CONTENTS -- Preface -- Acknowledgements -- About the Author -- List of Abbreviations -- Chapter 1: Introduction -- A. Key Concepts: Strategic Surprise and Intelligence Failure -- 1. Strategic Surprise -- 2. Intelligence Failure -- B. The "New Terrorism" -- 1. Qualitative and Quantitative Changes in the Terrorist Threat -- 2. The Challenge to Government -- C. Sources of Intelligence Failure -- 1. Leadership and Policy Failures -- 2. Organizational and Bureaucratic Issues -- 3. Problems with Warning Information -- 4. Analytical Challenges -- D. Understanding Mass Casualty Terrorism, 1993-2001 -- Chapter 2: February 26, 1993: The World Trade Center -- A. Introduction -- 1. The Streets ofNew York -- 2. The First Big Surprise -- B. Leadership Failures -- 1. Psychology, Perception and the Threat Environment -- 2. Setting Priorities for Intelligence Collection -- 3. Failures of Public Policy Leadership -- a. Policy Toward Israel and the Palestinians -- b. Iraq Policy -- c. Immigration Policy -- C. Organizational Obstacles -- 1. Obstacle #1: FBI Culture and Confidential Informants -- 2. Obstacle #2: Federal-State Coordination -- 3. Obstacle #3: FBI-CIA TurfWars -- 4. Obstacle #4: FBI Investigations vs. Intelligence -- 5. Obstacle #5: Executive and Legislative Restrictions -- D. Threat and Warning Information -- 1. Threat Indicators-Hiding in Plain Sight -- 2. Warning Indicators-Signals vs. Noise -- a. Where: The Twin Towers -- b. What: The Car Bomb -- c. When: A Date with History-The Liberation of Kuwait -- d. Who: Individuals-A Story of Missed Opportunities -- i. The Masterminds -- ii. The Other Iraqi -- 3. Missed Opportunities -- E. Analytical Challenges -- F. The First Avoidable Surprise? -- G. Conclusion -- Chapter 3: April -- 19, 1995: Oklahoma City -- A. Introduction -- 1. What Was the Nature of the Surprise? -- B. Leadership Failures.

1. Psychology, Perception, and the Threat Environment -- 2. The Perceived Threat Environment -- 3. Failures of Public Policy Leadership -- a. Broad Federal Policy Areas -- b. Waco and Ruby Ridge -- c. Gun Control -- C. Organizational Obstacles -- 1. The First Amendment and Domestic Surveillance -- 2. Law Enforcement Culture and Attitudes -- 3. Law Enforcement Coordination -- D. Threat and Warning Information -- 1. The Threat from the Far Right -- 2. Specific Warning Indicators -- 3. Possible Indicators from "Others Unknown" -- a. Other "Others Unknown" -- b. Other Iraqis Unknown -- c. Other Foreign Terrorists Unknown -- 4. No Warning -- 5. Failing to Learn -- a. Summary: Threat and Warning Indicators -- E. Analytical Challenges -- F. Conclusion -- Chapter 4: June 25, 1996: Khobar Towers, Saudi Arabia -- A. Introduction -- 1. The U.S. Mission in the Persian Gulf -- 2. The First Signs of Trouble: 1994-95 -- 3. Heightened Security at U.S. Installations -- 4. What Was the Nature of the Surprise at Khobar Towers? -- 5. Competing Judgments on the Failure -- B. Leadership Failures -- 1. The Perceived Threat Environment in Saudi Arabia Prior to -- November 1995 -- 2. Perceptions ofThreat After OPM/SANG -- 3. The Charge of "Mission Creep" -- 4. Efforts to Enhance Force Protection -- a. What Went Right -- b. What Went Wrong -- 5. Sensitivity to Host Country Concerns -- 6. Failures of Public Policy Leadership -- a. U.S. Policy Towards Iran -- b. U.S. Policy and Saudi Arabia -- C. Organizational Obstacles -- 1. For Lack of a SOFA -- 2. Structure of the Military Chain of Command -- 3. Lack of Guidance from DOD -- 4. Money and Manpower -- 5. Conclusions on Organizational Obstacles -- D. Threat and Warning Information -- 1. Threat Indicators in the Kingdom -- 2. Warning Indicators -- a. What? A Vehicle Bomb -- b. When? Soon!.

