Acknowledgments -- Preface -- Contents -- KEYNOTE ADDRESSES -- Being a Responsible Host: Supervising Foreign-Owned Banks Alan Bollard -- 1. New Zealand's Banking System is Dominated by Foreign Banks -- 2. Differences in the Interests of Home and Host Supervisors -- 3. The Need for Robust Host Supervision Arrangements -- 4. Enhanced Cooperation and Coordination Between Home and Host Authorities -- 5. Conclusion -- Dealing with Stress at Large and Complex Financial Institutions Andrew Crockett -- 1. Contemplating a Systemic Failure -- 2. Preventing Stress: The Role of Risk-Based Supervision -- 3. Dealing with Stress -- 4. Managing the Failure of Banking Institutions -- 5. Conclusion -- Changes in the Structure of the U.S. Financial System and Implications for Systemic Risk Timothy F. Geithner -- 1. Changing Market Structure -- 2. Implications -- 3. Conclusion -- FINANCIAL STABILITY - PROTECTING SOLVENCY -- The Resolution of Systemic Banking System Crises Stefan Ingves and David S. Hoelscher -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Managing Systemic Banking Crises -- 3. Crisis Containment -- 4. Emergency Liquidity Assistance -- 5. Blanket Guarantees -- 6. Administrative Measures -- 7. Bank Restructuring -- 8. Asset Management and Corporate Debt Restructuring -- 9. Conclusions -- References -- The Deposit Insurer's Role in Maintaining Financial Stability Jean Pierre Sabourin -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Deposit Insurance Systems -- 3. Deposit Insurers' Role in a Systemic Crisis -- 4. How can a Deposit Insurer Help Mitigate the Risk of a Large Bank Failure? -- 5. Early Warning and Prompt Corrective Action -- 6. Failure Resolution -- 7. The Need for Contingency Planning -- 8. Legal and International Issues -- 9. Conclusion -- References -- The IMF-World Bank Financial Sector Assessment Program: A View from the Inside Paul Kupiec -- References.

Financial Stability and Bank Solvency Andrew G. Haldane, Glenn Hoggarth, Victoria Saporta and Peter Sinclair -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Empirical Evidence on the Solvency-Stability Nexus -- 2.1. From financial instability to the banking system -- 2.2. From banking sector weakness to the macroeconomy -- 3. Model-Based Evidence on the Financial Stability-Solvency Nexus -- 3.1. The model by Chen -- 3.2. From macro shocks to output loss via the financial sector -- 3.3. From banking sector problems to output -- 3.4. Discussion -- 4. Financial Stability Instruments -- 4.1. A taxonomy of instruments -- 4.2. Methods of resolving a banking crisis -- 5. A Framework for Assessing Public Intervention in Bank Resolution -- 6. Open Issues in Bank Resolution -- 6.1. Judging "systemic" -- 6.2. Dealing with large complex financial institutions (LCFIs) -- References -- A Note on Financial Stability Craig H. Furfine -- 1. Financial Stability versus Institution Stability -- 2. Three Phases of Policymaker Effort -- 3. Using the Framework in Practice -- 4. Final Thoughts -- References -- THE COST OF INEFFICIENT RESOLUTION OF LARGE FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS -- Impediments to Fair and Efficient Resolution of Large Banks and Banking Crises Edward J. Kane -- 1. Bank Insolvency, Contracting Theory, and Safety Net Capital -- 2. Benchmarking the Costs and Benefits of Egalitarian Crisis Resolution -- 3. Mechanisms for Decreasing Public Loss Exposure: Standstills, Relicensing, and Haircuts -- 4. Determinants of Safety Net Capital -- 4.1. Dimensions of a country's contracting environment -- 4.2. Effects of a country's regulatory culture -- 5. Summary Implications -- References -- Dealing with Financial Fragility in Transition Economies John P. Bonin and Paul Wachtel -- 1. Banking in Transition Countries: The Birthing Process -- 2. Resolving Bank Crises in Transition Countries.

3. Conclusion -- References -- The Resolution of Systemic Banking System Crises: The Way Forward Stefan Ingves and David S. Hoelscher -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Prevention -- 3. Legal Structure -- 4. Resolution -- 5. The Role of the Fund -- 6. Conclusions -- References -- Mistakes of Bank Crisis Response Randall S. Kroszner -- References -- KEY POLICY CHALLENGES IN FINANCIAL RESOLUTION: CROSS-BORDER ISSUES -- Breaking Up is Hard to Do: An Essay on Cross-Border Challenges in Resolving Financial Groups Thomas C. Baxter, Jr. and Joseph H. Sommer -- 1. Basic Definitions -- 2. Financial Entity Insolvency Law: A Primer -- 3. The Complexities of a Cross-Border Financial Group Insolvency -- 4. The Problems of Group Reorganization -- 5. What to Do? -- References -- "Too Big to Save" -Toward a Functional Approach to Resolving Crises in Global Financial Institutions Eva H. G. Hupkes -- 1. Challenges of Resolving an LCFI -- 2. Refocusing Measures to Resolve Global Institutions - Function versus Institution-Based Approaches -- 2.1. Identifying systemically relevant functions -- 3. Insulating Systemically Relevant Functions -- 3.1. Replacement -- 3.2. Detachment -- 3.3. Immunization -- 4. Need to Refocus International Regulatory Initiatives -- 5. Conclusions -- References -- Europe's Universalist Approach to Cross-Border Bank Resolution Issues Christos Hadjiemmanuil -- 1. Absence of Convergence in International Bank Insolvency Law -- 2. The Main Policy Options in International Bank Insolvency -- 3. Endorsement of Universalism in European Law: The Winding up Directive -- 4. Some Open Questions of the European Bank Insolvency Regime -- References -- Comments on Financial Institution Resolution: Cross-Border Issues Chryssa Papathanassiou -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Coordination of International Insolvency -- 2.1. Separate entity doctrine -- 2.2. Single entity doctrine.

