Cover -- Half-title -- Series-title -- Title -- Copyright -- Contents -- Figures -- Tables -- Acknowledgments -- 1 The Electoral Incentives for Ethnic Violence -- The Electoral Incentives for Ethnic Violence -- Testing the Electoral Incentives Explanation -- The Importance of Understanding Hindu-Muslim Violence -- Plan of the Book -- 2 Explaining Town-Level Variation in Hindu-Muslim Violence -- The Importance of Local Electoral Incentives -- An Electoral Incentives Model of Ethnic Riot Occurrence -- Alternative Explanations for Town-Level Riot Variation -- The Economic Division of Labor Hypothesis -- The Demographic Balance-Security Dilemma Hypothesis -- The Embittered Refugee Hypothesis -- The Violence-Begets-Violence Hypothesis -- Testing the Theories -- Testing the Economic Competition Hypothesis -- Measures of Town-Level Electoral Competition -- Statistical Model -- Qualitative Evidence on the Relationship between Electoral Competition and Violence -- Electoral Effects of Town-Level Mobilization -- Alternative Hypotheses Not Tested: Institutional Riot Mechanisms and Civic Engagement -- Which Level of Analysis: Town or State? -- 3 State Capacity Explanations for Hindu-Muslim Violence -- The Structure of Local Law Enforcement in India -- State Autonomy, State Capacity, and Hindu-Muslim Violence -- The Decline of State Autonomy and State Capacity -- The Decline of State Institutional Autonomy -- The Decline of State Capacity -- Are Growing State Weakness and Hindu-Muslim Violence Related? -- State Capacity -- Conclusion -- 4 The Consociational Explanation for Hindu-Muslim Violence -- India as a Test Case for Consociational Theory -- When Was India Consociational? -- India from 1919 to 1947: A Consociational State -- India from 1947 to 1966: A Nonconsociational State -- The End of Ethnic Proportionality -- The Loss of Cultural Autonomy.

Overruling the Minority Veto -- Were Congress Governments Grand Coalitions? -- India since the Mid-1960s: Increasingly Consociational -- Consociationalism, Congress Decline, and Communal Violence -- Conclusion -- 5 The Electoral Incentives for Hindu-Muslim Violence -- Electoral Competition and the Supply of State Protection for Minorities -- Why Should Minorities Benefit from High Levels of Party Fractionalization? -- How Do Indian States Fit the Model? -- Testing for the Observable Implications of the Model -- Party Competition and Riot Prevention -- Discussion of Regression Results -- Party Competition, Minority Support, and State Riot Prevention -- How Electoral Competition Affects Riot Prevention -- Varanasi, November 8-11, 1991 -- Mathura, 1995 -- Conclusion -- 6 Party Competition and Hindu-Muslim Violence -- Does Ethnic Fractionalization Explain Party Fractionalization? -- Kerala: The Institutional Origins of Party Fractionalization -- Preindependence Caste Mobilization in Travancore and Cochin -- Postindependence Ethnic Politics in Kerala -- The Effects of Party Fractionalization in Kerala -- Tamil Nadu: Caste Polarization and Hindu-Muslim Peace -- Caste Mobilization in Preindependence Madras -- Postindependence Politics in Tamil Nadu -- Hindu-Muslim Violence in Tamil Nadu -- Bihar: Delayed Lower-Caste Mobilization -- Caste Mobilization before Independence -- Postindependence Politics -- Hindu-Muslim Violence in Bihar -- Conclusion -- 7 The Electoral Incentives for Ethnic Violence in Comparative Perspective -- Franchise Reform and Ethnic Riots in the First Wave -- Protestant-Catholic Riots in 19th-Century Britain -- Postcolonial Responses to Growing Interethnic Political Competition -- Malay-Chinese Riots in Malaysia -- Transitions from Communist Rule in Eastern Europe -- Romanian-Hungarian Violence in Post-Ceaucescu Romania -- Conclusion.

8 Democracy and Ethnic Violence -- Appendix A: Data Sources for Hindu-Muslim Riots -- Problems with the Existing Data -- Improving Our Data on Hindu-Muslim Riots -- Database Sources Used in This Book -- British Parliamentary Papers -- India Office Records, London -- Books/Official Publications -- Manuscripts: Files on British India -- Manuscripts: Files on Princely States -- Uttar Pradesh State Archives, Lucknow -- Miscellaneous Records -- General Administration Department Files (GAD) -- Indian Government Publications -- Indian and British Newspapers -- Secondary Sources -- Dissertations -- Appendix B: Data-Entering Protocol for Riot Database -- Basic Entering Groundrules -- Fields and Entry Protocol -- Village -- Appendix C: Additional Results from Statistical Tables -- References -- Archives -- India Office Library, London (IOR) -- Uttar Pradesh State Archives, Lucknow (UPSA) -- Private Collections -- Published Government Documents -- Books and Articles -- Index.