Cover -- Title Page -- Copyright -- Preface -- Contents -- Figures -- Tables -- Summary -- Acknowledgments -- Abbreviations -- Chapter One: Introduction -- Chapter Two: Insights from the Literature -- The Institutional Level -- Empirical Research on Institutions -- Policies at the Level of the Individual Decisionmaker -- Personnel Economics Literature -- An Example of Compensation Policies: The U.S. Military -- Incentives for Corruption -- The Role of Data and the Analytical Approach to Studying Incentives -- Summary -- Chapter Three: Mexico's Police Reforms -- Historical Context -- Overview of Police Reforms -- Police Reforms at the Federal Level -- Police Reforms at the State and Municipal Levels -- Militarization of Public Security in Mexico -- Summary and Conclusions -- Chapter Four: Empirical Data on Corruption and Inputs to Professionalism in the Mexican Security Services -- Data on Corruption and Demographics in Mexico -- Defining and Measuring Corruption -- National Trends in Corruption Perceptions, Reported Bribery, and Police Corruption -- Correlates of Corruption at the State Level -- Summary of Recent Corruption Trends -- Literature on the Effects of Mexico's Police Reforms -- Empirical Evidence on Professionalism in Mexico: Analysis of Age, Education, and Pay Trends -- Data and Variable Definitions -- Age and Education -- Comparisons of Pay for Security-Sector Versus Non-Security-Sector Personnel -- What Can We Learn? -- Chapter Five: Conclusions -- Some Evidence of Progress -- Next Steps -- Developing Institutional Data and Analysis Capabilities -- Specific Research Areas -- Conclusions -- Bibliography.