2.3. No single set of insolvency arrangements -- 2.4. Exemptions contributing to an orderly resolution in the case of insolvency -- 3. Systemically Important Functions: Do They Deserve to Be Preserved in Bank Insolvency? -- 3.1. Definition -- 3.2. What should regulators look at? -- 3.3. Why protect those systemically critical functions? -- 3.4. A managerial-initiated LCFI insolvency? -- 3.5. The involvement of central banks -- 4. Effect on Financial Architecture and Society -- 4.1. LCFI insolvency affects .nancial architecture -- 4.2. LCFI insolvency affects investors' behavior -- 4.3. LCFI insolvency and art -- 5. Conclusion -- KEY POLICY CHALLENGES IN FINANCIAL INSTITUTION RESOLUTION: ADDITIONAL COMPLEXITIES -- Multiple Regulators and Resolutions Charles A. E. Goodhart -- 1. Multiple Regulators within a Single Country -- 2. Crises with International Complications Involving Regulators in Several Countries -- References -- The Role of the Safety Net in Resolving Large Financial Institutions David G. Mayes -- 1. The Wider Context of Resolving Large Bank Insolvencies -- 2. The International Dimension -- 3. Too-Big-to-Save? -- 4. Other Factors Affecting the Choice of Structure and Regulatory Location -- 5. The Design of the Safety Net -- 6. The Need for Action over Systemically Important Banks -- 7. Trying to Minimize the Cost -- 8. Judging When to Intervene and Assessing the Loss -- 9. Equal Treatment and the Need for a Common Pool Approach -- 10. The Need for a Resolution Agency -- Appendix: The Example of Nordea -- References -- Comments on Key Policy Challenges in Financial Institution Resolution: Additional Complexities Robert R. Bliss -- 1. Barriers to Effective Supervision -- 2. Barriers to Orderly Resolution -- 3. Summary -- References -- LESSONS FROM CASE STUDIES OF LARGE INSOLVENCIES.

BCCI & Barings: Bank Resolutions Complicated by Fraud and Global Corporate Structure Richard J. Herring -- 1. Introduction -- 2. BCCI -- 3. Barings -- 4. Concluding Comment -- References -- Derivatives and Systemic Risk: What Role Can the Bankruptcy Code Play? Franklin R. Edwards and Edward R. Morrison -- 1. Derivatives Contracts and the Bankruptcy Code -- 2. Can the Bankruptcy Code Reduce Systemic Risk? -- 3. Why Give Derivatives Counterparties Special Treatment? -- 4. Conclusion -- References -- Argentina and Uruguay in the 2000s: Two Contrasting Experiences of Banking Crisis Resolution Liliana Rojas-Suarez -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Banking Crisis Resolution in Industrial and Latin American Countries: Similar Principles, Different Constraints -- 2.1. The main objectives of banking crisis resolution -- 2.2. Principles for effective banking crisis resolution -- 2.3. Differences in constraints between developed and Latin American countries -- 3. The Crises of Argentina and Uruguay in the Early 2000s: Similar Beginnings, Contrasting Outcomes -- 3.1. Origins of the crises and constraints for crisis resolution -- 3.2. Initial responses to the banking crises: Did they adhere to the principles? -- 3.3. The implementation of the restructuring program in Uruguay and the (lack of) program in Argentina -- 4. Concluding Remarks -- References -- Comments on Lessons from Case Studies of Large Insolvencies Paola Sapienza -- 1. BCCI & Barings: Bank Resolutions Complicated by Fraud and Global Corporate Structure, by Richard J. Herring -- 2. Derivatives and Systemic Risk: What Role can the Bankruptcy Code Play? By Franklin R. Edwards and Edward R. Morrison -- 3. Argentina and Uruguay in the 2000s: Two Contrasting Experiences of Banking Crisis Resolution, by Liliana Rojas-Suarez -- References -- PLANNING FOR EFFICIENT RESOLUTION - WHERE TO FROM HERE?.

The Reserve Bank of New Zealand's Creditor Recapitalization (BCR) Project: An Option for Resolving Large Banks? Ian Harrison.