Cover -- Half-title -- Series-title -- Title -- Copyright -- Contents -- Preface and acknowledgments -- Abbreviations -- Table of cases -- European Union -- United Kingdom -- United States -- Germany -- Other countries -- Table of legislation -- OECD -- European Union -- United Kingdom -- Germany -- France -- Japan -- China -- Introduction -- Part I The object and course of the investigation -- 1 Dimensions of convergence in shareholder law -- I. The spatial dimension: the legal systems covered -- II. The objective dimension: the shareholder of a joint stock company -- 1. Demarcation from shareholders in 'small companies' -- 2. Demarcation from other participants in the firm -- III. The temporal dimension -- 1. 'The End of History for Corporate Law'? -- 2. Historical interconnectedness in Europe -- 3. Receptions in the US, Japan and China -- a) USA -- b) Japan -- c) China -- 4. Conclusion -- IV. The methodological dimension -- 1. Variants of convergence -- 2. The division into 'diagnosis', 'prognosis' and 'therapy' -- 3. Shareholder law as the core of the study -- V. Summary -- Part II The status quo of convergence -- 2 legal bases -- I. International and regional law -- 1. International law -- 2. Regional law -- II. Statute law and case law -- III. Company and securities law -- 1. Comparative overview -- 2. Conclusions -- IV. Self-regulation and state regulation -- 1. Articles of association -- 2. Shareholder agreements -- 3. Corporate governance codes -- V. Conclusion -- 3 Bases for a shareholder typology -- I. The shareholder in the theoretical debate -- 1. The shareholder as 'owner' or 'quasi-partner' -- 2. The shareholder as 'member of an association' or 'parliamentarian' -- 3. The shareholder as 'investor' or 'bystander' -- II. Real types of shareholder -- III. Conclusions -- 4 The 'shareholder as such' -- I. The profit-oriented shareholder.

1. Limited liability -- 2. Profit realization while remaining in the company -- a) Legal bases for profit distribution -- b) Provisions on the amount of dividend -- c) Dividend practice -- d) Conclusion -- 3. Profit realization by selling shares -- a) Permissibility of trading in shares -- b) The influence of statutory provisions -- c) Agreed selling restrictions -- d) Practical difficulties -- e) Conclusion -- 4. Share buybacks -- 5. Conclusions -- II. The active shareholder -- 1. The purpose of shareholder participation -- a) The different types of shareholder -- b) The 'rational apathy' of shareholders -- 2. Modes of shareholder voting -- 3. Shareholder involvement prior to the general meeting -- a) Shareholder influence on convocation and agenda -- b) Timely information on the general meeting -- c) Voting in advance -- d) Conclusion -- 4. Participation in the general meeting -- a) The right to attend and to speak -- b) The voting right -- c) Participation of institutional investors -- 5. Conclusion -- III. The informed shareholder -- 1. Individual information rights -- a) The right to demand information -- b) Rights of inspection -- c) Conclusion -- 2. Securities law -- a) Convergence in law -- b) Reservations -- c) Conclusion -- 3. Financial reporting -- a) Regulatory philosophies -- b) Convergence -- c) Prospects -- 4. Conclusion -- IV. The anonymous shareholder -- 1. Anonymity of the registered shareholder -- a) Reasons for the success of the registered share -- b) Anonymity vis-`a-vis fellow shareholders -- 2. Anonymity of the bearer shareholder -- 3. Anonymity of the 'spurious' shareholder -- 4. Anonymity of the influential shareholder -- 5. Conclusions -- V. Conclusions to this chapter -- 5 The shareholder in the power structure of the company -- I. The deciding shareholder -- 1. The powers of the general meeting -- a) Legal bases.

