Contents -- List of Contributors -- 1. Introduction: Consciousness as a Top-Down Causal Agency G. Auletta and M. Jeannerod -- 1.1. BASIC NOTIONS -- 1.1.1. The Biological Self -- 1.1.2. The Concept of Emergence -- 1.1.3. Associationism and Life -- 1.1.4. Top-Down Causation -- 1.2. EVOLUTION, AWARENESS AND CONSCIOUSNESS -- 1.2.1. What is the Brain for? -- 1.2.2. Mammals' Awareness -- 1.2.3. Primates as Highly Social Animals -- 1.3. HUMAN CONSCIOUSNESS -- 1.3.1. The Problem of Human Consciousness -- 1.3.2. Unconscious and Conscious Processes -- 1.3.3. Symbolic Systems and Language -- 1.3.4. Unreflexive Consciousness -- 1.3.5. Reflexive Consciousness -- 1.4. INTENTIONS IN ACTION AND PRIOR INTENTIONS -- 1.4.1. Action and Consciousness -- 1.4.2. Plans and Prior Intentions -- 1.4.3. Failure and Systemic-Functional Reality of the Self -- 1.5. NEURAL ARCHITECTURE -- 1.6. SOCIETY OF MINDS -- REFERENCES -- 2. A Constraining Role of the Mind? G. Auletta -- DISCUSSION -- REFERENCES -- 3. Neurons, Schemas, Persons and Society-Revisited M. A. Arbib -- 3.1. THE CHALLENGE -- 3.2. TWO-WAY REDUCTION -- 3.3. MULTILEVEL ANALYSIS OF THE ROLE OF THE CEREBELLUM IN PRISM ADAPTATION -- 3.4. OF NEURONS AND SCHEMAS -- 3.5. SOCIAL SCHEMAS -- 3.6. THE MIRROR SYSTEM HYPOTHESIS FOR THE EVOLUTION OF THE LANGUAGE-READY BRAIN -- 3.7. CONSCIOUSNESS, BRIEFLY -- DISCUSSION -- REFERENCES -- 4. The Neural Basis of Consciousness and the Issue of Downward Causation Notes by G. Auletta and I. Colagè on Damasio's Contribution -- DISCUSSION -- SUGGESTED READING -- 5. The Functional Role of Conscious Will in Voluntary Action: Cause or Consequence? A Position Paper M. Jeannerod -- 5.1. INTRODUCTION -- 5.2. WILLING AND ACTING -- 5.3. THE TIMING OF ACTION AWARENESS -- 5.4. THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF CONSCIOUS WILL -- 5.5. WHY CONSCIOUSNESS? THE VALIDATION PROCESS.

5.6. HOW DO WE GET THE SENSE OF BEING THE AUTHOR OF OUR ACTIONS? -- DISCUSSION -- REFERENCES -- 6. Can the Self Be Considered a Cause? J. J. Sanguineti -- 6.1. METHODOLOGICAL PREMISES. A FIRST PHENOMENOLOGICAL LAYOUT -- 6.2. CAUSALITY IN THE NATURAL WORLD -- 6.3. SELF-ORGANIZATION3 -- 6.4. INTENTIONAL LIFE -- 6.5. THE UNITY OF SENSITIVE CONSCIOUSNESS -- 6.6. INTENTIONAL AND NATURAL LEVELS -- 6.7. ANIMAL ACTIONS AND THE ANIMAL SELF -- 6.8. HUMAN HIGHER LEVELS -- 6.9. THE SELF AS A CAUSE -- 6.10. LEVELS OF CAUSALITY -- 6.10.1. Bottom-Up Causation -- 6.10.2. Downward Causality12 -- 6.10.3. Horizontal Causality -- 6.10.4. Do Objects Cause? -- 6.11. CONCLUSION -- DISCUSSION -- REFERENCES -- 7. The Brain: A Highly Distributed Self-Organizing System. Who Has the Initiative? W. Singer -- 7.1. INTRODUCTION -- 7.2. CURRENT BELIEFS -- 7.3. BRIDGES TO THE HUMANITIES -- 7.4. EPISTEMIC CONSIDERATIONS -- 7.5. THE ORIGIN OF IMPLICIT KNOWLEDGE AND ITS ROLE IN COGNITION -- 7.6. EVOLUTIONARY HERITAGE -- 7.7. THE MIND-BODY PROBLEM -- 7.8. THE DISTRIBUTED ORGANIZATION OF THE BRAIN AND WRONG INTUITIONS -- 7.9. DISTRIBUTED REPRESENTATIONS -- 7.10. THE BINDING PROBLEM -- 7.11. THE ROLE OF OSCILLATORY SYNCHRONIZED ACTIVITY -- 7.12. THE NEURONAL CORRELATE OF CONSCIOUS PROCESSING -- 7.13. THE OUTLOOK -- DISCUSSION -- REFERENCES -- 8. Two Views of Brain Functioning M. Raichle -- DISCUSSION -- REFERENCES -- 9. Top-Down Causation in the Brain: Promises for Cognitive Psychology and Challenges for Research C. R. Crowell, J. R. Moskal, J. Burgdorf and J. Panksepp -- 9.1. INTRODUCTION -- 9.2. TDC: NOTABLE ASPECTS AND IMPORTANCE -- 9.2.1. Notable Aspects of TDC -- 9.2.2. Potential Importance of TDC -- 9.3. TDC: ITS POTENTIAL PROMISE FOR COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY -- 9.3.1. Executive Control -- 9.3.2. Expectancy or Mental Set -- 9.3.3. Selective Attention -- 9.3.4. