TABLE OF CONTENTS -- Introduction 1 -- 1. Hare's predecessors 5 -- 1.1 Introduction 5 -- 1.1.1 Descriptivism versus Non-Descriptivism 7 -- 1.1.1.1. Naturalism 10 -- 1.1.1.1.1 Objective Naturalism 11 -- 1.1.1.1.2 Subjective Naturalism 14 -- 1.1.1.2 Intuitionism 18 -- 1.1.2 Non-Descriptivism 23 -- 1.1.2.1 Emotivism 24 -- 2. The logical features of moral language 31 -- 2.1 Introduction 31 -- 2.2 Prescriptivity 32 -- 2.2.1 Some basic objections 38 -- 2.3 Universalizability 47 -- 2.3.1 The universalizability thesis criticized 54 -- 3. The non-logical ingredients of moral argument 69 -- 3.1 Introduction 69 -- 3.2 The factual element of moral argument 70 -- 3.2.1 The way the relevant facts come into moral argument 71 -- 3.3 The evaluative element of moral reasoning -- our freedom to choose anything we like 72 -- 3.3.1 From decisions of principle to preference satisfactions: a systematic development 74 -- 3.4 The role of imagination in moral argument: some related difficulties 78 -- 3.4.1 Imagining oneself in somebody else's position, some further problems 84 -- 4. Imperative logic and decisions of principle: the Existentialist phase of moral reasoning 89 -- 4.1 Introduction 89 -- 4.2 Imperatives and the Phrastics-Neustics theory 90 -- 4.3 The Phrastics-Neustics theory revised 93 -- 4.3.1 Some difficulties concerning the Phrastics - Neustics - Tropics-Clistics theory and the imperative inference in general 97 -- 4.4 Moral reasoning in LM 124 -- 5. The Universal Prescriptivist kind of Utilitarianism: the formalistic stage of moral argument 139 -- 5.1 Introduction 139 -- 5.2 Moral reasoning in FR 140 -- 5.3 Universal Prescriptivism as the formal foundation of Utilitarianism 145 -- 5.3.1 The kind of Utilitarian theory which Universal Prescriptivism implies 148 -- 5.4 Ideals, Fanaticism and Amoralism 152.

6. The two levels of moral thinking: the recent account of moral theory 157 -- 6.1 Introduction 157 -- 6.2 Analysis of the two-level theory, its point, in which cases it is required 158 -- 6.2.1 Some criticisms concerning the two-level theory 167 -- 6.3 The Fanatic and the Amoralist reconsidered 188 -- 7. From Theory to Practice 195 -- 7.1 Introduction 195 -- 7.2 The morality of abortion 196 -- 7.3 Is slavery under any circumstances justified? 203 -- 7.4 Alternative moral theories and Universal Prescriptivist Utilitarianism 211 -- 7.5 The practical relevance of Hare's moral theory: an assessment 227 -- 8. An overall evaluation 231 -- 8.1 Introduction 231 -- 8.2 Could Kant have been a Utilitarian? 231 -- 8.2.1 Is my duty to promote my own perfection compatible with some form of Utilitarianism? 235 -- 8.2.2 Kant and the Utilitarians on the happiness of others. 240 -- 8.2.3 Is Kant a consequentialist? 246 -- 8.3 Some further remarks on Hare's moral methodology: the Fanatic. 249 -- 8.4 Does Hare in the end slide into some kind of Naturalism? The Amoralist. 252 -- Bibliography. 259.