Cover -- Half-title -- Series title -- Title -- Copyright -- Contents -- Contributors -- Abstracts -- Preface -- Editors' Note -- PART I INTERNATIONAL REGIMES THEORY: DOES LAW MATTER? -- 1 Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables -- DEFINING REGIMES AND REGIME CHANGE -- DO REGIMES MATTER? -- EXPLANATIONS FOR REGIME DEVELOPMENT -- 1. Egoistic Self-Interest -- 2. Political Power -- a. Power in the Service of the Common Good -- b. Power in the Service of Particular Interests -- 3. Norms and Principles -- 4. Usage and Custom -- 5. Knowledge -- CONCLUSION -- 2 The Demand for International Regimes -- 1. SYSTEMIC CONSTRAINT-CHOICE ANALYSIS: VIRTUES AND LIMITATIONS -- 2. THE CONTEXT AND FUNCTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL REGIMES -- 3. ELEMENTS OF A THEORY OF THE DEMAND FOR INTERNATIONAL REGIMES -- The Demand for Agreements and the Demand for Regimes -- International Regimes and Transactions Costs -- The Demand for Specific Information -- PART II COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE -- 3 Democratic States and Commitment in International Relations -- THREE PERSPECTIVES ON DEMOCRATIC COMMITMENTS -- THE THEORETICAL BASES FOR DEMOCRATIC DISTINCTIVENESS -- The Stability of Foreign Policy in Liberal Democratic States -- The Stability of Public Preferences -- The Stability of Democratic Leadership -- The Stability of Democratic Institutions -- The Distinctive Preferences of Liberal Democracies -- The Role of Law in Liberal Democracy -- Democratic Interdependence -- The Institutional Resources for Democratic Commitments -- The Multiple Levels of Democratic Domestic Politics -- The Transparency of Democratic Domestic Politics -- EMPIRICAL SOUNDINGS: DEMOCRATIC ALLIANCE BEHAVIOR -- The Data: Measuring Democracy and Measuring Alliances -- International Alliance Behavior and Democratic States -- The Duration of Alliances -- CONCLUSIONS.

4 On Compliance -- BACKGROUND ASSUMPTION -- Efficiency -- Interests -- NORMS -- VARIETIES OF NONCOMPLYING BEHAVIOR -- AMBIGUITY -- CAPABILITY -- The Temporal Dimension -- ACCEPTABLE LEVELS OF COMPLIANCE -- DETERMINING THE ACCEPTABLE COMPLIANCE LEVEL -- CONCLUSION -- 5 Is the Good News About Compliance Good News About Cooperation? -- THE MANAGERIAL THESIS -- THE ENDOGENEITY AND SELECTION PROBLEMS -- DISCUSSION -- The Rarity of Deep Cooperation -- The Causes and Cures of Noncompliance -- ENFORCEMENT AND THE FUTURE OF COOPERATION -- PART III LEGALIZATION AND ITS LIMITS -- 6 The Concept of Legalization -- THE VARIABILITY OF LEGALIZATION -- THE DIMENSIONS OF LEGALIZATION -- Obligation -- Precision -- Delegation -- CONCLUSION -- 7 Legalized Dispute Resolution: Interstate and Transnational -- A TYPOLOGY OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION -- Independence: Who Controls Adjudication? -- Access: Who Has Standing? -- Legal Embeddedness: Who Controls Formal Implementation? -- Two Ideal Types: Interstate and Transnational Dispute Resolution -- THE POLITICS OF LITIGATION AND COMPLIANCE: FROM INTERSTATE TO JUDICIAL POLITICS -- The Interstate and Transnational Politics of Judicial Independence -- The Interstate and Transnational Politics of Access -- The Interstate and Transnational Politics of Embeddedness -- THE INTERSTATE AND TRANSNATIONAL DYNAMICS OF LEGALIZATION -- The Dynamics of Interstate Third-party Dispute Resolution -- The Dynamics of Transnational Dispute Resolution -- Beyond Formalism: The Dynamics of GATT and the WTO -- Conclusion -- 8 Legalization, Trade Liberalization, and Domestic Politics: A Cautionary Note -- LEGALIZATION, INFORMATION, AND THE MOBILIZATION OF DOMESTIC GROUPS -- The Logic of Mobilization -- Mobilizing Antitrade Groups -- Mobilizing Export Groups -- TIGHTLY BINDING TRADE RULES -- The Logic of ''Bindingness'' -- Exceptions and Escape Clauses.

