Case Law in Roman, Anglosaxonand Continental Law -- Table of Contents -- Preface -- Chapter1: Introduction -- Chapter: 2 Roman Iurisprudentia as Prudentia Iuris -- 1. Introduction to Roman Law, Especially Classical Law -- 2. Roman Iurisprudentia as Science of Law, as Distinct from its Modern Conception as Jurisprudenz in German and Jurisprudence in Anglosaxon Authors -- 3. Priority of Iurisprudentia over Law in Roman Law -- 4. Etymology of the Term Iurisprudentia as prudentia Appliedto Law in a Practical Manner -- Cognitive and Scientific Diff erences Regarding Scientia and Sapientia -- 5. Decisive Creative Role in Roman Iurisprudentia - Neithervia Legislator Nor Judge - of Two Bodies: Jurisconsults andPraetor -- 6. Origin of Roman Iurisprudentia in the College of Pontiff s,as a "Secret" Concept, and Subsequent Conversion into"Lay" and "Public" Jurisprudence -- 7. Value of Iurisprudentia and Ius Publicae Respondendi:Original Scope and Reduction by Augustus -- 8. Grandeur of Roman Iurisprudentia, Owing to Casuistics,Inductiveness and Intuitiveness -- Value of Science of LawToday as a Theoretical-Doctrinal Concept -- 9. Value of Iurisprudentia in Roman Law: The Source of Law? -- 10. Why Iurisprudentia and not Iuriscientia? -- 11. Roman Prudentia -- Chapter 3: The Anglosaxon Precedent -- 1. The Anglosaxon System of Sources -- 1.1. The Term "Anglosaxon" compared with "English" or "British" -- 1.2. The English System of Sources -- 1.2.1. List and Hierarchy of English Sources of Law -- A. Judge-made Law -- B. Statute Law -- 1.2.2. The Stare Decisis -- 1.2.3. Distinctions -- 1.2.4. The Ratio Decidendi -- 1.2.5. Declarative and Constitutive Theories of the Nature of Common Law -- 1.2.6. Types of Precedent -- 1.2.7. Hierarchy of Courts -- 1.2.8. Publication of Precedents -- The Law Reporting System -- 1.3. The North American System of Sources.

1.4. The Scottish System of Sources -- 2. Distinction between "Jurisprudence" - Science of Law -and "Case Law" - a Judicial Phenomenon -- 3. Differences between Common Law and Continental Legal Systems -- 3.1. The Distinct Infl uence of Roman Law -- 3.2. The Influence of Legal Codes on the Continent compared with Case Law Character of the Anglosaxon System -- 3.3. The Rationalist, Rule-based and Formalistic Conception of the Continental Systems Compared with Anglosaxon Realism and Empiricism -- 3.4. The Evolution of and Respect for Tradition in the Anglosaxon System Compared with the Continental Revolutions -- 3.5. A "Procedural" Law compared with a Law of "Rules" -- 3.6. A Social Organisation Model Based on Individual Initiative and Free Enterprise Compared with the Interventionist and State-centred Continental Model -- 3.7. An Open and Incomplete Law Compared with the Plenitude,Completeness and Closed Nature of the Continental Systems -- 3.8. A Casuistic System Compared with the Pre-established and Preconceived a Priori Ideas of the Continental Systems -- An Inorganic Doctrine without Codes -- The Case Method -- 3.9. Disregard of the Separation between Public and Private Law- a Key Issue in Continental Law -- 4. Main Differences between Anglosaxon Precedent and Continental Case Law -- 4.1. Provenance of Precedent from any Jurisdictional Body regardless of Hierarchical Rank -- 4.2. One Single Ruling sufficient for Judicial Precedent -- 4.3. Precedent as the Main Source of Anglosaxon Law -- 4.4. The System of Dispersed Jurisdiction Compared with Concentrated Jurisdiction -- 5. Current Harmonisation of Statute Law and Case Law Systems -- Chapter: 4 Continental Case Law -- 1. Concept and Main Requirements of Case Law in theSpanish Legal System -- 1.1. The Provenance of Case Law -- 1.1.1. The Supreme Court.

