Consciousness in Interaction -- Editorial page -- Title page -- LCC data -- Dedication page -- Table of contents -- Introduction -- What reason could there be To believe in Pre-reflective bodily self-consciousness? -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Pre-reflective self-consciousness -- 3. Pre-reflective bodily self-consciousness -- 4. Abundant and/or sparse -- 5. Indefeasible descriptions -- 6. Explanatory descriptions -- 7. Conclusion -- Acknowledgements -- Do sensory substitution devices extend the conscious mind? -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Neural deference and neural dominance -- 3. The variable neural correlates argument -- 4. Clark's intracranialism about consciousness -- 5. Expanding consciousness through technology -- 6. Conclusion -- Acknowledgments -- The extended mind and the boundaries of perception and action -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Embodied intersubjectivity and the extended mind -- 3. Action-understanding as simulation: Implications for EM -- 3.1 Simulation and the extended mind: Challenges to representationalism -- 4. Perceptual account of action-understanding: Implications for EM -- 4.1 Perception and the extended mind: Challenges to the basic functional dichotomy between perception and action -- 5. Conclusion -- Acknowledgments -- Showtime at the Cartesian Theater? -- 1. Introduction -- 2. The roots of vehicle externalism -- 3. Three objections, one presupposition -- 4. Dynamics, causation, and constitution -- 5. Conclusion -- Acknowledgments -- Is the function of consciousness to act as an interface? -- 1. Introduction -- 2. HIT -- 2.1 Empirical evidence in support of HIT -- 2.2 Conclusions drawn by Balleine and Dickinson -- 3. Why should philosophers take HIT seriously? -- 3.1 Grounding reasons for action -- 3.2 Achieving the desired outcome -- 3.3 The interface -- 3.4 Grounding in biological states or affective responses.

4. Some objections to HIT -- 4.1 Responses to objections (1) and (2) -- 5. Conclusion -- Acknowledgments -- Es are good -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Enactive -- 3. Embodied and embedded -- 4. Affective -- 5. Extended -- 6. Conclusion -- Acknowledgments -- Social cognition, self-control, artifacts and emotions: The role of consciousness -- Mindshaping and the intentional control of the mind -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Minds in the making -- 3. Narrative control -- 4. Intentional control of the mind: The limits of narrative control -- 5. How important is the intentional control of the mental? -- 6. But is this intentional control not cartesian? -- 7. Conclusion -- Acknowledgments -- My mind" -- 1. Mind-reading is for manipulating and being influenced -- 2. From inter-action to intra-action -- 2.1 Social moves: basic ontology -- 2.2 Reflexive application of social moves -- 3. To be "my self" -- 4. Self-adoption -- 5. How do we "read" our mind? -- 6. How can we succeed in influencing our selves? -- 7. Reflexive power: depending on me and governing me -- 7.1 The strength of our will -- 7.2 Promises and threats to our selves -- 7.3 "Good intentions" and prediction errors -- 7.4 Duties and debts to our selves -- 8. Self-empathic moves and affective interaction with our selves -- 9. Self-signaling and behavioral monologs -- 9.1 BIC messages to myself -- 9.2 Self-stigmergy -- 10. Concluding remarks about the sociality of mind and consciousness -- Acknowledgments -- Coherence of conduct and the self-image -- 1. Introduction -- 1.1 Aims of this work -- 2. Our notion of coherence of conduct -- 3. The need for coherence of conduct and its possible functions -- 3.1 Coherence of conduct and persistence -- 3.2 Coherence of conduct and social identity -- 3.3 Coherence of conduct, self-efficacy, and self-esteem -- 3.4 Coherence of conduct and personal identity.

3.5 Coherence and personal values -- 3.6 Self-coherence and change of conduct -- 3.6.1 Adjusting one's contingent attitudes to one's values: Reversal and specific compensation -- 3.6.2 Adjusting one's values to one's contingent attitudes: Fluid compensation -- 4. Concluding remarks -- Ulysses' will -- 1. Self-control, constraints, willpower, and the extended mind -- 2. Self-control: A working definition and some musings -- 3. Constraint games: towards a formal analysis of constraint-based self-control -- 4. Diachronic rationality: Ulysses and the ghost of christmas future -- Acknowledgments -- Bodily intentionality and social affordances in context -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Skillful unreflective action and the field of relevant affordances -- 3. The normative aspect of bodily intentionality in Merleau-Ponty -- 4. Motor intentionality and the tendency towards an optimal grip -- 5. The role of affect in motor intentional activity -- 6. How we unreflectively switch activities and improve our situation -- 7. Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia on motor intentionality and social affordances -- Acknowledgments -- Seeing with the hands -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Understanding actions from the inside -- 3. Grasping with the eyes -- 4. The space of action -- 5. Concluding remarks -- Recognition of emotion in others -- 1. Introduction -- 2. What is emotion recognition? -- 3. Emotion recognition does not equal emotion category assignment -- 3.1 Situational referencing -- 3.2 Anticipation of forthcoming action -- 3.3 Resonance -- 3.4 Emotion categorization -- 4. All four modes of recognizing grasp relational intent -- 5. States of action readiness -- 6. States of action readiness and emotions -- 7. Recognizing intent -- 8. Resonance -- 8.1 What does mimicry mime? -- 8.2 Explanation of resonance -- 8.3 Functions of resonance -- 8.4 When resonance?.

9. Emotion and emotion recognition -- 10. Conclusions -- Acknowledgments -- The paratactic account of propositional attitude ascription -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Use and mention in quotation -- 3. Peacocke's redeployment view -- 4. Peacocke and Frege on propositional attitude contexts -- 5. The Simple View of propositional attitude ascriptions -- 6. Davidson's Paratactic Account of reported speech -- 7. The Paratactic Account of propositional attitude ascription -- 8. Rejecting the Fregean View -- 9. Against the Simple View -- 10. Against the Redeployment View -- 11. Conclusion -- Historical perspectives on consciousness in interaction -- From sensation to consciousness -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Malebranche -- 3. Condillac -- Theories of consciousness in early-modern philosophy -- 1. The modern notion of consciousness: The Encyclopédie -- 2. Historical premises of conscience/consciousness -- 3. From conscience to consciousness -- 4. The spreading of the notion of consciousness in the xviii century -- 5. Concluding remarks -- Experience and identity of the self -- 1. The emergence of consciousness: A historiographic debate -- 2. From conscience to consciousness -- 3. Locke and leibniz on consciousness (and the cartesian paradigm) -- 4. Locke and leibniz on consciousness, the self, and personal identity -- Consciousness and imagination in the anthropological view of G. Vico -- 1. Introduction -- 2. The intense activity of the senses -- 3. Whose concern is thought? -- 4. The soul's faculties -- Consciousness and faculties in De antiquissima italorum sapientia by Vico -- 1. An «Integrum iudicium» -- 2. Descartes and mercury's trick -- 3. Knowing distinctly means knowing the limits of things» -- 4. Intelligere, cogitare -- 5. Substance -- 6. Matter, soul, spirit -- 7. Mind -- 8. Faculties, knowledge, consciousness -- Acknowledgments -- Authors -- References.

Index.