Dispute Settlement -- CONCLUSION -- 9 Alternatives to ''Legalization'': Richer Views of Law and Politics -- A RICHER VIEW OF INTERNATIONAL LAW -- Three Lacunae -- Custom -- Defining Characteristics of Law -- Law as Process -- WHAT DIFFERENCE DOES LAW MAKE? -- CONCLUSION -- PART IV INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL NORMS -- 10 Quasi-States, Dual Regimes, and Neoclassical Theory: International Jurisprudence and the Third World -- PRACTICE AND THEORY -- CIVIL REGIMES -- DECOLONIZATION -- QUASI-STATES -- JURIDICAL STATEHOOD IN INTERNATIONAL LAW -- A NEW DUAL CIVIL REGIME -- JURIDICAL STATEHOOD AND INTERNATIONAL THEORY -- Classical Theory -- Rationalism -- Realism -- Revolutionism -- CONCLUSION -- 11 Which Norms Matter? Revisiting the ''Failure'' of Internationalism -- ON NORMS -- ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE -- NORMS AND ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE IN WORLD WAR II -- Macrocorrelation -- Measuring Norms -- Measuring Organizational Cultures -- Predictions Versus Outcomes -- Microassessment of Causal Mechanisms -- British Submarine Warfare -- How Norms Matter -- Constituting Heinous Warfare -- Restricting Preparations -- Influencing Third-Party Reactions -- Gaining Advantage -- Signaling Intentions -- CONCLUSION -- 12 The Territorial Integrity Norm: International Boundaries and the Use of Force -- INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES FROM THE SEVENTEENTH TO THE EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURY -- THE EVOLUTION OF THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY NORM SINCE 1945 -- General Legal and Declaratory Developments -- Territorial Aggressions Since 1946: International Responses and Outcomes -- The Boundaries of Successor States -- Overview of Stages in the Development of the Norm -- ROOTS OF THE NEW TERRITORIAL ORDER -- CONCLUSION -- PART V TREATY DESIGN AND DYNAMICS -- 13 Why Are Some International Agreements Informal? -- SELF-HELP AND THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT -- WHAT DO TREATIES DO?.

RATIONALES FOR INFORMAL AGREEMENTS -- Speed and Obscurity -- Uncertainty and Renegotiation -- HIDDEN AGREEMENTS -- THE STATUS OF TACIT AGREEMENTS -- CHOOSING BETWEEN TREATIES AND INFORMAL AGREEMENTS -- CONCLUSION: INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION BY INFORMAL AGREEMENT -- 14 The Politics of Dispute Settlement Design: Explaining Legalism in Regional Trade Pacts -- DEFINING THE SPECTRUM: FROM DIPLOMACY TO LEGALISM -- THE ARGUMENT -- Policy Discretion -- Treaty Compliance -- Assessing the Trade-off -- THE DATA SET -- OVERVIEW OF REGIONAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT -- MEASURING ASYMMETRY AND PROPOSED INTEGRATION -- ASYMMETRY, PROPOSED INTEGRATION, AND LEGALISM -- CONCLUSION -- APPENDIX A: SOURCES FOR TREATY TEXTS -- APPENDIX B: EXCLUDED REGIONAL ECONOMIC AGREEMENTS, 1957-95 -- Nonreciprocal Agreements -- Cooperation or Framework Agreements -- Unavailable Agreements -- 15 Loosening the Ties that Bind: A Learning Model of Agreement Flexibility -- MODEL: LEARNING ABOUT THE WORKINGS OF AN AGREEMENT -- Assumptions -- Basics of the Model -- Notation -- Two-Period Game -- Timeline -- Equilibrium -- Comparative Statics -- NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY -- Background and Substance of the Agreement -- Duration and Renegotiation: The Role of Uncertainty -- Duration and Renegotiation: The Compromise -- Resolving the Uncertainty Through Learning -- CONCLUSION -- 16 Driving with the Rearview Mirror: On the Rational Science of Institutional Design -- ALTERNATIVES TO RATIONAL DESIGN -- Alternatives to ''Rational'' -- The Logic of Appropriateness -- On Uncertainty -- Alternatives to ''Design'' -- No Designer? -- No Intentionality? -- No Choice? -- BROADENING THE SCIENCE OF INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN -- Institutional Effectiveness -- Normative Desirability -- CONCLUSION -- 17 The Dynamics of International Law: The Interaction of Normative and Operating Systems.

INTERNATIONAL LAW AS OPERATING AND NORMATIVE SYSTEMS -- Operating System -- The Normative System -- CORRELATES OF OPERATING SYSTEM CHANGE -- The Necessity of Necessity -- The Impetus of Political Shocks -- The Role of Leading States -- Domestic Political Influences -- ILLUSTRATING THE INTERACTION BETWEEN THE OPERATING AND THE NORMATIVE SYSTEMS: THE CASE OF THE GENOCIDE NORM -- The Genocide Norm -- Jurisdiction -- Institutions -- Subjects/Actors in International Law -- CONCLUSION -- PART VI LAW AND LEGAL INSTITUTIONS -- 18 Europe Before the Court: A Political Theory of Legal Integration -- A RETURN TO NEOFUNCTIONALISM -- Neofunctionalism in historical perspective: a theory of political integration -- Neofunctionalism as a theory of the integration process: overcoming national barriers -- The actors: circumventing the state -- The motives: instrumental self-interest -- The process: incremental expansion -- The context: nominally apolitical -- A NEOFUNCTIONALIST JURISPRUDENCE -- Actors: a specialized national and supranational community -- Motives: the self-interest of judges, lawyers, and professors -- Giving individual litigants a personal stake in community law -- Courting the national courts -- Reciprocal Empowerment -- Process -- Functional spillover: the logic of law -- Political spillover: ''transnational incrementalism'' -- Upgrading common interests -- Context: the (apparent) separation of law and politics -- Maintaining the Fiction -- Transforming the political into the legal -- Law as a mask -- [CONCLUSION] -- 19 The European Court of Justice, National Governments, and Legal Integration in the European Union -- THE LEGAL POLITICS GAME IN THE EUROPEAN UNION -- ECJ PRECEDENT, DOMESTIC POLITICS, AND EU COALITIONS -- The ECJ -- The Litigant Government -- Other Member Governments -- A STRATEGIC HISTORY OF ECJ CASE LAW.

Import Bans on Agricultural Products.