Cover -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Table of Contents -- Chapter 1: Introduction -- 1.1 Logic of the Book's Structure -- 1.2 Readers' Guide -- 1.3 Empirical Evidence -- References -- Part I: Preliminaries -- Chapter 2: The Core-Periphery Model -- 2.1 Introduction -- 2.2 The Symmetric CP Model -- 2.3 Key Features -- 2.4 Concluding Remarks and Related Literature -- Appendix 2.A: Everything You Wanted to Know about Dixit-Stiglitz but were Afraid to Ask -- Appendix 2.B: Technicalities -- Appendix 2.C: Exogenous Asymmetries -- References -- Chapter 3: The Footloose Capital Model -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 The Symmetric FC Model -- 3.3 Key Features -- Appendix 3.A: FC Model with Exogenous Asymmetries -- References -- Chapter 4: The Footloose Entrepreneur Model -- 4.1 Introduction -- 4.2 The Symmetric FE Model -- 4.3 Key Features -- 4.4 Concluding Remarks and Related Literature -- Appendix 4.A: Technicalities and Exogenous Asymmetries -- References -- Chapter 5: Linear Models -- 5.1 Introduction -- 5.2 The Linear FC Model -- 5.3 The Linear FE Model -- 5.4 Congestion in the Linear FE Model -- 5.5 Concluding Remarks and Related Literature -- References -- Chapter 6: The Constructed Capital Model -- 6.1 Introduction -- 6.2 The Symmetric CC Model -- 6.3 The CC Model with Capital Mobility -- 6.4 Key Features -- 6.5 Concluding Remarks and Related Literature -- References -- Chapter 7: Global and Local Spillovers Models -- 7.1 Introduction -- 7.2 The Symmetric GS Model -- 7.3 The Symmetric LS Model -- 7.4 Concluding Remarks and Related Literature -- References -- Chapter 8: Vertical Linkages Models -- 8.1 Introduction -- 8.2 The CPVL Model -- 8.3 The FCVL Model -- 8.4 The FEVL Model -- 8.5 Key Features of VL Models -- 8.6 Concluding Remarks and Related Literature.

Appendix 8.A: Formal Stability Tests in Vertical-Linkage Models -- Part II: General Policy and Welfare Issues -- Chapter 9: Policy and Economic Geography: What's New? -- 9.1 Introduction -- 9.2 Threshold Effects, Discontinuities and Hysteresis -- 9.3 General Non-Linear Effects -- 9.4 Interaction Terms: Trade Freeness Also Matters -- 9.5 Selection Effects -- 9.6 Coordination Effects -- 9.7 Concluding Remarks and Related Literature -- Appendix 9.A. Heterogeneous Moving Costs Among the Agents -- References -- Chapter 10: A Typology of Welfare Effects: Regional Perspective -- 10.1 Introduction -- 10.2 Organizing Framework -- 10.3 Dixit-Stiglitz Preferences -- 10.4 Allowing for Variable Factor Supplies -- 10.5 Allowing for Endogenous Growth -- References -- Chapter 11: Efficiency, Equity and Optimal Agglomeration -- 11.1 Introduction -- 11.2 Equity and Efficiency in the Footloose Capital Model -- 11.3 Symmetric Footloose Entrepreneur Model -- 11.4 Conclusion -- References -- Part III: Trade Policy -- Chapter 12: Unilateral Trade Policy -- 12.1 Introduction -- 12.2 Price-Lowering Protection (PLP) -- 12.3 Liberalization and Industrialization -- 12.4 Industrial Development, Market Size and Comparative Advantage -- 12.6 Concluding Remarks -- References -- Chapter 13: Reciprocal Trade Agreements -- 13.1 Introduction -- 13.2 The Model -- 13.3 Symmetric Liberalization and Delocation -- 13.4 Trade Liberalization without Delocation -- 13.5 Avoiding Delocation via International Transfers -- 13.6 Concluding Comments -- References -- Chapter 14: Preferential Trade Agreements -- 14.1 Introduction -- 14.2 The Multi-Nation Footloose Capital Model -- 14.3 Production Shifting and Investment Diversion -- 14.4 Domino Effects and Endogenous Bloc Size -- 14.5 Hubs and Spokes: The Hub Effect.

14.6 Free Trade Areas and Internal Catastrophes -- 14.7 Concluding Remarks and Related Literature -- References -- Part IV: Tax Policy -- Chapter 15: Agglomeration with Taxation and Public Goods -- 15.1 Introduction -- 15.2 The Standard Tax Competition Literature -- 15.3 Lumpy World Taxes: Immobility of Perfectly Mobile Capital -- 15.4 Agglomeration and the Tax Gap: the CP Thought Experiment -- 15.5 Taxes with Symmetric Countries -- 15.6 Tax-Financed Public Goods as a Destabilizing Force -- 15.7 Duelling Public Amenities: A Modified Tiebout Hypothesis -- 15.8 Redistributive Taxes: Openness and Taxation of Mobile Factors -- References -- Chapter 16: Tax Competition and Agglomeration -- 16.1 Introduction -- 16.2 Tax Competition Between Similar Countries: Simplest Case -- 16.3 Harmless Tax Competition: Tiebout and Agglomeration -- 16.4 Tax Competition and Capital Mobility -- 16.5 Tax Competition and Catastrophic Agglomeration -- 16.6 Uneven Tax Competition and Asymmetric Nations: Race to the Top and Bottom -- 16.7 Concluding Remarks and Related Literature -- References -- Part V: Regional Policy -- Chapter 17: Infrastructure Policies and Economic Geography -- 17.1 Introduction -- 17.2 Public Policies: Growth and Geography Effects -- 17.3 Agglomeration, Congestion and Growth -- 17.4 Non-Linear Effects of Public Policies -- 17.5 Concluding Remarks and Related Literature -- References -- Chapter 18: Political Economics of Regional Subsidies -- 18.1 Introduction -- 18.2 The Augmented FC Model -- 18.3 The Vote Market Effect -- 18.4 The Role of the Electoral System in a Decentralized State -- 18.5 Legislative Bargaining and Strategic Delegation -- 18.6 Concluding Comments -- References -- Chapter 19: Concluding Remarks and Directions for Future Research -- 19.1 Summary of Insights -- 19.2 Future Research -- References -- Index.