front cover -- copyright -- table of contents -- front matter -- Acknowledgments -- Foreword -- body -- 1. Introduction -- 1.1 THE SITUATION -- 1.1.1 Reliability -- 1.1.2 Risk -- 1.2 HANDLING THE SITUATION -- 1.3 MANAGEMENT OF THE HAZARDS, OR THE POTENTIAL FOR MISHAP -- 1.4 WHY BOTHER WITH RISK MANAGEMENT, ANYWAY? -- 1.4.1 Legal Requirements -- 1.4.2 Commercial Requirements -- 1.4.3 Moral or Ethical Requirements -- 1.4.4 Three Variables: Cost, Risk, and Professional Skill -- 1.5 THE BENEFITS OF RISK MANAGEMENT -- 1.6 FIELDS OF RISK MANAGEMENT -- 1.7 SCOPE OF PROCESS RISK AND RELIABILITY MANAGEMENT -- 1.8 THE RISK SPECTRUM -- 1.9 STEPS IN RISK MANAGEMENT OF A PROCESS PLANT -- 1.10 RISK MANAGEMENT WITHOUT NUMBERS -- 1.11 SOME ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE APPROACH -- 1.12 DEFINE THE CONTEXT -- 2. Hazard Identification -- 2.1 INTRODUCTION -- 2.1.1 Situation -- 2.1.2 Sources of Major Hazard -- 2.2 TYPES OF IMPACT -- 2.3 TYPICAL TYPES OF INCIDENTS LEADING TO THE IMPACT -- 2.4 TYPES OF PROCESS PLANT INCIDENTS -- 2.4.1 Introduction -- 2.4.2 Major Fires -- 2.4.3 BLEVEs or Fireballs -- 2.4.4 Flash Fires -- 2.4.5 Vapor Cloud Explosion -- 2.4.6 Dust Explosions -- 2.4.7 Other Explosions -- 2.4.8 Toxic Gas Escapes -- 2.4.9 Toxic Fumes from Fires -- 2.4.10 Chronic Toxic Exposure -- 2.4.11 Damage to the Environment due to Toxic Liquid or Gas Release -- 2.4.12 "Domino" Incidents -- 2.4.13 Major Equipment Breakdown -- 2.4.14 General Comment -- 2.5 APPROACHES TO SYSTEMATIC IDENTIFICATION OF HAZARDS AND RISKS -- 2.5.1 Introduction -- 2.5.2 Identification of Major Hazard Inventories and Activities -- 2.5.3 Block Diagram Stage -- 2.5.4 Identification of Hazards from a Process Flowsheet -- 2.5.5 Detailed Identification of Hazards on an Existing Process Plant -- 3. Ranking and Short- Listing of Risks -- 3.1 INTRODUCTION -- 3.2 THE PARETO PRINCIPLE.

3.3 TWO CLASSES OF RISKS FOR ATTENTION -- 3.4 RANKING THE HAZARDS AND THE ASSOCIATED RISK SCENARIOS -- 3.5 EXAMPLES OF SCORING SYSTEMS FOR USE IN RAPID RANKING -- 3.5.1 Introduction -- 3.5.2 Consequence Scoring Systems -- 3.5.3 Frequency Scoring Systems -- 3.6 ESTIMATION OF THE MAGNITUDE OF THE CONSEQUENCES, OR THE FREQUENCY, OF OPERATIONAL LOSSES -- 3.6.1 Introduction -- 3.6.2 Methods of Estimating for Short-Listing Purposes -- 3.6.3 Incidents Arising from Hazardous Materials -- 3.6.4 Environmental Damage -- 3.6.5 Interruption to Supply of Goods or Services -- 3.7 CASE STUDIES -- 3.7.1 Introduction -- 3.7.2 Large Petrochemical and Chemical Factory -- 3.7.3 Oil-Gas Separation Facility -- 3.7.4 Industrial Estate, Including Chemical Processing Factories -- 3.7.5 Steelworks -- 3.7.6 Gas/Liquid Separation Plant -- 3.8 RISK MANAGEMENT WITHOUT NUMBERS -- 3.8.1 Introduction -- 3.8.2 Risk Matrix -- 3.9 IDENTIFYING THE QUESTIONS TO BE ANSWERED IN THE RISK ASSESSMENT -- 4. Risk and Reliability Criteria -- 4.1 INTRODUCTION -- 4.2 THE PROBLEM WITH "ACCEPTABLE RISK" -- 4.3 SOME EVERYDAY RISKS -- 4.3.1 Introduction -- 4.4 RISKS TO MEMBERS OF THE PUBLIC FROM NEW PLANT -- 4.4.1 Individual Risk -- 4.4.2 Societal Risk -- 4.5 RISKS TO EMPLOYEES -- 4.5.1 "Fatal Accident Rate" -- 4.5.2 Risk Criteria for Employees on Proposed New Plants -- 4.5.3 Risk Criteria for Employees on Existing Plants -- 4.6 ECONOMIC FACTORS IN RISK CRITERIA -- 4.7 REGULATORY APPROACHES TO SETTING RISK CRITERIA -- 4.7.1 Individual Fatality Risk -- 4.7.2 Individual Risk of Dangerous Dose -- 4.7.3 Societal Fatality Risk -- 4.7.4 Risk of Damage to Property or the Environment -- 4.7.5 Implicit Risk Criteria -- 4.7.6 Discretionary Powers -- 4.8 THE MEANING AND USES OF "AS LOW AS REASONABLY PRACTICABLE" -- 4.9 CALCULATING AND DISPLAYING THE RISKS OF POTENTIAL LOSSES -- 4.9.1 Individual Fatality Risk.

