Cover -- Preface -- Contents -- Figure and Tables -- Summary -- Acknowledgments -- Abbreviations -- Chapter One - Introduction -- Study Scope and Methodology -- Study Scope: The Range of Military Operations and FocusedLearning -- Study Methodology -- Chapter Two - The Relationship Between American Ground Power and Air Power Before the End of the Cold War -- Chapter Three - Iraq, 1991 -- Background -- Lessons: The Ground-Centric View -- Lessons: The Air-Centric View -- Areas of Ground-Air Tension -- Who Won the War? -- Lesser-Included Tensions -- The Institutionalization of "Lessons" from the Gulf War -- Immediate Ground-Centric Lessons -- Immediate Air-Centric Lessons -- The Failure to Create Joint Doctrinal Solutions -- The Continuing Debate About Who Owns the Battlespace -- The War in Bosnia -- The Halt Phase Concept -- Chapter Four - Kosovo, 1999 -- Background -- Ground-Centric View -- Air-Centric View -- The Appropriate Use of Air Power -- Improving Air Power Performance -- Areas of Ground-Air Tension -- Chapter Five - Afghanistan, 2001 -- Background -- Ground-Centric View: Strategic and Operational Lessons -- Air-Centric View -- Ground-Air Tensions and the Tactical Ground-CentricLessons of Operation Anaconda -- Chapter Six - Iraw, 2003 -- Background -- A Joint Ground-Centric View -- A Joint Air-Centric View -- Areas of Ground-Air Tension -- Chapter Seven - What Has Been Learned and What Has Not? -- The Inadequacies of Joint Doctrine -- The Relationship of Service Cultures to Joint Culture -- The Army Future Force as a Reflection of Army Culture -- The Problems with Army Concepts for Deep Operations -- The Enduring Nature of Army Culture and Self-Perception -- What Is the Future of Ground Power? -- The Future Air Force as an Evolving Idea -- Air Force Culture and Interservice Cooperation -- The Future of American Warfighting.

Reforms Beyond Warfighting -- Bibliography -- Index.