Cover image for Doing without Concepts : Why Cognition Is Not Unified.
Doing without Concepts : Why Cognition Is Not Unified.
Title:
Doing without Concepts : Why Cognition Is Not Unified.
Author:
Machery, Edouard.
ISBN:
9780199719198
Personal Author:
Physical Description:
1 online resource (296 pages)
Contents:
Contents -- Introduction -- 1 Concepts in Psychology -- 1.1 "Concept" in Psychology -- 1.2 Evidence for the Existence of Concepts -- 1.3 What Is a Psychological Theory of Concepts? -- 1.4 Alternative Characterizations of the Notion of Concept -- 1.5 Conclusion -- 2 Concepts in Philosophy -- 2.1 "Concept" in Philosophy -- 2.2 Concepts in Philosophy versus Concepts in Psychology -- 2.3 How Are the Psychological and the Philosophical Theories of Concepts Connected? Peacocke's Simple Account -- 2.4 How Are the Psychological and the Philosophical Theories of Concepts Connected? The Foundationalist Account -- 2.5 Conclusion -- 3 The Heterogeneity Hypothesis -- 3.1 The Received View -- 3.2 The Heterogeneity Hypothesis -- 3.3 Hybrid Theories of Concepts -- 3.4 Conclusion -- 4 Three Fundamental Kinds of Concepts: Prototypes, Exemplars, Theories -- 4.1 The Classical Theory of Concepts -- 4.2 The Prototype Paradigm of Concepts -- 4.3 The Exemplar Paradigm of Concepts -- 4.4 The Theory Paradigm of Concepts -- 4.5 Alternative Views of Concepts -- 4.6 Three Theoretical Entities That Have Little in Common -- 4.7 Conclusion -- 5 Multi-Process Theories -- 5.1 Multi-Process Theories -- 5.2 Examples of Multi-Process Theories -- 5.3 Conclusion -- 6 Categorization and Concept Learning -- 6.1 Categorization and Concept Learning -- 6.2 Studying Categorization and Concept Learning -- 6.3 Evidence for the Existence of Prototypes -- 6.4 Evidence for the Existence of Exemplars -- 6.5 Evidence for the Existence of Theories -- 6.6 Organization of the Categorization Processes and of the Concept-Learning Processes -- 6.7 Conclusion -- 7 Induction, Concept Combination, and Neuropsychology -- 7.1 Induction -- 7.2 Concept Combination -- 7.3 Neuropsychology -- 7.4 Conclusion -- 8 Concept Eliminativism -- 8.1 Two Inconclusive Arguments against the Notion of Concept.

8.2 Natural Kinds and Scientific Eliminativism -- 8.3 The Argument for the Elimination of "Concept" -- 8.4 Objections and Replies -- 8.5 Conclusion -- Conclusion -- References -- Index of Names -- A -- B -- C -- D -- F -- G -- H -- J -- K -- L -- M -- N -- O -- P -- Q -- R -- S -- V -- W -- Z -- Index of Subjects -- A -- B -- C -- D -- E -- F -- G -- H -- I -- K -- L -- M -- N -- O -- P -- R -- S -- T -- U -- W.
Abstract:
In Doing without Concepts, Edouard Machery argues that the dominant psychological theories of concept fail to provide a coherent framework to organize our extensive empirical knowledge about concepts. Machery proposes that to develop such a framework, drastic conceptual changes are required.
Local Note:
Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, Michigan : ProQuest Ebook Central, 2017. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest Ebook Central affiliated libraries.
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