I. Introduction -- Chapter 1 Different Perspectives from which to Approach the Concept of Law -- 1. The Difference between Formal and Material Perspectives -- 2. Formal Perspective: The Three-dimensional Method in the Study of Law -- 2.1. Structural Three-dimensionalism: The Values Plane, the Norms Plane, and the Facts Plane -- 2.2. Three-dimensionalism of Principles -- 2.3. Anthropological Three-dimensionalism: the Believer in the Church, the Citizen of the State, and the Individual in the Family -- 2.4. Three-dimensionalism and the Theory of Knowledge -- 2.5. Three-dimensionalism in Different Subject Areas of the Law -- 3. Material Perspective -- 3.1. From the Concept of Law to the Concept of Objective Law -- 3.2. From the Concept of Objective Law to the Concept of Positive Law -- 3.3. From the Concept of Positive Law to the Concept of the Legal Order -- 3.4. From the Concept of the Legal Order to the Concept of the Legal Norm -- 3.5. From the Concept of the Legal Norm to the Concept of Statute Law -- 3.6. From the Concept of Statute Law to the Concept of Regulations -- II. Theory of the Legal Norm -- Chapter 2 Concept of the Legal Norm -- 1. Defining the Legal Norm as Compared with Other Types of Norms -- 1.1. The Legal Norm and the Moral Norm -- 1.1.1. Differentiating Characteristics between Law and Morality -- A) By Subject -- B) By Object -- C) By Value Judgments -- D) By Coercive or Non-coercive Character -- a) General Idea -- b) Foundation and Goal of Punishment. Punishment and Deterrents -- E) By Heteronomous or Autonomous Character -- F) By the Type of Norm -- G) By the Sought-after Ends. Other Diff erentiating Criteria -- 1.1.2. Relationships between Law and Morality -- 1.2. The Legal Norm and Social Customs -- 2. Structure of the Legal Norm -- 2.1. The Ratio.

2.2. The Factual Situation and the Legal Consequence. The Legal Norm as Hypothetical Judgment. The Relevance of Causality and the Relevance of Imputation -- Chapter 3 Analytical-Linguistic Consideration of the Legal Norm, as a Prescriptive Proposition -- 1. Initial Considerations Regarding this Process of Analysis -- 2. The Concept of Proposition and how it Differs from Other Concepts -- 3. Types of Propositions. The Traditional Approach and Enrico Pattaro's Approach -- 3.1. The Representative or Semantic Function of Language -- 3.2. The Descriptive Function of Language -- 3.3. The Prescriptive or Preceptive Function of Language -- 3.4. The Emotive Function of Language. Relationship with the Expressive Function -- Chapter 4 Classifi cations of the Legal Norms -- 1. Primary and Secondary Norms. Historical Criteria for Differentiation -- 1.1. The Temporal or Neutral Criteria: The Traditional Conception -- 1.2. The Axiological-Functional Criteria: The Innovative Thesis of Rudolf von Ihering (1818-1892) in Tension with Karl Binding (1841-1920). The Kelsenian Position -- 1.3. The Conciliatory Theory of H. L. A. Hart in The Concept of Law. Types of Secondary Rules -- 1.4. The Axiological-Hierarchical Criteria: Differentiation in Constitutional Law -- 2. Other Classification Criteria for Legal Norms -- 2.1. By Material Effectiveness -- 2.1.1. General and Individual Norms -- 2.1.2. Abstract and Concrete Norms -- 2.1.3. Regular Norm, Exceptional Norm-the Privilege-and Special Norm -- 2.1.4. Necessary and Dispositive Norms -- 2.1.5. Complete and Incomplete Norms (Explanatory: Legal Defi nitions -- Restrictive -- and Remittible: Legal Fictions) -- 2.2. By Effectiveness in Time: Permanent Norms, Temporary Norms, and Transitory norms -- 2.3. By Effectiveness in Space: Universal Norms, General or Common Norms, and Particular or Local Norms.

2.4. The Distinction Between the Norms of Public Law and Those of Private Law -- 2.4.1. The Distinction from the Perspective of the Legal Relationship -- A) By the Subjects -- a) By the Nature of the Subjects -- b) By the Position of the Subjects -- B) By the Object -- C) Cicu's Thesis -- 2.4.2. The Distinction from the Perspective of Legal Norms -- A) By the Character of Necessary Law or Dispositive Law -- B) By the Form of Protection -- C) By the Status of the Legal Norm -- 2.4.3. Critical Conclusion -- III. Theory of the Legal Order -- A) Moments or Phases in the Life of the Legal Order: The Formation, the Interpretation, and the Application -- Chapter 5 Formation of the Legal Order: Theory of the Sources of Law -- 1. The Sources of Law -- 1.1. Formal and Material Sources of Law -- 1.2. De Lege Data Sources and de Lege Ferenda Sources: Their Hierarchy -- 1.2.1. Analysis of Article 1 of the Preliminary Title of the Spanish Civil Code -- 1.2.2. The Issue in the 1978 Spanish Constitution -- 2. Communitarian Law -- 3. Written Law as the Principal Source in the Roman-Germanic System -- 3.1. Codification and Constitutionalism -- 3.2. The Legality Principle -- 3.3. The Hierarchy of the Different Types of Law in a Broad Sense -- 3.3.1. The Constitution as a Supreme Law -- 3.3.2. International Treaties -- 3.3.3. Organic Laws -- 3.3.4. Ordinary Laws -- 3.3.5. Executive Branch Norms: Executive Orders and Legislative Decrees -- Regulations -- 4. Custom as a Spontaneous Reiteration of the Acts of the People -- 4.1. Concept and Requirements -- 4.2. Types of Custom -- 4.3. Proof of Custom -- 5. General Principles of Law -- 5.1. Naturalist and Positivist Conceptions: Express and Non-Express General Positive Principles -- 5.2. Constitutional Principles -- 5.3. Other Classifications of Principles Based on Their Objective, Level of Generality, and Function.

