Cover -- Half-title -- Title -- Copyright -- Dedication -- Contents -- Tables -- Contributors -- Acknowledgments -- 1 Theory and international history -- Introduction -- Realist approaches -- Tasks of this volume -- Conclusion -- 2 Transformations in power -- Summary introduction -- Failures of war: resulting from excessive or inappropriate notions of power -- Failures of peace: when history failed to turn -- The 1780s and 1870s -- The successes of peace: enduring periods of intensive maximization -- 1815-1848 -- 1870-1890 -- The future -- Conclusion -- 3 Domestically driven deviations: internal regimes, leaders, and realism's power line -- The abstract question -- Domestic regime -- Who governs? -- States' preferences -- Cognition and judgment -- Domestic cohesiveness -- Foreigners' reactions to the state -- How would we know? -- Conclusion -- 4 How international institutions affect outcomes -- Institutional theory as a partial challenge to realism -- Identifying anomalies in realism -- Institutional theory -- Observable implications of institutional theory -- Challenges to institutional theory -- Attempts at synthesis -- A realist theory of "binding" -- Institutional theory and domestic politics -- The endogeneity trap and the delegation escape -- Endogenous, yes but epiphenomenal? -- Conclusions: Institutions as endogenous and consequential -- 5 Not even for the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries: power and order in the early modern era -- 6 Austria-Hungary and the coming of the First World War -- I -- II -- III -- IV -- 7 British decisions for peace and war 1938-1939: the rise and fall of realism -- The example of Godesberg -- The decision for war -- 8 Realism and risk in 1938: German foreign policy and the Munich Crisis -- I -- II -- III -- IV -- V -- 9 Domestic politics, interservice impasse, and Japan's decisions for war.

A "realist" Imperial Japan? -- 10 Military audacity: Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, and China's adventure in Korea -- Perceptions of martial prowess and foreign policy -- Assessing the martial confidence of Mao and Liu -- China's adventure in Korea -- The decision to intervene -- Perceptions of martial prowess and the decision -- Alternative perspectives -- Conclusion -- 11 The United States' underuse of military power -- 12 The overuse of American power -- Unipolarity vs. unilateralism (the overuse of power) -- Dissuasion or persuasion? -- Regime change or behavior change? -- Conclusion -- 13 Redrawing the Soviet power line: Gorbachev and the end of the Cold War -- Realistic power line and Gorbachev's foreign policy -- The Soviet Union's declining power position -- New Thinking and its alternatives -- Identity and status -- The Soviet Union and soft power -- Social identity theory and the New Thinking -- The Soviet Union as moral, visionary leader -- Implementation of the New Thinking -- Conclusion -- 14 Shared sovereignty in the European Union: Germany's economic governance -- The Schuman Plan: the first step in shared sovereignty -- Germany and the Rome treaties -- The European Monetary System -- The Single European Act -- Toward economic and monetary union -- The Maastricht Treaty and EMU -- Conclusion -- 15 John Mearsheimer's "elementary geometry of power": Euclidean moment or an intellectual blind alley? -- 16 History and neorealism reconsidered -- Chapter conclusions -- Factors that influence national position on or off the power line -- 1. International power -- 2. Domestic politics and ideology -- 3. International leadership -- 4. Domains of loss or gain -- The result: The interaction of leadership, international power, domain of loss/gain, and domestic politics/ideology -- Arrogation of case studies: historical cases -- Redefinitions of power?.

Hedgehog or fox? -- Index.