Contents -- Volume Foreword -- Acknowledgements -- Introduction -- 1 Phenomenological Criticism of Science -- 2 The Primacy of Philosophical Anthropology -- 3 Natural Foundation of Anthropology in Current Economics -- 4 The Relational Approach to Anthropology in Social Philosophy -- 5 The Double Description of Anthropology in Theology -- Chapter One Anthropology as a Representation of Humanity -- 6 Interdisciplinary Anthropology -- 7 Anthropology and Sociality in the Individual Disciplines -- 7.1 Theological Figures of Thought on Nature and Humanity -- 7.1.1 The Difference between 'Natura Lapsa' and 'Oeconomia Naturae' -- 7.1.2 Isomorphism of Nature, Humanity and Society? -- 7.2 Basic Anthropological Paradigms of Experimental Economics -- 7.2.1 Human vs. Rational Behavior -- 7.2.2 Human vs. Animal Behavior -- 7.3 Philosophical Points of Entry in Anthropology -- 7.3.1 Anthropology as Human Self-Inquiry -- 7.3.2 Alternatives: The Dualism and Monism of Anthropology -- 8 Anthropological Key Differences -- 8.1 Heidegger: Humanity as the Truth of Being -- 8.2 Agamben: The Dissolution of the Animal Construct -- 8.3 Adorno: Dehumanization through Society -- 8.4 Conclusion -- 9 The Human Condition as a Concrete Condition of Existence -- 9.1 Barthes: The Human Condition as Myth -- 9.2 Arendt: Loss of the Social 'Human Condition'? -- 10 Plessner: Humanity and Bodily Existence -- 10.1 The Broken Relation to the World -- 10.2 From the Shared World ('Mitwelt') to Interpersonal Relations -- 10.3 Conclusion -- 11 Concreteness, Objectivity and Phenomenal Excess -- Chapter Two The Conflict between Egoism and Altruism -- 12 Possibilities and Limitations of an Empirical Anthropology -- 13 The Economic Modeling of Human Social Behavior -- 13.1 The Methodological Paradigm Shifts of Experimental Economics -- 13.2 Skepticism about the Homo Oeconomicus.

13.3 Backgrounds to the Critical Assessment of the Homo Oeconomicus Model -- 14 The Methodology of Experimental Economics -- 14.1 Translatability of Laboratory and Experiential World -- 14.1.1 Empirical Explanation and Methodological Object Constitution in Experiments -- 14.1.2 The Validity of Experimental Findings Outside of the Laboratory -- 14.2 Construction Principles of Economic Laboratory Experiments -- 14.2.1 The Experiment as a Strategic Course of Action -- 14.2.2 The Experiment as Selective Replication of Reality -- 14.2.3 Game Theory and Hypothesis Formation in the Behavioral Experiment -- 15 The Modeling of Social Preferences -- 15.1 What are Preferences? -- 15.2 The Ultimatum Game and Inequity Aversion of Social Agents -- 16 Norms for Cooperative Behavior -- 16.1 Sanctions in Public Goods Games -- 16.2 Social Norms as a Second-Order Public Good? -- 17 From 'Homo Reciprocans' to 'Homo Altruisticus' -- 17.1 Negative Reciprocity: Ultimatum Game -- 17.2 Positive Reciprocity: Trust Game -- 17.3 Pure Altruism: Dictator Game -- 17.4 Strong Reciprocity: Altruistic Punishment and Rewarding -- 18 The Utility Expectation of Altruistic Agents -- 18.1 Psychological, Biological, and Moral Altruism -- 18.2 Personal Satisfaction in Altruistic Punishment -- 19 Affective Empathy: The Significance of Social Emotions -- 20 The Phenomenal Excess of Social Interaction -- 21 Conclusion -- 21.1 Critique -- 21.2 Theses -- 21.3 On the Sense and Nonsense of Talking about Altruism -- Chapter Three Difference in the Interpersonal Relation -- 22 Three Constellations of the Interpersonal Relation -- 23 Human Nature and its Function for the Legitimation of Political Order -- 23.1 The Separation of Politics and Nature in the Model of Societal Order -- 23.2 The Genesis of Order from Contingence -- 24 Antagonism: The Irreducibility of Difference.

24.1 Laclau and Mouffe: Antagonism and Democracy -- 24.2 Critical Assessment of the Liberal, Deliberative Model of Society -- 25 Recognition: The Pacification of Difference -- 25.1 Recognition: Normative Demand or Real-Life Practice? -- 25.2 Post-Hegelian Perspectives on Recognition -- 25.2.1 Honneth: Recognition and Its Negative Forms -- 25.2.2 Taylor: Recognition and the Risk of Homogenizing Difference -- 25.2.3 García Düttmann: A Critical Assessment of Restorative Recognition -- 25.3 Ricoeur's Concept of Mutual Symbolic Recognition -- 25.3.1 The Critique of Reciprocity -- 25.3.2 The Critique of Equal Recognition -- 25.3.3 Symbolic Recognition -- 25.3.4 States of Peace: Recognition and Religious Agape -- 26 Alterity: Difference as the Source of Responsibility -- 26.1 Levinas' Ethical Reconception of Humanity -- 26.2 The Impossibility of Social Inhumanity -- 26.3 The Relationship to the Other as the Third and the Standards of Justice -- 26.4 Beyond the Symmetry of Egalitarian Relationships -- 26.5 God's Invisibility -- 27 Conclusion -- Chapter Four Humanity and Inhumanity in the Love of Neighbor -- 28 Theological Reservations against an Immanence of the Social -- 29 Biblical Usage and Hermeneutical Function of the Word 'Neighbor' -- 29.1 The Biblical Contexts of Caring for the Other Human Being -- 29.2 Who is my Neighbor - the Wrong Question? -- 29.3 Terminological Delineations -- 29.4 Hermeneutical Analysis of the Word 'Neighbor' -- 29.5 Proximity and Distance in the Love of Neighbor -- 30 Social Criticism Instead of Morality -- 31 Meisinger: Anthropological Awareness of Difference -- 32 Kierkegaard: Humanity as the Phenomenal Excess of God's Love -- 32.1 Kierkegaard's Method of Analysis -- 32.2 The Negative Definition of the Neighbor -- 32.3 Self-Love and the Deficiencies of Interpersonal Love.

33 Beyond Kierkegaard: The Love of Neighborand Inhumanity -- 33.1 Adorno: The Dead Neighbor -- 33.2 Žižek, Santner, Reinhard: The Neighbor as a Figure of Inhumanity -- 34 Humanity and Inhumanity as Reflected by Mercy -- 34.1 Lack of Consequences and Resources -- 34.2 Lack of Expectations -- 34.3 Unpredictability: The Phenomenal Abundance of Practicing Mercy -- 34.4 Inhuman Mercilessness -- 35 Conclusion -- Final Thoughts -- 36 Multiperspectivity Instead of Transdisciplinarity -- 37 Result of this Study -- Bibliography -- Index of Names -- Index of Subjects.