CONTENTS -- PREFACE -- ACKNOWLEDGMENTS -- Chapter 1 Introduction -- 1-1 What Is Decision Theory? -- 1-2 The Basic Framework -- 1-2a Some Philosophical Problems about Problem Specifications -- 1-3 Certainty, Ignorance, and Risk -- 1-3a Some Details of Formulation -- 1-4 Decision Trees -- 1-5 References -- Chapter 2 Decisions under Ignorance -- 2-1 Preference Orderings -- 2-2 The Maximin Rule -- 2-3 The Minimax Regret Rule -- 2-4 The Optimism-Pessimism Rule -- 2-5 The Principle of Insufficient Reason -- 2-6 Too Many Rules? -- 2-7 An Application in Social Philosophy: Rawls vs. Harsanyi -- 2-8 References -- Chapter 3 Decisions under Risk: Probability -- 3-1 Maximizing Expected Values -- 3-2 Probability Theory -- 3-2a Bayes's Theorem without Priors -- 3-2b Bayes's Theorem and the Value of Additional Information -- 3-2c Statistical Decision Theory and Decisions under Ignorance -- 3-3 Interpretations of Probability -- 3-3a The Classical View -- 3-3b The Relative Frequency View -- 3-3c Subjective Views -- 3-3d Coherence and Conditionalization -- 3-4 References -- Chapter 4 Decisions under Risk: Utility -- 4-1 Interval Utility Scales -- 4-2 Monetary Values vs. Utilities -- 4-3 Von Neumann-Morgenstern Utility Theory -- 4-3a Some Comments and Qualifications on the Expected Utility Theorem -- 4-4 Criticisms of Utility Theory -- 4-4a Allais's Paradox -- 4-4b Ellsberg's Paradox -- 4-4c The St. Petersburg Paradox -- 4-5 The Predictor Paradox -- 4-6 Causal Decision Theory -- 4-6a Objections and Alternatives -- 4-6b Concluding Remarks on the Paradoxes -- 4-7 References -- Chapter 5 Game Theory -- 5-1 The Basic Concepts of Game Theory -- 5-2 Two-Person Strictly Competitive Games -- 5-3 Equilibrium Strategy Pairs -- 5-3a Mixed Strategies -- 5-3b Proof of the Maximin Theorem for Two-by-Two Games -- 5-3c A Shortcut -- 5-3d On Taking Chances.

5-4 Two-Person Nonzero Sum Games: Failures of the Equilibrium Concept -- 5-4a The Clash of Wills -- 5-4b The Prisoner's Dilemma -- 5-4c Other Prisoner's Dilemmas -- 5-4d The Prisoner's Dilemma and the Predictor -- 5-4e Morals for Rationality and Morality -- 5-5 Cooperative Games -- 5-5a Bargaining Games -- 5-6 Games with Three or More Players -- 5-7 References -- Chapter 6 Social Choices -- 6-1 The Problem of Social Choice -- 6-2 Arrow's Theorem -- 6-2a Arrow's Conditions -- 6-2b Arrow's Theorem and Its Proof -- 6-3 Majority Rule -- 6-4 Utilitarianism -- 6-4a Harsanyi's Theorem -- 6-4b Critique of Harsanyi's Theorem -- 6-4c Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility -- 6-5 References -- BIBLIOGRAPHY -- INDEX -- A -- B -- C -- D -- E -- F -- G -- H -- I -- L -- M -- N -- O -- P -- R -- S -- T -- U -- V.