Cover -- Half title -- Title -- Copyright -- Contents -- List of Figures -- List of Tables -- Foreword -- Preface -- Introduction -- The Mutual Fund Industry and Its Critics -- Mutual Funds and U.S. Retirement Assets -- Mutual Fund Pricing -- Purpose of the Book -- Organization of the Book -- Chapter 1. Mutual Fund Industry Growth and Importance in Retirement Plans -- Mutual Fund Growth -- Mutual Fund Growth in Retirement Plans -- Mutual Funds and the Pension Protection Act of 2006 -- Government Pension Plans: Further Opportunity for Growth in Mutual Funds -- Summary and Conclusions -- Chapter 2. Mutual Funds and Charges of Excessive Fees: The Historical Background -- Fees Are Excessive: The Critics' View -- Early Mutual Fund Management Malfeasance and U.S. Regulations, 1924-1940 -- The 1950s and 1960s -- Proposed Regulatory Solutions to Excessive Fees -- Chapter 3. Mutual Fund Excessive Fees and the Courts -- Gartenberg Case Background -- The District Court's Decision in Gartenberg -- The Appellate Court's Decision in Gartenberg -- Subsequent Court Decisions -- Summary and Conclusions -- Chapter 4. Price Competition and the Demand for Mutual Funds -- Prior Studies -- An Alternative Approach to Examining Competition in the Mutual Fund Industry -- The Model -- Estimating the Demand for Mutual Funds and Corresponding Price Elasticities -- Simulations of the Model -- Summary and Conclusions -- Chapter 5. Mutual Fund Industry Structure and Indicators of Price Competition -- Industry Structure -- Investors' Willingness to Switch Mutual Funds -- Fund Distribution Channels -- Product Innovations and Price Competition -- Further Direct Evidence of Price Competition -- Summary and Conclusions -- Chapter 6. Mutual Fund Pricing, Excessive Fees, and Empirical Evidence -- Introduction -- Mutual Fund Market Segments and Fee Disparities.

Price Dispersion and Price Competition -- Economies of Scale in Mutual Funds and Price Competition -- Increasing Expense Ratios as Evidence of No Price Competition -- Summary and Conclusions -- Chapter 7. Mutual Funds' Organizational Form and Conflicts of Interest -- Introduction -- Assessing Internal Management and Nonprofit Status -- The Vanguard Group -- TIAA-CREF -- Performance Comparisons: Vanguard, TIAA-CREF, and Rival Funds -- Summary and Conclusions -- Chapter 8. What Have We Learned? -- Introduction -- The Excessive Fee Hypothesis -- Principal Findings -- Excessive Fees and Mutual Fund Regulation -- Conclusions -- Appendix to Chapter Four -- The Analytical Framework -- The Single-Nested Model -- Cost Function -- Simulation of Competition Between Two Complexes with Four Funds -- Empirical Estimation of the Nested Logit Demand Model -- Empirical Estimation of Own-Price and Cross-Price Elasticities -- The Two-Nested Model -- The Demand for Funds -- Complex and Distribution Channel Goodwill -- Estimation of the Principles of Differentiation Generalized Extreme Value Model -- Theoretical Aspects of the Principles of Differentiation Generalized Extreme Value Model -- Solving the Principles of Differentiation Generalized Extreme Value Equation -- Appendix to Chapter Seven -- Multivariate Results -- Notes -- Bibliography -- Index.