Lessons from the Financial Crisis: Causes, Consequences and Our Economic Future -- Contents -- Acknowledgments -- Editor's Note -- Introduction -- Part I: Overview of the Crisis -- Chapter 1: Leverage and Liberal Democracy -- Chapter 2: A Property Economics Explanation of the Global Financial Crisis -- Chapter 3: Of Subprimes and Sundry Symptoms: The Political Economy of the Financial Crisis -- Chapter 4: The Political Economy of the Financial Crisis of 2008 -- Chapter 5: The Global Financial Crisis of 2008: What Went Wrong? -- Chapter 6: The Roots of the Crisis and How to Bring It to a Close -- Chapter 7: Enron Rerun: The Credit Crisis in Three Easy Pieces -- Chapter 8: The Global Crisis and Its Origins -- Chapter 9: Four Paradoxes of the 2008-2009 Economic and Financial Crisis -- Chapter 10: Understanding the Subprime Financial Crisis -- Part II: Causes and Consequences of the Financial Crisis -- Chapter 11: The Origins of the Financial Crisis -- Chapter 12: Ten Myths About Subprime Mortgages -- Chapter 13: The Financial Crisis: How Did We Get Here and Where Do We Go Next? New Evidence on How the Crisis Spread Among Finanacial Institutions -- Chapter 14: A Decade of Living Dangerously: The Causes and Consequences of the Mortgage, Financial, and Economic Crises -- Chapter 15: Making Sense of the Subprime Crisis -- Chapter 16: Miraculous Financial Engineering or Legacy Assets? -- Chapter 17: The Making and Ending of the Financial Crisis of 2007-2009 -- Chapter 18: The Subprime Mortgage Problem: Causes and Likely Cure -- Chapter 19: Sequence of Asset Bubbles and the Global Financial Crisis -- Part III: Borrowers -- Chapter 20: The Past, Present, and Future of Subprime Mortgages -- Chapter 21: FHA Loans and Policy Responses to Credit Availability.

Chapter 22: The Single-Family Mortgage Industry in the Internet Era: Technology Developments and Market Structure -- Chapter 23: Speed Kills? Mortgage Credit Boom and the Crisis -- Chapter 24: Subprime Mortgages: What We Have Learned From a New Class of Homeowners -- Chapter 25: Rating Agencies: Facilitators of Predatory Lending in the Subprime Market -- Part IV: The Process of Securitization -- Chapter 26: A Primer on the Role of Securitization in the Credit Market Crisis of 2007 -- Chapter 27: Incentives in the Originate-to-Distribute Model of Mortgage Production -- Chapter 28: Did Securitization Lead to Lax Screening? Evidence from Subprime Loans -- Chapter 29: Tumbling Tower of Babel: Subprime Securitization and the Credit Crisis -- Chapter 30: The Incentives of Mortgage Servicers and Designing Loan Modifications to Address the Mortgage Crisis -- Chapter 31: The Contribution of Structured Finance to the Financial Crisis: An Introductory Overview -- Chapter 32: Problematic Practices of Credit Rating Agencies: The Neglected Risks of Mortgage-Backed Securities -- Chapter 33: Did Asset Complexity Trigger Ratings Bias? -- Chapter 34: The Pitfalls of Originate-to-Distribute in Bank Lending -- Part V: Risk Management and Mismanagement -- Chapter 35: Behavioral Basis of the Financial Crisis -- Chapter 36: Risk Management Failures During the Financial Crisis -- Chapter 37: The Outsourcing of Financial Regulation to Risk Models -- Chapter 38: The Future of Risk Modeling -- Chapter 39: What Happened to Risk Management During the 2008-2009 Financial Crisis? -- Chapter 40: Risk Management Lessons from the Global Financial Crisis for Derivative Exchanges -- Part VI: The Problem of Regulation -- Chapter 41: Regulation and Financial Stability in the Age of Turbulence.

Chapter 42: The Financial Crisis of 2007-2009: Missing Financial Regulation or Absentee Regulators? -- Chapter 43: The Demise of the United Kingdom's Northern Rock and Large U.S. Financial Institutions: Public Policy Lessons -- Chapter 44: Why Securities Regulation Failed to Prevent the CDO Meltdown -- Chapter 45: Curbing Optimism in Managerial Estimates Through Transparent Accounting -- Chapter 46: Basel II Put on Trial: What Role in the Financial Crisis? -- Chapter 47: Credit Rating Organizations, Their Role in the Current Calamity, and Future Prospects for Reform -- Chapter 48: Global Regulation for Global Markets? -- Chapter 49: Financial Regulation, Behavioral Finance, and the Global Financial Crisis: In Search of a New Regulatory Model -- Part VII: Institutional Failures -- Chapter 50: Why Financial Conglomerates Are at the Center of the Financial Crisis -- Chapter 51: Corporate Governance and the Financial Crisis: A Case Study From the S&P 500 -- Chapter 52: Secondary-Management Conflicts -- Chapter 53: The Financial Crisis and the Systemic Failure of Academic Economics -- Chapter 54: Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac: Privatizing Profit and Socializing Loss -- Chapter 55: Disclosure's Failure in the Subprime Mortgage Crisis -- Part VIII: The Federal Reserve, Monetary Policy, and the Financial Crisis -- Chapter 56: Federal Reserve Policy and the Housing Bubble -- Chapter 57: The Greenspan and Bernanke Federal Reserve Roles in the Financial Crisis -- Chapter 58: The Risk Management Approach to Monetary Policy: Lessons from the Financial Crisis of 2007-2009 -- Chapter 59: Reawakening the Inflationary Monster: U.S. Monetary Policy and the Federal Reserve -- Chapter 60: The Transformation of the Federal Reserve System Balance Sheet and Its Implications -- Part IX: Implications of the Crisis for Our Economic Systems.

Chapter 61: Systemic Risk and Markets -- Chapter 62: The Transmission of Liquidity Shocks During the Crisis: Ongoing Research into the Transmission of Liquidity Shock Suggests the Emergence of New Channels During the Credit Crisis -- Chapter 63: Credit Contagion From Counterparty Risk -- Part X: International Dimensions of the Financial Crisis -- Chapter 64: Only in America? When Housing Boom Turns to Bust -- Chapter 65: The Equity Risk Premium Amid a Global Financial Crisis -- Chapter 66: Australia's Experience in the Global Financial Crisis -- Chapter 67: Collapse of a Financial System: An Icelandic Saga -- Chapter 68: Iceland's Banking Sector and the Political Economy of Crisis -- Chapter 69: The Subprime Crisis: Implications for Emerging Markets -- Part XI: Financial Solutions and Our Economic Future -- Chapter 70: The Long-Term Cost of the Financial Crisis -- Chapter 71: Coping with the Financial Crisis: Illiquidity and the Role of Government Intervention -- Chapter 72: Fiscal Policy for the Crisis -- Chapter 73: The Future of Securitization -- Chapter 74: Modification of Mortgages in Bankruptcy -- Chapter 75: The Shadow Bankruptcy System -- Chapter 76: Reregulating Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac -- Chapter 77: Would Greater Regulation of Hedge Funds Reduce Systemic Risk? -- Chapter 78: Regulating Credit Default Swaps -- Index.