Cover -- Half-title -- Title -- Copyright -- Dedication -- Contents -- Figures -- Tables -- Acknowledgements -- 1 Introduction -- 1.1 Aims -- 1.2 Method -- 1.3 Outline -- Part I Theory -- 2 The political economy and economic system of Japan: a survey of literature, conflict and confusion -- 2.1 Introduction -- 2.2 The Japanese political economy -- The 'Japan, Inc.' model -- Bureaucracy-led model -- Pluralistic model -- Consensual policy model -- Pluralistic network model -- Conclusions -- 2.3 The Japanese economic system -- The interventionist school -- The market school -- Summary of interventionist and market schools -- Hybrid interpretations -- 2.4 Conclusions -- 3 Informal aspects of Japanese economic policy -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 The alleged importance of informality in Japan -- 3.3 Informal aspects I: administrative guidance -- Definition and classification -- Compliance -- Criticism -- Relevance of administrative guidance in theoretical schools -- 3.4 Informal aspects II: informal networks -- Amakudari -- 3.5 Summary and conclusions -- Summary -- Conclusions -- Appendix 3.1 Japanese 'special legal entities' (tokushu hojin) -- Public corporations (kodan)13 -- Business corporations (jigyodan)17 -- Finance corporations (koko) 9 -- Finance corporations/special banks (kinko/tokushu ginko) 3 -- Corporation (eidan)1 -- Special corporations (tokushu gaisha)12 -- Others (sono hoka) 37 -- Privatised Public Corporations (7 as of October 1995) -- 4 Informality and monetary policy: an operational framework -- 4.1 Introduction -- 4.2 Monetary policy -- 4.3 Informality and monetary policy -- Informality and macro monetary policy -- Informality and micro monetary policy -- Corporate governance and prudential policy: the Japanese context -- 4.4 Conclusions -- Part II The institutions and their policies.

5 Informality, monetary authorities and monetary policy: the pre-1998 reform regime -- 5.1 Introduction -- 5.2 The post-war financial system -- 5.3 Depository financial institutions -- 5.4 The Ministry of Finance (MoF) -- Legal framework -- Personnel: informal networks -- Macro monetary policy -- Micro monetary policy: prudential policy -- 5.5 The Bank of Japan (BoJ) -- Legal framework -- Personnel: informal networks -- Macro monetary policy -- Micro monetary policy: prudential policy -- 5.6 Conclusions -- Appendix 5.1 The Ministry of Finance Establishment Law (Okurasho Setchi Ho) -- Table of Contents -- Chapter 1 -- Article 1 -- Article 2 -- Article 3 -- Article 4 -- Article 5 (authority ) -- Appendix 5.2 The pre-1998 organisation of the MoF -- Appendix 5.3 The pre-1998 organisation of the BoJ -- 6 Informality, banking crisis and financial reform: 1998 and beyond -- 6.1 Introduction -- 6.2 Financial reform: the experience of the seventies and eighties -- 6.3 The rise and collapse of the 'bubble' economy -- 6.4 The policy response: forbearance and financial reform -- Phase I (1990-June 1996): initial policy response -- Phase II (June 1996-January 1997): administrative and financial reform -- Phase III (January 1997-January 1998): the end of 'too big to fail' -- Phase IV (January 1998-June 1998): scandals, injection of public funds and financial reform -- Phase V (June 1998-October 1998): administrative reform and intensifying crisis -- Phase VI (October 1998-June 2000): financial revitalisation-the end of the crisis? -- Phase VII (July 2000- ): further administrative reform - consolidation of prudential policy -- 6.5 Conclusions -- Part III Empirical evidence -- 7 Amakudari in the private banking industry: an empirical investigation -- 7.1 Introduction -- 7.2 Data sources on amakudari -- 7.3 Analysis of data.

7.4 Alternative explanation of amakudari -- Patterned equalisation -- Bureaucratic intervention -- Career management -- 7.5 Comparison of empirical findings with more recent data -- 7.6 Conclusions -- 8 Amakudari and the performance of Japanese banks -- 8.1 Introduction -- 8.2 Amakudari, prudential policy and corporate governance -- 8.3 Data, dependent and independent variables -- Data and dependent variables -- 8.4 Empirical results -- 8.5 The effect of amakudari on bank performance -- 8.6 The detrimental effects of amakudari -- 8.7 Conclusions -- Appendix 8.1 Definitions -- Sample periods -- Dependent variables -- Independent variables in all data sets -- Additional independent variables in data sets 2 and 3 -- 9 Conclusion: Informality, monetary policy and bank performance - lessons from the Japanese experience -- 9.1 Introduction -- 9.2 The Japanese banking crisis: what went wrong -- 9.3 Policy effectiveness: the limitations of informal instruments -- 9.4 Amakudari and prudential policy: too close for comfort -- 9.5 Lessons from the Japanese experience -- Bibliography -- Index.