CONTENTS -- Foreword -- Preface -- Acknowledgments -- List of Abbreviations -- List of Actors -- Glossary -- Chapter 1: Early Warnings and Early Action by Bystanders -- 1.1 Introduction -- 1.1.1 Human Rights Standards -- 1.1.2 After the Cold War -- 1.1.3 Perpetrator-Victim-Bystander Approach -- 1.1.4 Third-Party Intervention -- 1.2 The Role of the Bystander -- 1.3 Early Warning -- 1.3.1 Categorizing Early Warnings on Human Rights Violations -- 1.3.2 Linking Gross Human Rights Violations to Violent Conflicts -- 1.4 Early Action -- Chapter 2: The Tribunal's Interpretation and Implementation of the Genocide Convention -- 2.1 The 1948 Convention Definition of Genocide -- 2.2 The Rwanda Tribunal's Definition of Genocide -- 2.2.1 Akayesu's Hate Speech: Direct and Public Incitement to Genocide -- 2.2.2 Hate Propaganda by Radio RTLMC and the Newspaper, Kangura: Genocide -- Chapter 3: Rwandan History -- 3.1 German Colonial Rule -- 3.2 Belgian Colonial Rule -- 3.2.1 Belgian Introduction of Identity Cards -- 3.3 Hutu Dominance After Independence -- 3.4 Tutsi-RPF Invasion in 1990 -- 3.5 Concluding Observations -- Chapter 4: Undermining UNAMIR -- 4.1 The Arusha Peace Accords -- 4.2 The Mission of the Neutral International Force in the Arusha Peace Agreement -- 4.3 The UNAMIR Mandate -- 4.4 Differences Between the Arusha Accords and the UNAMIR Mandate -- 4.5 The Rules of Engagement and the Operational Procedure -- 4.5.1 The Rules of Engagement -- 4.5.2 The Operational Procedure for the Establishment of the Weapon-Free Zone in Kigali -- Chapter 5: The Installment of UNAMIR with Belgian Participation -- 5.1 The Preparation by the Reconnaissance Mission -- 5.2 Belgian Participation -- 5.2.1 The Only Western Country Willing to Participate -- 5.2.2 Belgium Explicitly Requested by the United Nations to Participate.

5.2.3 Belgian Awareness of the Danger of Participating in UNAMIR -- 5.3 Composition of the Peace-Keeping Force and Its Resources -- 5.3.1 No U.N. Intelligence Unit -- 5.4 Concluding Observations -- Chapter 6: Early Warning of Atrocities in 1991-1994 -- 6.1 Hutu Extremism Emerges -- 6.1.1 Military Attacks in 1991-1993 -- 6.1.2 Reaction by Bystander States in Spring 1992 -- 6.1.3 Violence Continues During Arusha Peace Negotiations 1992-1993 -- 6.2 Reports from Diplomats to the Outside World -- 6.3 Reports from Human Rights Organizations -- 6.4 Report from the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Executions -- 6.5 Human Rights Watch Warnings in 1993 and 1994 -- 6.6 American Warnings-CIA-in 1993 and 1994 -- 6.7 Hate Propaganda Is Reported as Early Warning -- 6.7.1 Hate Newspaper Kangura -- 6.7.2 Hate Radio Mille Collines -- Chapter 7: Early Warnings from November to January -- 7.1 A Violent Start for UNAMIR -- 7.2 The Machiavelli Plan -- 7.3 Announcements on the Distribution ofArms -- 7.4 Knowledge of the Distribution ofArms -- 7.5 Inability to Install the Broad Based Transitional Government (BBTG) -- 7.6 The First Violent Demonstration -- Chapter 8: The Genocide Fax and the Prohibition from U.N. Headquarters to Act -- 8.1 Marchal Meets Informant Jean Pierre -- 8.2 The Genocide Fax -- 8.3 The Recipients of the Fax -- 8.4 The Instructions Following the Genocide Fax -- 8.4.1 The First Response from Annan and Riza to Booh Booh -- 8.4.2 The Direct Reaction from Booh Booh to New York -- 8.4.3 New York's Reaction to Booh Booh and Dallaire -- 8.4.4 Communications Between Dallaire and New York -- 8.4.5 Dallaire's Vain Attempts to Influence Booh Booh -- 8.5 Arms Raids and the Scope of Resolution 872's Mandate -- 8.6 Conclusions on the U.N. Political Leadership of Annan, Riza and Annabi.

