Cover -- Half-title -- Title -- Copyright -- Table of Contents -- Foreword -- 1 Introduction: Varieties of Practical Conflict and the Scope of Practical Reason -- Notes -- Bibliography -- 2 Willing the Law -- an irrational sort of person -- how to hold an agent responsible for his reasons -- korsgaard's concessive version of kant -- cohen's objection and the beginning of korsgaard's reply -- the rest of korsgaard's reply -- why korsgaard's version of kantianism is concessive -- conclusion -- Notes -- Bibliography -- 3 The Myth of Egoism -- i. normative foundations for the egoistic principle -- Instrumental Egoism -- The Imperative of Prudence -- A Kantian Conception of Rationality -- Implications of the Kantian Conception for Egoism -- The Realist Egoist -- ii. the content of the egoistic principle -- Balancing and Particularity -- Reasoning from Egoistic Materials -- The Pursuit of Satisfaction -- conclusion -- Notes -- Bibliography -- 4 Thinking about Conflicts of Desire -- desire's object as out of place in deliberation? -- the problem with backgrounding desires -- idealizing desires does not help -- an alternative conception of desire -- how to deliberate about conflicting desires -- objections and conclusion -- Notes -- Bibliography -- 5 Putting Together Morality and Well-Being -- other approaches -- A Prima Facie Case -- The Orthodox Approach -- two conceptions of choice -- Nameless Values -- conclusion -- Notes -- Bibliography -- 6 The Second Worst in Practical Conflict -- ties for optimality -- inconsistent value commitments -- conflict due to doubt -- maximality and ordinal-based value structures -- second worst -- Note -- Bibliography -- 7 Personal Practical Conflicts -- practical conflicts: initial characterization -- practical conflicts and pluralistic choice -- conflict and imperfect conformity with reason.

conditional and independent reasons -- conflict and compliance -- consequences of conflict and incomplete conformity -- Notes -- Bibliography -- 8 Sources of Practical Conflicts and Reasons for Regret -- unsatisfied desires -- comprehensive goals and incommensurable values -- commitments, the two-tier model of reasons, and surrogate valuing -- moral conflicts, normative expectations, and sacrifice -- responding to reasons in regret -- Notes -- Bibliography -- 9 Conflicting Values and Conflicting Virtues -- Notes -- Bibliography -- 10 Involvement and Detachment: A Paradox of Practical Reason -- the paradox -- some objections -- Working Hard for Success -- Future Goals -- Conditional Goals -- what is to be done? -- Notes -- Bibliography -- 11 Outcomes of Internal Conflicts in the Sphere of Akrasia and Self-Control -- garden-variety akratic and enkratic actions -- socratic akratic actions and enkratic counterparts -- conclusion -- Notes -- Bibliography -- 12 Are There Insolvable Moral Conflicts? -- equally good options -- conflicts of oughts? -- conflicts of moral reasons -- incommensurable reasons -- practical incommensurability -- insolvable moral conflicts -- objections -- conclusion -- Notes -- Bibliography -- 13 Moral Dilemmas of Transitional Justice -- "we are not like them" -- forward-looking or backward-looking? -- suffering and compensation -- excuses and counterfactuals -- conclusion -- Notes -- Bibliography -- 14 Do Conflicts Make Us Free? -- are indetermined controlled actions possible outside conflict situations? -- teleologically intelligible indetermined actions in conflict situations -- we are not free unless we are in a conflict - but which conditions have to be fulfilled for us to be able to act freely in a conflict situation? -- Notes -- Bibliography -- List of Contributors -- Name Index -- Subject Index.