Acknowledgements and Disclaimers -- Introduction -- I The Horizontality Revolution -- II Two Histories, Four Questions, Twelve Cases, Two Scholarly Debates -- III Liberal Democratic Constitutionalism -- IV Liberal Democratic Sovereignty -- V Liberal Democratic Historicity -- VI Liberal Democratic Constitutional Review -- VII Outline of Arguments and Chapters -- Part One: Horizontal Effect -- Chapter One: Erased Baselines and Inversed Coordinates: 19th Century Backgrounds of the Horizontality Question -- I Introduction -- II The Privatisation of Constitutional Rights in America -- III The Nineteenth Century Transformation of Private Law Rights in America -- IV The Privatisation of Constitutional Rights in Germany -- V The Nineteenth Century Transformation of Private Law Rights in Germany and its Impact on Early Twentieth Century German Public Law -- VI The Baseline of Erased Baselines -- VII Inversed Coordinates -- Chapter Two: Twelve Pivotal Cases -- I Introduction -- II The Civil Rights Cases (and their Unlikely South African Echoes) -- III Shelley v Kraemer -- IV Labour v Swing and New York Times v Sullivan -- V RWDSU v Dolphin Delivery Ltd -- VI Lüth -- VII Du Plessis v De Klerk -- VIII Flagg Brothers, Inc. v Brooks -- IX DeShaney v Winnebago County Department of Social Services -- X The Duty to Protect: Roe v Wade and Erste Abtreibung -- XI Reiten im Walde -- XII Summary Reflections -- 1 Vicissitudes of the State Action Doctrine -- 2 The Contradictory Legacies that Informed Du Plessis -- 3 The Dismantling of Swing, Shelley and Sullivan in Flagg Brothers and DeShaney -- 4 Shifting Horizontal Effect Jurisprudence from Private to Legislative Relations -- 5 Substantive and Procedural Due Process and the Question of Sovereignty -- 6 Constitutional Histories of Peoples -- Chapter Three: State Action -- I Introduction.

II Michelman's "Hohfeldian Point" -- III Wechsler and Tribe: Two Readings of Shelley -- IV Seidman's Reading of DeShaney -- V One Way out of the American Conceptual Impasse -- Chapter Four: Drittwirkung -- I Introduction -- II Nipperdey's Position -- III Dürig's Position -- IV Leisner's Position -- V Schwabe's Position -- VI Canaris' Response -- VII Schutzpflicht and/or Drittwirkung? -- Part Two: Sovereignty -- Chapter Five: Uninterrupted Sovereignty -- I Introduction -- II Divided Sovereignty -- III Between Deism and Deontology - Europe and Ordo-Liberalism -- IV Dispersed Sovereignty - Government and Governance -- V Dispensed Sovereignty - The Davidsonian Road to Luhmann -- VI Uninterrupted Sovereignty - A "Luhmannian" Return to Hegel -- Chapter Six: Différantial Sovereignty -- I Introduction -- II Coercive Enlightenment Ideals -- III Carl Schmitt's Unitary Substantive Due Process and Indirect Horizontal Effect Jurisprudence -- IV Hans Kelsen and the Open Duality of the Constitutional Democratic Whole -- V Leisner's "Kelsenian" Horizontal Effect Jurisprudence -- VI Différantial Sovereignty -- Chapter Seven: Sovereignty and the Dual Destiny of Lüth in Europe -- I Introduction -- II The Rise of European Union Sovereignty -- III The Demise of German Sovereignty and the Marginalisation of Lüth in Germany -- IV European Union Sovereignty - Vertical and Monistic or Horizontal and Différantial? -- Chapter Eight: Liberal Democratic Constitutional Review -- I Introduction -- II The Recognition of Sovereignty -- III Liberal Democratic Sovereignty -- IV Substantive and Procedural Due Process Constitutional Review -- V The Proceduralisation of Minimum Substance and the First Proportionality Question -- VI The Second Proportionality Question: Rationality and Effectiveness.

VII The Third Proportionality Question: Minimal Intrusion -- VIII The Difference between Ordinary and Constitutional Law -- IX Social Liberal Democracy? -- Bibliography -- Abbreviations -- Index of Persons -- Subject Index.