Contents -- Abbreviations -- 1. Introduction -- 1. Scope -- 2. The Socratic Tradition -- 3. Aristotelian Naturalism -- 4. Critics of Aristotelian Naturalism -- 5. Beginning and End -- 6. Progress, Optimism, and Pessimism -- 7. What this Book is Not -- 8. Level and Organization -- 2. Socrates -- 9. The Founder of Moral Philosophy? -- 10. Method -- 11. What is a Socratic Definition? -- 12. Basic Moral Principles -- 13. Knowledge of the Good: Eudaemonism -- 14. Why Virtue is Necessary for Happiness -- 15. Why is Virtue Sufficient for Happiness? -- 16. Wisdom and its Product -- 17. The Supremacy of Virtue -- 18. Does Happiness give a Reason for being Virtuous? -- 19. What sort of Virtue is Supreme in Happiness? -- 20. Integrity and Socratic Virtue -- 21. The Nature of Happiness: Socratic Hedonism -- 22. Hedonism and Socratic Virtue -- 23. Objections to Hedonism: The Gorgias -- 24. Hedonism without Prudence? -- 25. An Adaptive Conception of Happiness -- 26. Is Virtue Identical to Happiness? -- 27. Reason and Desire -- 3. The Cyrenaics -- 28. The 'One-Sided' Socratics -- 29. Aristippus and the Protagoras -- 30. Hedonism without Eudaemonism -- 31. For and against Eudaemonism -- 32. Epistemological and Metaphysical Objections to Eudaemonism -- 33. Doubts about the Continuing Self -- 34. A Conflict between Hedonism and Eudaemonism? -- 4. The Cynics -- 35. Socrates and the Cynics -- 36. Socratic Alternatives to Hedonism: Virtue or Self-Sufficiency? -- 37. Happiness and Adaptation -- 38. Do the Cynics Improve on Socrates? -- 39. Socrates and the Cynics: Is Virtue Identical to Happiness? -- 40. An Objection to Cynicism -- 5. Plato -- 41. Plato's Reflexions on Socrates -- 42. The Scope of Plato's Ethical Thought -- 43. Definitions and Disputes -- 44. Why Explanation Requires Non-sensible Forms -- 45. Appropriate Definitions -- 46. Non-rational Desires.

47. Why a Tripartite Soul? -- 48. Why Parts of the Soul? -- 49. The Tripartite Soul, Virtue, and Vice -- 50. Why is Justice to be Chosen for Itself ? -- 51. How is Justice a Non-instrumental Good? -- 52. Is Justice Sufficient for Happiness? -- 53. Inadequate Conceptions of Happiness -- 54. Cyrenaic Hedonism v. Eudaemonism -- 55. Why Intelligence is Not the Good -- 56. Responses to the Philebus -- 57. Why Justice is Insufficient for Happiness -- 58. Are Plato's Questions Reasonable? -- 59. What is Psychic Justice? -- 60. How Psychic Justice Fulfils the Human Function -- 61. The Philosopher as Ruler: A Conflict between Justice and Happiness? -- 62. The Philosopher as Ruler: No Sacrifice of Happiness? -- 63. Love, Self-Concern, and Concern for Others -- 64. Eudaemonism and Concern for Others -- 6. Aristotle: Happiness -- 65. Interpreting Aristotle -- 66. Aristotle's Main Contributions -- 67. Method -- 68. The Role of the Final Good -- 69. The Final Good and Happiness -- 70. The Final Good and the 'Three Lives' -- 71. A Comprehensive Conception of Happiness -- 72. Happiness and Goodness -- 73. Implications of Eudaemonism -- 7. Aristotle: Nature -- 74. The Function Argument -- 75. Function, Essence, End, and Explanation -- 76. Function and Practical Reason -- 77. Aristotelian Naturalism? -- 78. A Non-naturalist Account of the Function Argument -- 79. Nature, Happiness, and External Goods -- 80. Naturalism and 'Second Nature' -- 81. The Extent of Naturalism in the Ethics -- 82. Happiness, Function, and the Theoretical Life -- 8. Aristotle: Virtue -- 83. The Function Argument and the Virtues -- 84. Virtue, Continence, Incontinence, and Vice -- 85. The Doctrine of the Mean -- 86. Virtue and Harmony -- 87. Rationalist v. Anti-rationalist Accounts of Virtue -- 88. Anti-rationalism: Virtue and Pleasure -- 89. Anti-rationalism: Limits of Practical Reason.

