Cover -- Preface -- Contents -- Figure and Tables -- Summary -- Acknowledgments -- Abbreviations -- Chapter One - Introduction -- Chapter Two - Models of Recruiter Effort, Market Quality, andEnlistment Supply -- A Model with a Single Type of Contract -- A Model Distinguishing the Three Missioned ContractTypes -- A Conceptually Grounded, Econometrically BasedPerformance Measure -- Chapter Three - Data and Econometric Estimates of Contract-Production Models -- Data -- Estimates for the Graduate, Senior, and "Other" ContractModel -- Estimates for a Model Distinguishing Men and Women -- Chapter Four - Empirical Analysis of Performance Measures -- Chapter Five - Choosing Performance Windows andOrganizational Units for Evaluation -- Using the Performance Window to Control for RandomOutcomes -- The Use of Station Versus Individual PerformanceEvaluation -- The Impact of Station Missioning: Theory and Simulations -- Empirical Evidence on the Efficacy of Station Missioning -- Chapter Six - Conclusions -- Summary of Results -- Implications for Policy -- Appendix A - Allocation of Recruiter Effort: Implications of aMicroeconomic Model -- Appendix B - Recruiter Behavior in the Face of Risk -- References.