Appeal to the Highest Instance (Appealfor Cassation) -- A. History of the Supreme Court and Appeal to the HighestInstance (Appeal for Cassation) -- B. Main Purpose of Cassation -- C. The Various Chambers of the Supreme Court -- D. Evolution of Concept of "Legal Doctrine" as a Basis forCassation -- Eff ect of the Reform of the Rules of Civil Procedure of200094 -- 1.1.2. The Constitutional Court - Main Functions -- A. Introduction: the North American Model of DispersedJurisdiction Compared with the Austrian Model ofConcentrated Jurisdiction -- B. Nature of the Spanish Constitutional Court -- a. Jurisdictional Nature -- b. Political Nature -- c. "Mixed", Special, Sui Generis and Complex Nature -- C. Relations between the Constitutional Court and the SupremeCourt and other Judicial Authorities: A Question of Hierarchy or Jurisdiction? -- D. Place Occupied by Case Law Established by ConstitutionalCourt Rulings and Orders -- 1.1.3. The Higher Courts of Justice of the Autonomous Communities -- Territorial Jurisdiction -- 1.1.4. The European Courts -- A. The European Court of Human Rights of Strasbourg -- B. The European Court of Justice of Luxembourg -- C. The International Criminal Court -- 1.1.5. Value of Rulings by the General Department of Registers and Notaries Public -- 1.2. Reiteration of Rulings -- 1.3. Ratio Decidendi Compared with Obiter Dicta -- The Ratio andSimilar Concepts in Law -- 1.3.1. The De Facto Assumption, Legal Consequence and Ratio as Elements of the Law -- Historical Development of the Concept of Ratio -- A. The Greek Logos -- B. Appearance of the Term Ratio in Roman Law with a Diff erent Meaning: The Arithmetical and Geometrical Ratio of Mathematical Content - Proportionality -- C. The Middle Ages -- a. The Glossators and Devotion to the Letter and LiteralInterpretation.

b. The Post-glossators or Commentators and Use of Logical Interpretation in Search of the Ratio -- 1.3.2. The Causa Legis in Transactions compared with the RatioLegis in Law -- 1.3.3. The Ocassio Legis Compared with the Ratio Legis -- 1.3.4. The Anima Legis Compared with the Animus -- 1.3.5. The Ratio Legis Compared with the Ratio Legislatoris -- 1.3.6. The "Historical Ratio" Compared with the "Presumed orHypothetical Ratio" -- 1.3.7. The Corpus Compared with the Ratio and the "Criteria forInterpretation" -- 1.3.8. The Opinio Iuris in Custom -- 1.3.9. The Ratio in Legal Argumentation -- Types -- A. The Eadem Ratio in Analogy -- B. The Major Ratio in the A Fortiori Argument -- C. The Minor or Contrary Ratio in the A Contrario Argument -- 1.3.10. The Ratio Decidendi of the Judgement Compared with the Obiter Dicta -- Fundamental Points of Law -- 2. The Functions of Case Law -- 2.1. The Interpretation of Law -- 2.2. The Application of Law -- 2.3. The Integration of Law -- 2.4. The "Limited" and "Derived" Creative Function of Case Law -- 2.5. Other Functions -- 2.5.1. The Function of Decantation and Application of the General Principles of Law -- 2.5.2. The Updating Function of Law -- 2.5.3. The Function of Forming and Creating Legal Concepts -- 3. Is Case Law, Especially that of the Supreme Court, a Source of Law in the Spanish Legal System? -- 3.1. Arguments in Favour of it Being a Source -- 3.1.1. The Evolution of the Principle of Separation of Powers -- 3.1.2. Kelsen's "Stufenbau" Theory and Hart's "Open Texture"Theory -- Problems Resolving the Improvement of Strict Lega lPositivism and the Conception of Law as a Legal System -- 3.1.3. The Infringement of Case Law as Grounds for Appeal to the Highest Instance (Appeal for Cassation) -- 3.1.4. Association of Case Law with Other Sources of Law.

A. Association with Custom, i.e. Judicial Practice - Usus Fori -- B. Association with the General Principles of Law, as a Source ofSaid Principles -- C. Association with Legislation151 -- a. Case Law as "Special", "Individual" or "Specifi c" Law -- b. The Legislator's Tacit Approval via a posteriori "Reception" orPrior "Delegation" of the Case Law Rule -- c. The Legislator's Express Approval in the Additional Provisions of the Civil Code, by reference to the Comisión de Codifi cación(Council of Law Reporting) -- 3.1.5. The New Value of Case Law due to Progressive Importance of"Agreements Adopted by the Non-jurisdictional Meetings ofthe Supreme Court" -- 3.2. Arguments against it Being a Source153 -- 3.2.1. A Strict Interpretation of the Principle of the Separation of Powers and the Judge's Position -- 3.2.2. The General and Abstract Nature of Statute Law and the Specific Area of Case Law Maxims for Isolated Cases -- 3.2.3. The Imperative Nature of Statute Law as a Source of Law compared with the Merely Persuasive, Non-binding and Merely Authoritative Value of Case Law -- 3.2.4. Inclination of Legislation in Principle towards Permanence, Stability and Coherence compared with Freedom to Vary Doctrine and Contradiction in Case Law -- 3.2.5. The Presumption of Res Judicata Compared with the Merely Exemplary Value of Case Law for all Cases Comparable with the One at Issue -- 3.2.6. The Creation of Objective Law by Legislation Compared with the Award of Subjective Rights by Case Law -- 3.2.7. The Requirements of Legal Certainty -- 3.2.8. The Originating Value of Legislation Compared with the Borrowing Nature of Case Law -- 3.2.9. The Creative Nature of Legislation Compared with the Function of Mere Interpretation, Application and Integration of Case Law -- 3.3. Case Law and Equity -- 3.4. Analogy and Resultant Maxims of Decision.

3.5. The Consideration of Case Law as an Improper, Material Source or Source of Knowledge of Law: "Legislation Reigns and Case Law Governs".