Chapter 9: The Negative Response of New York and Capitals in the West to the Deteriorating Situation -- 9.1 Following the Instructions After the Genocide Fax -- 9.2 The Response of the Heads of Missions of France, Belgium and the United States to the Fax of Dallaire -- 9.3 Jean Pierre Proves His Story but Is Denied Asylum -- Chapter 10: Deteriorating Security in Rwanda and the Negative Response from New York from January Up Until March -- 10.1 Political Deadlock in the Arusha Peace Agreements -- 10.2 January 1994 -- 10.3 February 1994 -- 10.4 March 1994 -- 10.5 April 1994 -- 10.6 Concluding Observations -- Chapter 11: Requests from Dallaire and from Belgium to New York for a Stronger and Firmer Broadened Mandate for UNAMIR -- 11.1 Dallaire's Requests to Seize Arms -- 11.1.1 Failure of U.N. Top Officials -- 11.2 Belgium Asks for a More Robust Role for UNAMIR -- 11.3 Conclusion -- Chapter 12: UNAMIR: Its Mandate and the Offending Belgian Role -- 12.1 SC Resolution 909, April 5, 1994: A Possibility to Broaden the UNAMIR Mandate -- 12.2 The American Attitude Toward Peace-Keeping in 1994 -- 12.3 Continuing Anti-Belgian Feeling -- 12.4 Radio Broadcasts Reinforce the Anti-Belgian Climate -- 12.5 Anti-Belgian Incidents -- 12.6 Belgian Peace-Keepers: An Easy Target -- Chapter 13: The Start of the Genocide -- 13.1 Indifference as to Who Shot the Plane Down -- 13.2 The First 12 Hours Following the Plane Crash -- 13.2.1 A Denial of Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyamana's Authority -- 13.2.2 UNAMIR Fails to Protect Madame Agathe -- 13.2.3 The Killings Start with a Politicide -- 13.2.4 Contact Between Riza and Dallaire in the First Hours After the Crash -- 13.3 Death ofTen Belgian Peace-Keepers -- 13.3.1 Jean Pierre's Prediction Becomes Reality -- 13.3.2 New York's First Response upon the Death of the Ten Belgian Paramilitary Commandos.

13.3.3 Marchal and Dewez Heavily Criticized in Belgium -- 13.4 Conclusion -- Chapter 14: Evacuation -- 14.1 U.S. Reaction to the Crash -- 14.2 Evacuation by the American Military -- 14.3 Evacuation by the French Military -- 14.4 Evacuation by the Belgian Military -- 14.5 U.N. Role in the Evacuation -- 14.6 Conclusion on the Possible Preventative Role of the EvacuationForces -- Chapter 15: Belgian Decision to Withdraw Its Troops -- 15.1 Introduction -- 15.2 Belgian Efforts to Change the Mandate -- 15.2.1 Belgium Asks for an Explanation of the Mandate Immediately After the Plane Crash -- 15.2.2 Belgium Requests a Change of the Mandate After the Death of the Ten Paramilitary Commandos -- 15.2.3 Sincerity of the Belgian Requests for a Broader Mandate -- 15.3 Belgian Participation at Stake After the Killings of the Belgian Paramilitary Commandos -- 15.4 Belgium Decides to Withdraw -- 15.4.1 The Belgian Cabinet Prepares for the Meeting of Minister Claes with the U.N. Secretary-General -- 15.4.2 Minister Claes Meets the U.N. Secretary-General on April 12 in Bonn -- 15.5 Belgium Starts Campaigning for a Total Withdrawal ofUNAMIR -- 15.5.1 Telling the World that UNAMIR Has Become Pointless -- 15.5.2 The Belgian Explanation for Its Efforts to Get a Total Withdrawal -- 15.6 Conclusion -- Chapter 16: The Response of the Security Council -- 16.1 Introduction -- 16.2 The Secretary-General's Response on the Death of the Peace-Keepers and the Belgian Withdrawal -- 16.2.1 The Secretary-General's April 8 Letter to the Security Council -- 16.2.2 Boutros-Ghali's Response to the Security Council After His Meeting with Minister Claes -- 16.3 The Security Council: What to Do After the Belgian Withdrawal -- 16.3.1 April 13: A Meeting of Troop-Contributing States and an Informal Security Council Meeting.

16.3.2 April 14: An Informal Security Council Meeting-Three Options Are Presented to the Council -- 16.3.3 April 15: Another Informal Security Council Meeting-A Decision Without Saying "No" -- 16.4 DPKO Suddenly Wants a Total Withdrawal -- 16.4.1 Information from Dallaire to New York -- 16.4.2 Reverse Reaction from New York by Riza on Input from Dallaire -- 16.4.3 Annan Favors Withdrawal -- 16.5 Boutros-Ghali Suddenly Comes Up with an Option to Reinforce the Mission -- 16.6 Unanimous Adoption of Resolution 912: Leaving a Symbolic Number of Peace-Keepers Behind -- 16.7 Resolution 918: UNAMIR II, Enforcement Up to 5,500 Troops -- Chapter 17: The Role of the Netherlands Throughout the Genocide -- 17.1 The Dutch Role in UNOMUR and UNAMIR -- 17.2 Meetings During the Genocide Within International Organizations and the EU -- 17.3 Rwanda in the Dutch Parliament -- 17.4 Dutch Non-Role in Peace-Keeping -- 17.5 Pronk's Visits to Rwanda -- 17.6 Efforts to Alleviate the Refugee Problems in Goma -- Chapter 18: Apologies from Bystanders Ten Years Later -- 18.1 Apologies from Belgium -- 18.2 Apologies from the United States -- 18.3 Apologies from France -- 18.4 Apologies from the European Union -- 18.5 Apologies from the African Union -- 18.6 Apologies from the United Nations -- 18.6.1 Early and Clear Warning -- 18.7 Lessons Learned at U.N. Summit 2005 -- Chapter 19: Conclusions -- Annexes -- 1 Scheme "Hurivic," Human Rights Violations and Conflict -- 2 Organization and Composition of UNAMIR -- 3 Fax Dallaire -- 4 List of Early Warnings -- Bibliography -- Index.