4.9.2 Societal Risks -- Example of Calculation of Societal Risks -- 4.9.3 Other Types of Risks -- 4.9.4 Risk Contours -- 5. Assessment of the Severity of the Consequences of Hazardous Incidents -- 5.1 INTRODUCTION: CALCULATION VERSUS ESTIMATION -- 5.2 FIRES -- 5.2.1 Introduction -- 5.2.2 Pool Fires -- 5.2.3 Attenuation of Heat Radiation by Atmospheric Water Vapor -- 5.2.4 Jet Fires -- 5.3 BLEVES -- 5.3.1 Introduction -- 5.3.2 Calculation of the Diameter and Duration of a BLEVE -- 5.3.3 Calculation of the Heat Radiation from a BLEVE -- 5.4 VAPOR CLOUD EXPLOSIONS -- 5.4.1 Introduction -- 5.4.2 Calculation of the Effect of an Unconfined Vapor Cloud Explosion -- 5.4.3 The British Gas VCE Method -- 5.4.4 The Multienergy Model -- 5.4.5 Assessment of Frequency of Explosions, and Resulting Risks -- 5.4.6 Confined Explosions -- 5.5 OTHER EXPLOSIONS -- 5.5.1 Dust Explosions -- 5.5.2 Solid-Phase Explosions -- 5.6 TOXIC GAS ESCAPES -- 5.6.1 Introduction -- 5.6.2 Calculation of Concentration of Gas Downwind of Leak -- 5.6.3 Special Cases -- 5.6.4 Effects of Toxic Gas -- 5.7 ENVIRONMENTALLY DAMAGING ESCAPES -- 5.8 ASSESSMENT OF PROBABILITY OF FATALITY USING PROBIT MATHEMATICS -- 5.8.1 Introduction -- 5.8.2 Application to Fatality Risks from Heat Radiation from a Fire -- 5.8.3 Application to Fatality Risks from Heat Radiation from a BLEVE -- 5.8.4 Application to Fatality and Injury Risks from Toxic Gas Exposure -- 6. Assessing the Frequency or Likelihood of Potential Hazardous Incidents or Losses -- 6.1 ANALYSIS OF CAUSES OF INCIDENTS USING FAULT TREES -- 6.1.1 Introduction -- 6.1.2 Distinguishing "Demands" from "Protection Failure" -- 6.1.3 Constructing Fault Trees -- 6.1.4 Reduction of Fault Trees with Boolean Algebra -- 6.2 INTRODUCTION TO RELIABILITY MATHEMATICS -- 6.2.1 Introduction -- 6.2.2 Component Behavior.