b) Decisions on conduct of business -- c) Regular decisions -- d) Fundamental changes -- e) Special situations -- f) Conclusions -- 2. The necessary majority of shareholders -- a) Relative, absolute and qualified majorities -- b) Cumulative voting rights -- c) Conclusion -- 3. Conclusion -- II. The protected shareholder -- 1. Protection against management -- a) The ranking of shareholder interests -- b) Oversight of management -- c) Conclusions -- 2. Protection against the shareholder majority -- a) Voting in case of special interests -- b) Substantive control of decisions -- c) Leaving the company -- d) Conclusion -- 3. Conclusions -- III. The litigating shareholder -- 1. Actions against management conduct -- 2. Actions against resolutions of the general meeting -- 3. Conclusions -- IV. Conclusions to this chapter -- 6 Conclusions to Part II -- I. Divergence and convergence -- II. Globalization and Americanization -- III. Convergence and artificial convergence -- Part III Developmental trends and patterns -- 7 Bases -- I. The dependency of shareholder law -- 1. The causality problem -- 2. The public choice theory -- a) Voters, parties and politicians -- b) Problems of application -- 3. The influence of interest groups -- 4. Conclusion -- II. Regulatory levels of shareholder law -- 1. Multinational firms and national law -- 2. Internationalization -- 3. Regionalization -- 4. Conclusion -- III. Regulatory forms at the national level -- 1. Statute and case law -- 2. Company and securities law -- 3. Corporate governance codes -- 4. Conclusion -- IV. Conclusions to this chapter -- 8 Convergence through congruence -- I. General cultural and economic-policy approximation -- 1. 'Clash' or 'convergence' of cultures -- 2. 'TINA' or 'THEMBA' -- II. The convergence of legal cultures -- 1. The importance of legal culture -- 2. Changes in legal cultures.

a) Civil and common law -- b) Western and Asian law -- c) Conclusion -- III. Internationalization of the economy -- 1. International economic law -- 2. Internationalization through 'new media' -- 3. The internationalization of private institutions -- 4. The internationalization of undertakings -- a) International mergers -- b) Foreign investors -- c) Exchange listings abroad -- d) Enterprise culture -- IV. Approximation of shareholder structures -- 1. Explanatory models -- a) The role of law and politics -- b) The role of private law-making and individualism -- c) Conclusion -- 2. The decline in concentrated shareholder structures -- a) Features to date -- b) Current developments -- 3. The influence of institutional investors -- 4. Conclusion -- V. Legislative responses -- 1. Reform and reception -- 2. Path dependencies -- a) Weak path dependencies -- b) Strong path dependencies -- 3. Conclusion -- 9 Convergence through pressure -- I. Pressure from company founders -- 1. Regulatory competition -- a) Supply -- b) Demand -- c) Conclusion -- 2. Other forms of pressure -- II. Pressure from management -- III. Pressure from shareholders -- 1. Regulatory competition -- a) Supply -- b) Demand -- c) Conclusion -- 2. Other forms of pressure -- IV. Pressure from other interest groups -- V. Pressure from international organizations and foreign states -- VI. Legislative responses -- 1. Competition for the seat of companies -- a) The position in the US -- b) The position in the European Union -- c) Divergence and convergence -- 2. The effect of lobbying -- a) International lobbying -- b) National lobbying -- c) Conclusion -- 3. Competition for shareholders -- a) The evolutionary position -- b) Limits to convergence -- c) Conclusion -- 4. Conclusions -- 10 Future convergences in shareholder law -- I. The 'shareholder as such' -- 1. The profit-oriented shareholder.

2. The modern shareholder -- a) The international shareholder -- b) The delegating shareholder -- c) The information-seeking shareholder -- d) The postmodern shareholder -- e) Conclusions -- 3. Conclusions -- II. The shareholder in the power structure of the company -- 1. The deciding shareholder -- 2. The protected shareholder -- a) Protection against management -- b) Protection against the shareholder majority -- c) Conclusion -- 3. The litigating shareholder -- 4. Conclusions -- 11 Conclusions to Part III -- I. Re-regulation -- II. Convergence forces -- III. Changes in future law -- Part IV Conclusion -- 12 Convergence as a model for the future -- I. Convergence 'from above' -- 1. Reasons for unification of law -- 2. Problems and implications -- a) Uniform law -- b) Means towards convergence 'from above' -- 3. Interim finding -- II. Convergence 'from below' -- 1. National legislators -- a) Regulatory competition -- b) Convergence through lobbying -- c) Convergence through congruence -- 2. Case law -- 3. Self-regulation -- 4. Conclusion -- III. The object of convergence in shareholder law -- 1. The powerless shareholder? -- 2. The disempowered shareholder? -- 3. The empowered shareholder -- IV. Conclusion -- 13 Summary of principal findings -- References -- Index.