Fact and Value in Emotion -- Editorial page -- Title page -- LCC data -- Table of contents -- Fact and value in emotion -- 1 The humean schism -- 2 Themes of the book -- 3 Chapter summaries -- References -- A moral line in the sand -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Problems with 'Moral' -- 3 Hume and Rousseau on the passions -- 4 Crichton and Pinel on the passions -- 5 Crichton's manifesto -- 6 Pinel's moral treatment -- 7 Crichton's legacy -- 8 Pinel's legacy -- 9 The dilemma -- References -- How to evaluate the factual basis of emotional appraisals? -- 1 The problem -- 2 The situational warrant of emotion in philosophy and clinical psychology -- 3 Philosophical theories of emotional appropriateness -- 4 Emotional authenticity -- 5 Emotional truth -- 6 Emotional authenticity and truth in psychotherapeutic practice -- 7 Conclusions -- References -- The problem with too much anger -- 1 Vignette -- 2 What is anger? -- 3 Anger, extremes, and dispositional anger. -- 4 The doubling effect of injury on anger -- 5 What impedes giving uptake to real-time anger? -- 6 Anger and gender norms. -- 7 Conclusion -- References -- A confusion of pains -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Conceptual clarifications -- 2.1 Pain is not the simulation of pain receptors -- 2.2 Pain is not merely an episode of simple, localized sensory experience -- 2.3 Painful sensations, like 'merely psychological' pain and suffering, may be psychologenically cau -- 2.4 Emotional pain is not a metaphor -- 2.5 Although analogous, s-pain and e-pain differ -- 2.6 Separate e-pain may accompany s-pain -- 2.7 There can be no co-morbidity between s-pain and e-pain -- 3 Pain in psychiatry -- 3.1 E-pain is a symptom indicator of mental disorder -- 4 Conclusion -- References -- Ethical implications of emotional impairment -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Framework.

3 Ethical implications of emotional impairment in major depression -- 4 Ethical implications of emotional impairment in narcissistic personality disorder -- 5 Ethical implications of emotional impairment in schizophrenia -- 6 Conclusion -- References -- Facts and values in emotional plasticity -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Conceptual clarifications -- 2.1 The components of emotions -- 2.2 Models of plasticity -- 3 The development of emotions -- 3.1 Order of development of emotions -- 3.2 Models of development -- 3.3 The plasticity of emotional components -- 3.3.1 Appraisal mechanisms -- 3.3.2 Emotional expression -- 3.3.3 Emotional experience -- 3.3.4 Emotional dispositions -- 3.4 Discussion -- 4 Conclusion -- References -- Attributing aberrant emotionality to others -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Perceiving emotions in others -- 3 Attributing aberrant emotionality to groups I: Denying uniquely human attributes -- 4 Attributing aberrant emotionality to groups II: Denying human nature -- 5 Attributing aberrant emotionality to individuals -- References -- Emotion and the neural substrate of moral judgment -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Prinz's sentimentalism -- 3 Embodiment and appraisal -- 4 Testing, testing -- 5 Tasks of moral judgment -- 6 Evidence of appraisal -- 7 Structure of an emotional mechanism -- 8 Conclusion -- References -- The phenomenology of alexithymia as a clue to the intentionality of emotion -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Two kinds of alexithymia -- 3 Alexithymic phenomenology -- 4 Phenomenological distinctions and biological mechanisms -- 5 Two alexithymias, again -- 6 Conclusion -- References -- A phenomenologist's view of the omnipresence of the evaluative in human experience -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Martin heidegger's phenomenological philosophy: knowledge as a founded mode -- 3 The care-structure and a phenomenological psychological theory -- 4 Implications.

4.1 The primacy of care -- 4.2 The primacy of emotion -- 4.3 Reason and emotion -- 4.4 Fact and value in emotion -- 4.5 Epistemological and methodological implications -- 4.6 How neuroscience fits in with this -- 5 Discussion and conclusions -- References -- Index -- The Consciousness & Emotion Book Series.