Contents -- 1 Introduction -- 1.1 A Comprehensive Realism -- 1.2 Metaphysical Method -- 1.3 An Alternative to Both Physicalism and Mysterianism -- 1.4 Causal Internalism -- 1.5 The Ontology of Causation -- 1.6 The Need for an Indeterministic Model -- 1.7 A Causal-Probabilistic Theory of Information -- 1.8 Why an Exact Theory? -- 1.9 The Big Picture: Preview of Part II -- 1.10 A Glossary of Symbols -- I: A Theory of Causation and Information -- 2 Toward a Unified Theory of Causation -- 2.1 The Nomological/Deductive Tradition -- 2.2 Theories of Probabilistic Causation -- 2.3 Davidson and Event-Tokens -- 2.4 Lewis's Counterfactual Account -- 2.5 Mackie's INUS Conditions -- 2.6 Yablo's Theory -- 2.7 Branching-Time Models -- 2.8 Artificial Intelligence and Models of Causal Inference -- 2.9 Tooley and Cartwright -- 2.10 Process and Linkage Theories -- 2.11 Mellor's Theory -- 2.12 Accounts of Causal Asymmetry -- 2.13 Distinctive Features of My Theory -- 3 Situation Theory and Causation -- 3.1 The Need for Situation Theory -- 3.2 Situation Mereology and Causation -- 3.3 A Situation-Theoretic Logic of Causation -- 3.4 The Transitivity of INUS Causation -- 4 A Deterministic Model -- 4.1 Desiderata -- 4.2 Causation and Determinism -- 4.3 Basic Ontology -- 4.4 Constraints and Causation -- 4.5 Defining Causal Explanation -- 4.6 Singular Causation -- 4.7 Empiricism and Modality -- 4.8 Causal Relevance -- 4.9 Piecemeal Causation -- 4.10 Desirable Features of the Theory -- 4.11 Applying the Theory to Some Examples -- 4.12 Verifying the Axioms of Chapter 3 -- 5 An Indeterministic Model -- 5.1 Beyond Determinism -- 5.2 Why an Indeterministic Account Is Difficult -- 5.3 If Not Determinism, Then What? -- 5.4 Causation and Causal Explanation -- 5.5 Desirable Features of the Theory -- 5.6 Example Applications -- 6 A Probabilistic Model of Causation -- 6.1 Models.

6.2 Token Causation -- 6.3 Weighted Causal Constraints on Types -- 6.4 Probabilistic Explanation -- 6.5 Examples -- 6.6 Humphreys's Explanation -- 7 Higher-Order Causation: Modal Facts as Causes -- 7.1 A Problem with Higher-Order Causation -- 7.2 Modal Facts as Causes -- 7.3 The Causal Relevance of the Excluded Middle -- 7.4 First-Order Teleological Causation -- 7.5 Higher-Order Teleological Causation -- 8 The Universality of Causation -- 8.1 A Modal Mereology of Situations -- 8.2 Principles of Causation -- 8.3 The Universality of Causation -- 8.4 The Existence of an Uncaused First Cause -- 8.5 The Well-Foundedness of Causation -- 8.6 Objections -- 9 A Theory of Information and Misinformation -- 9.1 Introduction -- 9.2 The Historical (Retrospective) Strategy -- 9.3 Two New Strategies -- 9.4 Information as the Basis of Knowledge -- 10 A Look Back, and Ahead -- 10.1 The Causal Relation -- 10.2 Against Determinism -- 10.3 Spacetime as Constrained by Causation, Not Vice Versa -- II: Applications to Metaphysics, Epistemology, and Ethics -- 11 An Overview -- 11.1 Teleology as Higher-Order Causation -- 11.2 Teleosemantics -- 11.3 The Link between Teleosemantics and Epistemology -- 11.4 Causal/Teleological Accounts of Knowledge -- 11.5 Mental Causation and Qualia -- 11.6 Teleological Accounts of Ethics -- 11.7 Enduring Substances as Logical Constructions -- 12 Teleology as Higher-Order Causation -- 12.1 Three Definitions of Teleology -- 12.2 Darwin: Real or Only Apparent Functionality? -- 12.3 Retrospective and Non-Retrospective Accounts -- 12.4 Extrinsic Functions and the Extended Phenotype -- 12.5 Our Knowledge of Teleology -- 12.6 Teleological Natural Kinds -- 13 Causal Theories of Mental Content -- 13.1 Millikan -- 13.2 Dretske -- 13.3 Fodor's Critique of Teleological Semantics -- 14 Teleosemantics of Mental Representations.

