple Equilibria: Examples of Empirical Evaluation.

Counteractive Lobbying. -- 6.4 Implications of the Examples -- CHAPTER 7 Evaluating Relationship Predictions -- 7.1 Evaluating Comparative Static Predictions -- 7.1.1 Roll-Call Voting over Supreme Court Nominations: Probabilistic Voting Applied -- 7.1.2 Presidents and Supreme Court Nominees: The Regime Approach -- 7.1.3 Comparison of the Two Studies -- 7.1.4 A Digression: Model Fitting and Explanatory Power -- 7.2 Evaluating Process or Dynamic Path Predictions -- 7.2.1 A Political Macroeconomic Model: A Dynamic Formal Model as a Partial DGP -- 7.2.2 A Neoclassical Economic Growth Model and Political Competition: Theory versus Stress Tests -- 7.3 Extending the Empirical Focus -- 7.4 Policy Implications of Formal Models -- 7.5 Implications of the Examples -- CHAPTER 8 Evaluating Alternative Models -- 8.1 Alternatives or Not? -- 8.2 Contrasting Explanations -- 8.2.1 Comparing Models as Complete DGPs: QRE versus QRNB -- 8.2.2 Comparing Models as Partial DGPs -- Convergence versus Divergence: Contrasting Predictions. -- Direction versus Proximity: Contrasting Assumptions. -- 8.3 Dimensions of Comparability -- 8.3.1 Principal-Agent Models and Bureaucrats -- 8.3.2 Bureaus and Budgetary Control -- 8.4 Generalizability of Empirical Comparisons of Alternative Models -- 8.5 Formal versus Nonformal Models Redux -- 8.5.1 Crisis Bargaining -- 8.5.2 Cosponsorship -- 8.6 Implications of the Examples -- PART IV A Second Revolution -- CHAPTER 9 The Present and the Future -- 9.1 Guidelines for the Present -- 9.1.1 The Process of Empirical Analysis -- 9.1.2 The Steps Analogy -- 9.2 Revolutionary Political Science -- 9.2.1 Laboratories Everywhere -- 9.2.2 Rethinking the Fields of Political Science -- 9.2.3 Required Graduate Training in Formal Models and Methods -- 9.2.4 A New Undergraduate Political Science -- 9.2.5 You're OK, I'm OK.

9.3 A Call for "Constructive Criticism" -- References -- Name Index -- Subject Index.