c. Where? The Three Most Vulnerable Sites -- d. How? Surveillance and Planning -- 3. Conclusions on Threat and Warning -- E. Analytical Challenges -- 1. The Lack of Human Intelligence -- F. Conclusion -- 1. The Final Question: Whodunit? -- 2. Was the Surprise at Khobar Towers Avoidable? -- 3. Final Thoughts on the Bombing of Khobar Towers -- Chapter 5: August 7, 1998: U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania -- A. Simultaneous Destruction -- 1. The Attacks -- 2. The Response -- 3. The Surprise in East Africa -- 4. A Step Back in Time: The 1983 Bombing of the U.S -- Embassy in Beirut -- B. Leadership Failures -- 1. Psychology, Perception, and the Threat Environment -- a. Perceived Threats in East Africa -- 2. Failures of Public Policy Leadership -- a. U.S. Policy Toward Sudan -- b. Law Enforcement vs. Intelligence -- c. Embassy Security -- 3. Losing Bin Laden? -- C. Organizational Obstacles -- 1. Diplomatic Insecurity -- 2. CIA: The Central Inaction Agency -- 3. A Narrow Miss of Major Proportions -- D. Threat and Warning Information -- 1. Strategic Intelligence and Threat Indicators -- 2. Warning Indicators -- a. Public Warnings and Old Patterns -- b. Specific Warnings in East Africa -- c. A Note About Iraq -- E. Analytical Challenges -- F. Was the Failure Avoidable? -- G. Conclusion: Surprise and Failure in East Africa -- Chapter 6: September 11,2001: The Twin Towers -- A. Introduction -- 1. What Was the Nature of the Surprise? -- B. Leadership Failures -- 1. Leadership in the 1990s -- 2. Leadership 2001 -- 3. Bush Administration Policies Before 9/11 -- a. The Pre-9/11 Threat Environment -- b. No Response to the USS Cole -- c. Administrative Transition -- 4. Congressional Responsibility -- C. Organizational Obstacles -- 1. FBI Structure and Technology -- 2. CIA Culture and Priorities -- 3. Information Sharing -- 4. Immigration Enforcement.

5. Transportation Security -- 6. Organizational Obstacles Remain -- D. Threat and Warning Information -- 1. Threat Indicators -- 2. Threat Indicators Prior to 9/11 -- 3. Warning Indicators -- 4. Warning Indicators Prior to 9/11 -- a. Likely Methods -- b. The Plotters -- c. Estimated Timing and Possible Targets -- d. Last-Minute Indicators -- E. Analytical Challenges -- 1. Intelligence Planning -- 2. Collection -- 3. Collation and Information Sharing -- 4. Analysis -- 5. Dissemination -- F. Key Findings Pertaining to 9/11 -- 1. Findings of the Joint Inquiry and the 9/11 Commission -- 2. Additional Findings -- a. Threat Assessments -- b. Restrictions on Intelligence Collection -- Chapter 7: Surprise, Again and Again -- A. Intelligence Failures -- B. Failures of Public Policy Leadership -- C. Organizational Obstacles -- D. Threat and Warning Information -- E. Analytical Challenges -- 1. Intelligence Planning -- 2. Collection -- 3. Collation and Information Sharing -- 4. Analysis -- 5. Dissemination -- F. Policy Recommendations -- 1. Recommendations by the Joint Inquiry and the 9/11 Commission -- 2. Recommendations from this Study -- a. Structure of the Intelligence Community -- b. Legal Authorities -- c. Congressional Accountability -- d. Strategic Intelligence -- G. Final Thoughts on the Inevitability of Surprise -- H. Epilogue -- Appendix: Government-Imposed Restrictions on FBI Domestic Terrorism Investigations -- Bibliography -- Index.