90. Anti-rationalism: Moral Virtue and Responsibility -- 91. Anti-rationalism: The Voluntary -- 92. Anti-rationalism and the Weakness of Practical Reason: Incontinence -- 93. Anti-rationalism: Vice -- 94. Virtue, Election, and Reason -- 95. Pleasure and Reason -- 96. Virtue, Election, and Deliberation -- 97. Wish and Will -- 98. Prudence and Deliberation -- 99. Virtue, Reason, and Responsibility -- 100. Voluntary Action in Rational Agents -- 101. Rational Agency and Character -- 102. Moral Responsibility and Morality -- 103. Questions about Incontinence and Responsibility -- 104. Incontinence, Ignorance, and Deliberation -- 105. Vice, Reason, and Appetite -- 106. Self-Love, Reason, and the Fine -- 107. How is the Fine Connected with Reason? -- 108. Vice and Pleasure -- 109. The Vicious Person's Regret -- 110. The Instability of the Vicious Person -- 111. Vice, Reason, and Nature -- 9. Aristotle: Virtue and Morality -- 112. Why Virtues? -- 113. The Content of the Virtues -- 114. Are the Virtues of Character Moral Virtues? -- 115. Is Aristotle an Unsystematic Theorist? -- 116. Virtue and the Fine -- 117. Justice, the Common Good, and Concern for the Fine -- 118. The Fine and the Virtues of Character: Bravery -- 119. The Fine and the Virtues: Temperance -- 120. The Fine and the Virtues: Generosity and Magnificence -- 121. The Fine and the Virtues: Magnanimity -- 122. How can Friendship Justify Morality? -- 123. Friendship and Concern for Others -- 124. The Friend as Another Self -- 125. Why Other Selves? -- 126. The Extension of Friendship -- 127. Different Aspects of Friendship in the Political Community -- 128. Friendship and Morality -- 129. Aristotelian and other Conceptions of Morality -- 10. The Sceptics -- 130. Scepticism in the History of Greek Ethics -- 131. The Sceptic as an Investigator -- 132. Socrates as a Source of Scepticism.

133. Protagoras and Plato -- 134. Aristotle and Conflicting Appearances -- 135. Aristotle on Nature and Convention -- 136. Arguments against Objective Goodness -- 137. Natural Goodness -- 138. Sceptical Tranquillity -- 139. Actions without Beliefs? -- 140. What kind of Life can we live without Beliefs? -- 141. Scepticism, Belief, and Deliberation: Sextus, Hobbes, and Hume -- 142. Do we Need Beliefs? -- 11. Epicurus -- 143. Epicurus' Aims -- 144. Hedonism -- 145. Epicurean Eudaemonism v. Cyrenaic Hedonism -- 146. Why Freedom Matters -- 147. Why we should Reject Compatibilism -- 148. Why we should Reject Determinism -- 149. Epicurus' Indeterminism -- 150. Indeterminism and Epicurus' Ethical Theory -- 151. Types of Pleasure -- 152. Fear of Death as the Source of Excessive Desires -- 153. Does Epicurus Show that Death is Not an Evil? -- 154. Kinetic Pleasure v. Freedom from Pain -- 155. Is Epicurus a Hedonist? -- 156. Hedonism and Good Pleasures -- 157. A Defence of Virtue? -- 158. Justice and its Consequences: Epicurus v. Plato -- 159. The Value of Friendship: Epicurus and Aristotle -- 160. Difficulties in Epicureanism -- 12. Stoicism: Action, Passion, and Reason -- 161. The Stoics and their Predecessors -- 162. Eudaemonism -- 163. Reactions to Stoic Ethics -- 164. Stoic Strategies -- 165. Preconceptions -- 166. Nature, Conciliation, and Appearances -- 167. Passions as Assents -- 168. How can we Correct our Assents? -- 169. Questions about Responsibility -- 170. Assent as Principal Cause -- 171. Fate v. Necessity -- 172. Incompatibilist Objections -- 173. Assent as the Basis for Responsibility -- 174. Passions, Assent, and Responsibility -- 175. Action and Practical Reason -- 13. Stoicism: Virtue and Happiness -- 176. Practical Reason and Preconceptions -- 177. Practical Reason, Consistency, and Agreement.

178. The Use and the Value of Practical Reason -- 179. The Non-instrumental Value of Practical Reason -- 180. The Non-instrumental Value of Virtue -- 181. Virtue as the Only Good -- 182. Indifferents -- 183. Preferred Indifferents -- 184. Crafts, Ends, and Objectives -- 185. The Connexion of the Virtues -- 186. Concern for Preferred Indifferents -- 187. The Selective Value of Virtue and the Preferred Indifferents -- 188. Why Virtue is Praiseworthy -- 189. Why should Virtue be Identified with Happiness? -- 190. Two Roles of Aristotelian Happiness -- 191. Freedom from Passion -- 192. Appearances without Passions -- 193. Is the Sage really Free of Passion? -- 194. The Extent of Friendship -- 195. Expanding Circles of Friendship -- 196. The Characteristics of Friendship -- 197. Stoic Political Theory -- 198. The Community of Sages -- 199. The Community of Human Beings -- 200. Limitations of Stoic Friendship -- 201. Estimate of the Stoic Position -- 14. Christian Theology and Moral Philosophy -- 202. Christian Influences -- 203. Questions for Moral Theory -- 204. The Difference between the Moral and the Ceremonial Law -- 205. Law and Gospel -- 206. Natural Law -- 207. Perfectionism -- 208. The Moral Law and the Consciousness of Sin -- 209. Justification -- 210. Moral Implications -- 211. The Christian Conception of Morality -- 212. Moral Psychology -- 213. Free Will -- 214. Eudaemonism -- 215. The Virtues -- 15. Augustine -- 216. The Rejection of Greek Ethics? -- 217. The Importance of the Will: Rejection of Psychological Dualism -- 218. The Will and Other Mental States -- 219. Will and Passion: Stoics v. Peripatetics -- 220. Augustine's Objections to the Stoics on Passions -- 221. Will and Passions -- 222. Platonists and Peripatetics on Passions -- 223. The Primacy of the Will -- 224. The Will and the Good: Eudaemonism and Intellectualism.

225. Freewill and Determination.