6. Case Law -- 6.1. Diverse Understandings of the Term -- 6.1.1. Iurisprudentia as Science-in Roman Law -- 6.1.2. Precedent-in the Common Law System -- 6.1.3. Jurisprudence as Judicial Phenomenon-in the Roman-Germanic System -- 6.2. The Requirements of Case Law -- 6.3. The Legal Value of Case Law -- 7. Contracts -- 8. Jurisprudence -- Chapter 6 Interpretation of the Legal Order -- 1. Interconnection between the Processes of Application and Interpretation of Law -- 2. The concept of Interpretation. Elements -- 2.1. The Anima or Purpose -- the Corpus or Object -- 2.2. The Means or Criteria of Interpretation: Article 3.1 of the Preliminary Title of the Spanish Civil Code -- 2.2.1. The Literal or Grammatical Interpretation -- 2.2.2. The Logical Interpretation -- A) Legal Formalism -- B) The Anti-formalist Revolt -- 2.2.3. The Systematic Interpretation -- 2.2.4. The Historical Interpretation -- 2.2.5. The Sociological Interpretation -- 3. Types of Interpretation -- 3.1. By its Results: Declarative-Broad, Strict-, Extensive, Restrictive, and Corrective -- 3.2. By its Author: Private, Public-Authentic, Official, and Common -- 3.3. By its Object: Interpretation "of" the Constitution and Interpretation "from" the Constitution -- 3.4. Product-interpretation and Activity-interpretation -- Chapter 7 Application of the Legal Order -- 1. Analogy -- 1.1. Concept -- 1.2. Origin and Historical Evolution -- 1.3. Foundation -- 1.4. Function -- 1.5. Requirements -- 1.6. Field of Applicability -- 1.6.1. Analogy in Criminal Law -- 1.6.2. Analogy and Exceptional Norms -- 1.7. The Difference between Analogy and other Similar Concepts: Analogy and Extensive Interpretation -- 2. Equity -- 2.1. Equity as "Vitalized Justice" -- 2.2. Its Complex Meaning and Variable Content in Different Time Periods and Legal Systems. Historical Types of Equity in Western European Culture.

2.2.1. The Aristotelian Epieikeia -- 2.2.2. The Roman Aequitas (the Aequum et Bonum) -- 2.2.3. The Christian Benignitas and the Canonical Aequitas -- 2.2.4. Equity According to the Conceptions of Medieval and Modern Writers from Continental Europe -- 2.2.5. The Concept of Anglo-American Equity -- 2.3. Equity in Continental Private Law and in Continental Public Law-Especially in Public International Law -- 2.4. Equity and General Principles of Law -- 3. Other Types of Legal Arguments -- 3.1. Arguments Based on the Ratio: A Fortiori Argument and A Contrario Argument -- 3.2. Other Legal Arguments -- 3.2.1. The A Cohaerentia Argument -- 3.2.2. The Sedes Materiae Argument -- 3.2.3. The A Rubrica Argument -- 3.2.4. The Non-redundant Argument -- 3.2.5. The Ad Absurdum Argument -- 3.2.6. The Pragmatic Argument -- 3.2.7. The Argument of Authority -- 3.2.8. The Psychological Argument -- B) Characteristics of the Legal Order: Completeness, Coherence, and Unity -- Chapter 8 The Completeness of the Legal Order. Gaps in the Law -- 1. Principal Theories Utilized by the Legal Order's Dogma of Completeness -- 1.1. The Theory of Empty Legal Space -- 1.2. The Theory of the Exclusive General Norm -- 1.3. The Theory of the Non Liquet Prohibition -- 2. The Problem of Gaps in the Law -- 2.1. The Concept and Types of Gaps in the Law -- 2.2. The Principal Legal Means of Filling in Gaps in the Law -- 2.2.1. Hetero-integration: Resort to Natural Law -- 2.2.2. Self-integration -- 2.2.3. Judicial Discretion -- Chapter 9 The Coherence of the Legal Order. Legal Antinomies -- 1. The Concept of System -- 2. The Problem of Antinomies -- 2.1. Concept and Types of Antinomies. False Antinomies -- 2.2. Criteria for the Resolution of Antinomies -- 2.2.1. Criteria for the Resolution of First-level Antinomies or between Norms: Hierarchical, Chronological, by Specialty, and by Competency.

2.2.2. Criteria for the Resolution of Second-level Antinomies or between the Criteria Themselves.