Cover -- Contents -- List of Figures and Tables -- Abbreviations -- Preface and Acknowledgments -- Introduction -- Goals -- The Basic Argument -- Overview -- One: Pact-Making, Bargaining, and Institutional Choice -- The Empirical Puzzle -- A Framework for Analysis: Pacts, Rules, and Institutions -- Pact-making, Bargaining, and Risk-taking -- Uncertainty and Beliefs, Mental Models and Transition Players -- A Model of Pact-Making -- Case Studies: Hungary in Comparative and Counterfactual Perspective -- Two: Pact-Making in Hungary: The 1989 Hungarian Roundtable Talks -- Dissidents and Populists, Reformers and Conservatives -- Pact-Making about Pact-Making -- Negotiating Democracy: The National Roundtable Talks -- Summary -- Three: Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, and Opposition Intransigence: The Presidency -- An MSZMP Presidency -- The Opposition on the Presidency -- The Negotiated Design of Presidential Powers -- Election Rules -- Summary -- Four: From Perverse Checks and Balances to Guardian of the Constitution: The Constitutional Court -- The MSZMP's Strategy: Institutionalizing a Perverse Checks and Balances -- The Opposition and the Constitutional Court -- Bargaining Over the Constitutional Court -- Summary -- Five: Comparative Perspectives: South Africa, Poland, and China -- South Africa, 1990-1994: From Risk-taking to Risk-averse Bargaining Strategies -- Poland, 1989: A Risk-averse Opposition and Risk-taking Softliners -- China, 1989: A Risk-taking Opposition and a Risk-taking Regime -- Summary -- Conclusion -- Counterfactual Pact-Making in Hungary -- Pact-making, Institutional Choice, and Rational Action -- Appendix: Sources and Data -- List of Interviews -- Notes -- References -- Index -- A -- B -- C -- D -- E -- F -- G -- H -- I -- J -- K -- L -- M -- N -- O -- P -- Q -- R -- S -- T -- U -- V -- W -- Y -- Z.