6.2.3 Probability of Failure of Protective Systems -- 6.2.4 Effect of Testing Time, Repair Time and Failure to Rearm -- 6.2.5 Hazard Rate with an Untested Protective System -- 6.3 QUANTIFYING INCIDENT FREQUENCY ON FAULT TREES -- 6.3.1 Introduction -- 6.3.2 Rules for Quantifying Events on a Fault Tree -- 6.3.3 Quantification of a Fault Tree -- 6.4 ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO ASSESSING THE FAILURE FREQUENCY OF A SYSTEM: THE CUTSET APPROACH -- 6.4.1 Cutset Method -- 6.4.2 Discussion -- 6.5 ASSESSING THE PROBABILITIES OF VARIOUS OUTCOMES USING EVENT TREES -- 6.6 CALCULATION OF RELIABILITY OF UNITS WITH INSTALLED SPARES -- 6.7 AVAILABILITY AND MODELING THE PRODUCTION CAPABILITY OF A PLANT -- 6.8 METHODS OF IMPROVING RELIABILITY OF CONTROL AND PROTECTIVE SYSTEMS -- 6.9 SOURCES OF FAILURE DATA -- 6.9.1 Introduction -- 6.9.2 Some Limitations of Data -- 6.9.3 External Sources of Data -- 6.9.4 Preliminary Failure Data -- 7. Quantitative Risk Assessment: Computer Modeling, Uses in Setting Buffer Zones, Strengths and Limitations, Uses and Abuses -- 7.1 MODELING THE RISK -- 7.1.1 Introduction -- 7.1.2 Description of a Typical Computer System -- 7.2 SEPARATION DISTANCES (OR "BUFFER ZONES") -- 7.2.1 Introduction -- 7.2.2 Bases for Setting Separation Distances -- 7.2.3 Use of Risk Assessments to Guide Selection of Separation Distances -- 7.3 SOME EXPERIENCES WITH QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT -- 7.3.1 Assessment of Proposed New Plants on an Existing Site -- 7.3.2 Limitations Discovered -- 7.3.3 The Problem of the " Human Factor" -- 7.3.4 Development of the " Management Factor" -- 7.3.5 The Purposes of Risk Assessment -- 7.3.6 The Limitations of Historically Determined Risk -- 7.3.7 A Trap for Managers -- 7.4 SUMMARY OF THE STRENGTHS AND LIMITATIONS OF QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT -- 7.4.1 Strengths and Benefits -- 7.4.2 Weaknesses and Difficulties.

7.5 APPLICATIONS OF HAZARD ANALYSIS AND RISK ASSESSMENT -- 7.5.1 Incorporation of Safety into the Design of a New Plant -- 7.5.2 Review of the Safety of Existing Plants -- 7.5.3 Determination of the Buffer Zones Required around Hazardous Facilities -- 7.5.4 Focusing Attention on Critical Issues -- 7.6 FAULTS IN THE APPLICATION OF HAZARD ANALYSIS AND RISK ASSESSMENT -- 7.6.1 Divorcing Risk Assessment from Design -- 7.6.2 Assessing Risks without Auditing the Equipment and People -- 7.6.3 Incorporating Management Weaknesses by Adjusting Equipment Failure Data -- 7.6.4 Biased Review of Data -- 7.6.5 Assuming Unachievable Precision -- 7.6.6 Use of Data of Unclear Relevance for the Particular Application -- 7.6.7 Reliance on Risk Assessment in the Absence of Practical Experience -- 7.7 CONCLUSION -- 8. A Systematic Approach to Risk Reduction -- 8.1 PRINCIPLES -- 8.1.1 Introduction -- 8.1.2 Elimination or Reduction of Inherent Hazard (i.e., Strategies for Inherently Safer Design) -- 8.1.3 Improved Preventive Measures -- 8.1.4 Improved Protective Systems -- 8.1.5 Damage Limitation -- 8.1.6 Cost- and Time-Effectiveness -- 8.2 TRANSFERRING THE RISK -- 8.3 REDUCING FIRE RISKS IN PROCESS PLANTS -- 8.3.1 General Design Features -- 8.3.2 Pipelines -- 8.3.3 Tanks Holding Flammable Liquids -- 8.3.4 Pumps Handling Flammable Liquids -- 8.3.5 Reactors Handling Flammable Liquids -- 8.3.6 Buildings -- 8.3.7 Catalyst Handling -- 8.4 STEPS IN DESIGN OF A NEW PLANT TO MAXIMIZE FIRE SAFETY -- 8.5 CASE STUDY: UPGRADING A FIREFIGHTING WATER SYSTEM -- 8.6 PRINCIPLES OF FIREFIGHTING -- 8.6.1 Introduction -- 8.6.2 "First-Aid" Firefighting -- 8.6.3 Works Team Response -- 8.6.4 External Brigade Response -- 8.6.5 Fire Plans -- 8.6.6 Firefighting Media -- 8.7 REDUCING FIRE RISKS IN WAREHOUSE OPERATIONS -- 8.7.1 Introduction -- 8.7.2 Location -- 8.7.3 Layout -- 8.7.4 Design.

8.7.5 Firefighting Equipment.