Cover image for Iterated Prisoners' Dilemma : 20 Years On.
Iterated Prisoners' Dilemma : 20 Years On.
Title:
Iterated Prisoners' Dilemma : 20 Years On.
Author:
Kendall, Graham.
ISBN:
9789812770684
Personal Author:
Physical Description:
1 online resource (273 pages)
Series:
Advances in Natural Computation, v. 4 ; v.v. 4

Advances in Natural Computation, v. 4
Contents:
Contents -- List of Contributors -- Chapter 1 The Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma: 20 Years On Siang Yew Chong, Jan Humble, Graham Kendall, Jiawei Li and Xin Yao -- 1.1. Introduction -- 1.2. Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma -- 1.3. Contents of the Book -- 1.4. Celebrating the 20th Anniversary: The Competitions -- 1.5. Competition Results -- 1.6. Acknowledgements -- Appendix: Software Framework -- References -- Chapter 2 Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma and Evolutinary Game Theory Siang Yew Chong, Jan Humble, Graham Kendall, Jiawei Li and Xin Yao -- 2.1. Introduction -- 2.2. Strategies in IPD Tournaments -- 2.2.1. Heterogeneous TFTs -- 2.2.2. Pavlov (Win-Stay Lose-Shift) -- 2.2.3. Gradual -- 2.2.4. Adaptive strategies -- 2.2.5. Group strategies -- 2.3. Evolutionary Dynamics in Games -- 2.3.1. Evolutionary stable strategy -- 2.3.2. Genetic algorithm -- 2.3.3. Strategies -- 2.3.4. Population -- 2.3.5. Selection scheme -- 2.4. Evolution of Cooperation -- References -- Chapter 3 Learning IPD Strategies Through Co-evolution Siang Yew Chong, Jan Humble, Graham Kendall, Jiawei Li and Xin Yao -- 3.1. Introduction -- 3.2. Co-evolving Strategies for the IPD Game -- 3.2.1. Co-evolutionary Learning Framework -- 3.2.2. Shadow of the Future -- 3.2.3. Issues for Co-evolutionary Learning of IPD Strate- gies -- 3.3. Extending the IPD Game -- 3.3.1. Extending the IPD with More Choices -- 3.3.2. IPD with Noise -- 3.3.3. N-Player IPD -- 3.3.4. Other Extensions -- 3.4. Conclusion and Future Directions -- References -- Chapter 4 How to Design a Strategy to Win an IPD Tournament Jiawei Li -- 4.1. Introduction -- 4.2. Analysis of strategies involved in IPD games -- 4.3. Estimation of possible strategies in an IPD tournament -- 4.4. Interaction with a strategy optimally -- 4.5. Escape from the trap of defection -- 4.6. Adaptive Pavlov and Competition 4 of 2005 IPD tour- nament.

4.7. Discussion and conclusion -- References -- Chapter 5 An Immune Adaptive Agent for the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma Oscar Alonso and Fernando Ni~no -- 5.1. Introduction -- 5.2. Immune network fundamentals -- 5.3. A general adaptive agent model -- 5.4. Immune agent model -- 5.4.1. Strategy representation -- 5.4.2. Memory -- 5.4.3. Recognition module -- 5.4.3.1. Immune network model -- 5.4.4. Strategy generation module -- 5.4.5. Decision module -- 5.5. Experimental results -- 5.5.1. Can the agent adapt to a new opponent? -- 5.5.2. Can the agent adapt to consecutive opponents? -- 5.5.3. Can the agent remember previous opponents? -- 5.5.4. Results from the IPD competition -- 5.6. Discussion -- 5.7. Conclusions -- References -- Chapter 6 Exponential Smoothed Tit-for-Tat Michael Filzmoser -- 6.1. Introduction -- 6.2. Exponential Smoothed Tit-for-Tat -- 6.2.1. Exponential Smoothing -- 6.2.2. Strategies for Competitions with and without Noise -- 6.3. Tournament Results -- 6.4. Conclusions -- References -- Chapter 7 Opponent Modelling, Evolution, and The Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma Philip Hingston, Dan Dyer, Luigi Barone, Tim French and Graham Kendall -- 7.1. Introduction -- 7.1.1. Opponent modelling -- 7.1.2. Modeller, the competition entry -- 7.1.3. Anatomy of the modeller -- 7.1.4. Competition performance -- 7.2. Opponent Modelling Versus Evolution -- 7.2.1. The new experiments -- 7.3. Conclusions -- References -- Chapter 8 On Some Winning Strategies for the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma Wolfgang Slany and Wolfgang Kienreich -- 8.1. Introduction -- 8.2. Analysis of the Tournament Results -- 8.2.1. 2004 competition, league 1 (standard IPD rules, with 223 participating strategies) -- 8.2.2. 2004 competition, league 2 (uncertainty IPD vari- ant, same 223 participating strategies as in the first league).

