Contents -- Introduction -- 1 SPECTRUM INVERSION -- 0. Introduction -- 1. Two views on perception -- 2. Spectrum inversion and functionalism -- 3. Spectrum inversion sans functionalism -- 4. The irrelevance of behavioral undetectability: Extending the argument -- 5. Qualia and Fregean senses -- 6. Phenomenology and representational content -- 7. An alternative view of perception -- 8. Generalized use-mention confusion -- 9. Pain and other sensations -- 10. Shoemaker's view -- 11. Conclusion -- 2 THE STRUCTURE OF BELIEF AND PERCEPTUAL REPRESENTATION -- 0. Introduction -- 1. Intentionality and paradox -- 2. Intentionality and sense-data theory -- 3. The link to truth and falsity -- 4. The relational nature of belief -- 5. Instantial states vs. internal states -- 6. Against internal belief states -- 7. The possible worlds account of propositions -- 8. Saying and believing -- 9. Perceptual representation -- 10. Perception and the particularizing fallacy -- 11. Intentionality revisited -- 12. The Fregean/Millian distinction and the what/how distinction -- 13. Descriptive Fregeanism and non-descriptive Fregeanism -- 14. Guise Millianism and pure Millianism -- 15. Singular propositions -- 16. Explaining the what/how distinction -- 17. Conclusion -- 3 FREGE'S PUZZLE -- 0. Introduction -- 1. Four ways of generating Frege's puzzle -- 2. The way that appeals to reasons for behavior -- 3. Two ways the triadist can explain the differences in information conveyed: Differences-in-the-how and differences-about-the-how -- 4. Representational content, qualia, and non-descriptive modes of presentation -- 5. Against differences-about-the-how -- 6. Against differences-in-the-how -- 7. Two false assumptions -- 8. Conclusion -- 4 THE STRUCTURE OF LINGUISTIC COMMUNICATION -- 0. Introduction -- 1. What's implicated and what's said.

2. The philosophical importance of implicature -- 3. The Gricean paradox and two ways of generating it -- 4. The accessibility of Gricean inferences -- 5. The underdetermination of the inferences -- 6. Dispensing with the inferences -- 7. Semantic value as a theoretical entity -- 8. The opacity of semantic value -- 9. Trivial but informative sentences -- 10. True identity statements, belief ascriptions containing true identity statements, etc. -- 11. A kind of conventional implicature -- 12. Conclusion -- 5 BLACK-AND-WHITE MARY -- 0. Introduction -- 1. A first pass at the argument -- 2. A response to the argument -- 3. A qualification: Conveying vs. registering -- 4. Reformulating the argument -- 5. First response: Mary gains only non-propositional knowledge -- 6. The relation between Mary's new propositional and non-propositional knowledge -- 7. Seeing objects vs. seeing properties -- 8. Second response: Mary learns about red' -- 9. Third response: Mary lacks the concept red -- 10. Toward the heart of the argument: Dumbing Mary down -- 11. Toward the heart of the argument: Setting Mary free -- 12. At the heart of the argument -- 13. Why we can't name the properties represented in perception -- 14. Looking some color -- 15. The intuition that colors are represented in perception -- 16. Perceptual representation and dispositionalism about color -- 17. Conclusion -- Notes -- Works Cited -- Index -- A -- B -- C -- D -- E -- F -- G -- H -- I -- J -- K -- L -- M -- N -- P -- R -- S -- T -- V -- W -- Z.