Cover -- Half-title -- Title -- Copyright -- Contents -- Figures -- Tables -- Preface -- Acknowledgments -- 1 Federations and the Theoretical Problem -- 1.1 Why Federalism -- 1.2 Definitions -- Federalism -- Stability -- Institution -- Self-Enforcement -- 1.3 The Long Search for Stability -- Federalism as Nuisance -- Federalism as Engine of Prosperity -- Riker as Intermediary -- 1.4 The Fundamental Problem of Stability -- 1.5 Basic Premises and Conclusions -- 2 Federal Bargaining -- 2.1 Alliances versus Federations -- 2.2 The Private Character of Public Goods -- 2.3 Equilibrium Selection and Redistribution -- 2.4 The Federal Problem -- Designing the Center -- 2.5 Bargaining for Control of the Center -- 2.6 Allocating Jurisdictions -- 2.7 Three Levels of Institutional Design -- 3 Two Cases of Uninstitutionalized Bargaining -- 3.1 The Czechoslovak Dissolution -- 3.2 The Soviet Disintegration -- 3.3 The Feasibility of Success in Initial Bargaining -- 3.4 Secession: The Special Road to Renegotiation -- 4 Representation -- 4.1 Two Alternative Models of Federalism -- 4.2 A National Venue for Bargaining -- Within versus Without Representation -- Direct versus Delegated Representation -- 4.3 Within versus Without -- 4.4 Direct versus Delegated Representation -- 4.5 Other Parameters of Design -- 4.6 Bilateral Decision Making and the Case of Russia -- 5 Incentives -- 5.1 Institutional Enforcement -- 5.2 The Court -- 5.3 Some Simple Rules of Constitutional Design -- 5.4 Voters versus Elites -- 5.5 Desirable Imperfection and a Democratic As-If Principle -- 6 Political Parties in a Federal State -- 6.1 An Extreme Hypothesis -- 6.2 Parties in a Democracy -- 6.3 The Idealized Party System -- 6.4 Integrated Parties -- 6.5 Integration outside the United States -- Australian Federalism and the Role of Parties -- Canada -- 6.6 India -- Leadership Incentives.

Rank-and-File Incentives -- The Party and Federalism -- 1967 and Thereafter -- 7 Institutional Sources of Federal Stability I -- 7.1 Introduction -- 7.2 Level 2 and The Federalist Papers -- 7.3 Level 3 Institutions -- 7.4 Australia, Canada, Germany, and India Revisited -- Germany -- Canada -- Canada versus Australia and India -- 7.5 Local and Regional Design Parameters -- 8 Institutional Sources of Federal Stability II -- 8.1 Electoral Mechanisms and Societal Structures -- Representation -- Ethnicity -- 8.2 Level 2 Again and a Proper Federal Structure -- Defining Federal Subjects -- Number of Local Jurisdictions -- Authority over Local Governments -- Bicameralism -- Symmetry -- Presidential Authority -- Presidential Selection -- Electoral Connections -- 8.3 Level 1 and the Scope of the Federal Mandate -- 8.4 Level 0 - Things beyond Design -- 9 Designing Federalism -- 9.1 Introduction -- 9.2 Russia -- Electoral Arrangements -- Regional Autonomy -- Constitutional Matters -- Parties and the Current Status Quo -- 9.3 The European Union -- Background -- The Role of Parties -- The Puzzle of the Collusion -- France versus Britain -- EU Institutional Design -- 9.4 Conclusion -- References -- Name Index -- Subject Index.