14.1 An Overview of Representational States -- 14.2 Pre-cognitive Representations -- 14.3 Cognitive States: Opinions and Intentions -- 14.4 Mental Representation and Language -- 14.5 The Narrowness of Mental Content -- 14.6 Teleosemantics and the Liar Paradox -- 15 A Causal Theory of Logical and Mathematical Cognition -- 15.1 The Need for a Causal Theory -- 15.2 Logico-Modal Facts as Causes -- 15.3 Knowing How to Infer Correctly -- 15.4 Is Logic Factual? -- 15.5 Logical and Physical Necessity -- 15.6 From Logic to Arithmetic -- 15.7 Set Theory and Other Branches of Mathematics -- 15.8 Alternatives to Mathematical Realism -- 15.9 Why the Human Mind Is Not a Turing Machine -- 16 A Teleological Theory of the Mind -- 16.1 The Irony of Non-Reductive Materialism -- 16.2 Supervenience and Type and Token Identity -- 16.3 Downward Causation versus Epiphenomenalism -- 16.4 Two Further Problems of Mental Causation -- 16.5 Qualia -- 16.6 Problem Cases -- 16.7 The Correlation of Qualia and Physiology -- 16.8 Free Will -- 17 Teleological Reliabilism -- 17.1 Reliabilism: The Reference Class Problem -- 17.2 Grue, Bleen, and the New Riddle of Induction -- 17.3 Curve-Fitting: The Problem of Mathematical Simplicity -- 17.4 The Reliability of Simplicity as a Criterion of Truth -- 17.5 The Incompatibility of Materialism and Scientific Realism -- 17.6 When Does Bayesian Learning Constitute Knowledge? -- 17.7 Objective Chance and Empiricism -- 18 Enduring Substances and Their Identities -- 18.1 Substances as Logical Constructions -- 18.2 Change and the Johnston Paradox -- 18.3 Zeno's Paradox and the Instant of Change -- 18.4 Hard Cases for Substance Identity -- 18.5 Quantum Reality and the Foundations of Materialism -- 19 Eudaemonism and the Objectivity of Value -- 19.1 Objectified Subjectivity: A Dead End -- 19.2 Eudaemonia.

19.3 The Connection between Eudaemonia and Motivation -- 19.4 Nature and Nurture -- 19.5 The Unity and Universality of Good -- 19.6 Indeterminacy and Objectivity -- 19.7 The Semantics and Epistemology of Ethics -- 19.8 Eudaemonism versus Evolutionary Ethics -- 19.9 Moore and the Indefinability of Good -- 20 Moral Theory as the Teleology of Character -- 20.1 Virtue as Both Means and End -- 20.2 Eudaemonism versus Egoism -- 20.3 Is and Ought -- 20.4 Sociobiology, Game Theory, and Species Relativity -- 20.5 Elements of a Teleo-Ethological Morality -- 20.6 Politics and the Natural Law -- 20.7 Justice toward Future Generations -- 20.8 Kierkegaard and the Teleological Suspension of the Ethical -- 21 A Coherent Realism Is a Comprehensive Realism -- 21.1 The Four Waves of Anti-Realism -- 21.2 A Prolegomenon to Any Future Critique of Metaphysics -- 21.3 Causalism, Yes! Materialism, No! -- 21.4 Anti-Realist Obscurantism -- 21.5 Is the Theory Naturalistic? -- A: Partiality, Modality, and Conditionals -- A.1 Partial Propositional Logics -- A.2 Partial Modal Logics -- A.3 Partial Conditional Logics -- A.4 Partiality and Quantificational Logic -- A.5 First-Order Quantification over Situation-Types -- B: A Causal Calculus -- B.1 Causation and Projectible Statistics -- B.2 Some Other Well-Known Puzzles -- B.3 Screening Off -- B.4 Conditions on Hyperfinite Probability Functions -- B.5 Examples -- B.6 Abduction and Induction -- B.7 Proofs of Theorems B.2 through B.4 -- Bibliography -- Index -- A -- B -- C -- D -- E -- F -- G -- H -- I -- J -- K -- L -- M -- N -- O -- P -- Q -- R -- S -- T -- U -- V -- W -- X -- Y -- Z.