8.2.3. 2005 competition, league 1 (standard IPD rules, with 192 participating strategies) -- 8.2.4. 2005 competition, league 4 (standard IPD rules, but only non-group, individual strategies were allowed to participate -- 50 participating strategies) -- 8.2.5. Analysis of OmegaTitForTat's (OTFT) performance -- 8.2.6. The practical difficulty of detecting collusion -- 8.3. Details of Our Strategies -- 8.3.1. OmegaTitForTat, or Mr. Nice Guy meets the iterated prisoner's dilemma -- 8.3.1.1. Suspicion -- 8.3.1.2. Randomness -- 8.3.1.3. Exploits -- 8.3.1.4. OTFT -- 8.3.1.5. Examples -- 8.3.1.6. OTFT's behaviour laid bare -- 8.3.2. Our group strategies -- 8.3.2.1. The CosaNostra group strategy, or Organized crime meets the iterated prisoner's dilemma -- 8.3.2.2. The gory details of the CosaNostra group strategy -- 8.3.2.3. TheEmperorAndHisCloneWarriors -- 8.3.2.4. The StealthCollusion group strategy -- 8.4. Analysis of the Performance of the Strategies -- 8.4.1. OmegaTitForTat -- 8.4.2. Group strategies -- 8.4.3. Collusion detection is an undecidable problem -- 8.5. Conclusion -- Acknowledgments -- References -- Chapter 9 Error-Correcting Codes for Team Coordination within a Noisy Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma Tournament Alex Rogers, Rajdeep K. Dash, Sarvapali D. Ramchurn, Perukrishnen Vytelingum and Nicholas R. Jennings -- 9.1. Introduction -- 9.2. The Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma and Related Work -- 9.3. Team Players -- 9.4. Experimental Results -- 9.5. Analysis -- 9.6. Error Correcting Codes -- 9.7. Competition Entry -- 9.8. Conclusions -- A.1. Test Population -- References -- Chapter 10 Is it Accidental or Intentional? A Symbolic Approach to the Noisy Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma Tsz-Chiu Au and Dana Nau -- 10.1. Introduction -- 10.2. Motivation and Approach -- 10.3. Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma with Noise.

10.4. Strategies, Policies, and Hypothesized Policies -- 10.5. Derived Belief Strategy -- 10.6. Learning Hypothesized Policies in Noisy Environ- ments -- 10.6.1. Learning by Discounted Frequencies -- 10.6.2. Deficiencies of Discounted Frequencies in Noisy En- vironments -- 10.6.3. Identifying Deterministic Rules Using Induction -- 10.6.4. Symbolic Noise Detection and Temporary Tolerance -- 10.6.5. Coping with Ignorance of the Other Player's New Behavior -- 10.7. The Move Generator in DBS -- 10.8. Competition Results -- 10.8.1. Overall Average Scores -- 10.8.2. DBS versus the Master-and-Slaves Strategies -- 10.8.3. A comparison between DBSz, TFT, and TFTT -- 10.9. Related Work -- 10.10. Summary and Future Work -- References.
Abstract:
In 1984, Robert Axelrod published a book, relating the story of two competitions which he ran, where invited academics entered strategies for the Iterated Prisoners' Dilemma. The book, almost 20 years on, is still widely read and cited by academics and the general public. As a celebration of that landmark work, we have recreated those competitions to celebrate its 20th anniversary, by again inviting academics to submit prisoners' dilemma strategies. The first of these new competitions was run in July 2004, and the second in April 2005. Iterated Prisoners' Dilemma: 20 Years On essentially provides an update of the Axelrod's book. Specifically, it. Presents the prisoners' dilemma, its history and variants. Highlights original Axelrod's work and its impact. Discusses results of new competitions. Showcases selected papers that reflect the latest researches in the area.
Local Note:
Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, Michigan : ProQuest Ebook Central, 2017. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest Ebook Central affiliated libraries.
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