Front cover -- Title page -- Copyright page -- Table of contents -- Acknowledgements -- Contributors -- 1 Introduction: The Art of Precise Epistemology -- Questions -- Quine's Naturalization of Epistemology -- Quine's Farewell to the Concept of Knowledge -- Drowning in Details -- Leaving Out Lines -- Discerning Lines -- This Book's Essays -- Australian Epistemology -- References -- Part A Epistemology as Scientific? -- 2 A Problem About Epistemic Dependence -- Foundationalism, Coherence, and Epistemic Dependence -- Why an Account of Dependence is Needed -- With What Kind of Justification Are We Concerned? -- An Account in Terms of Necessary Conditions -- An Account in Terms of Support Relations -- Personal Justification and the Basing Relation Reconsidered -- Acknowledgements -- References -- 3 Accounting for Commitments: A priori Knowledge, Ontology, and Logical Entailments -- A Puzzle and Jackson's Solution -- A More General Puzzle for the Necessitation Account -- Is Jackson Really a Necessitarian? -- Conclusion -- References -- 4 Epistemic Bootstrapping -- Plantinga on Christianity -- With One Bound the Brain Leapt Out of its Vat -- An Informal Analysis -- The Bayesian Analysis -- Unwarranted Even if True -- Back to the Example of Christianity -- The Refutation of Scepticism -- Replies to Two Objections -- Conclusion -- References -- 5 More Praise for Moore's Proof -- Moore's Argument and Meta-Argument -- What's Wrong with Moore's Proof ? -- The Dogmatist Defense -- The Dialectical Critique -- Might Moore's Argument Rationally Persuade? -- Moore's Proof Versus Philosophical Proofs -- Why Does Moore's Argument Seem So Bad? -- Epistemological Lessons from Moore -- Moore Meets Bayes -- Conclusion -- References -- 6 Lotteries and the Close Shave Principle -- The Lottery Problem -- The Lottery Generalized.

The Far-Fetched and the Merely Improbable -- Inductive Knowledge -- Conclusion -- References -- 7 Skepticism, Self-Knowledge, and Responsibility -- The Idea of a Once-and-for-All (Dis)Solution -- The Interminability of Skepticism -- Hume's New Science of the Mind -- Two Perspectives on one's Own Beliefs -- The Two Stances and the Avoidance of Responsibility -- Nagel on Skepticism -- Naturalism and Skepticism -- References -- 8 A Reasonable Contextualism (or, Austin Reprised) -- Austin's Modest Proposal -- Scepticism and Nonsense -- References -- 9 Questioning Contextualism -- Basic Indexicals in Questions -- Other Type B Terms in Questions -- Questions about Knowledge -- Objections and Replies -- References -- Part B Understanding Knowledge? -- 10 Truthmaking and the Gettier Problem -- The Classic Gettier Cases -- States of Affairs and Truthmaking -- True Sentences -- Compass and Ruler in Truthmaking -- Missed Opportunities -- References -- 11 Is Knowing Having the Right to be Sure? -- References -- 12 Knowledge by Intention? On the Possibility of Agent's Knowledge -- Introduction -- A Causal Approach -- The Reasons-Based Model -- Fallibilism and the Gap -- Conclusion -- References -- 13 Gettier's Theorem -- The Manifest Image -- Taking Heart -- Three Axioms -- Zagzebski, Merricks and Lewis -- Where Does That Leave Us? -- Moral -- References -- 14 Knowledge that Works: A Tale of Two Conceptual Models -- A Methodological Question -- Sceptical Possibilities and the Not-Yet Model -- Gettier Circumstances and the Not-Yet Model -- Some Failings of the Not-Yet Model -- Towards an Alternative Model -- An Analogy -- Fallibly Working Knowledge -- Gradualism and Scepticism -- Working Knowledge in Gettier Cases -- The Not-Yet Model's Reach -- A Platonic Precedent and a Cartesian Constriction -- Modern Epistemology and Unwitting Cartesianism -- References.

Indices -- Author Index -- Subject Index.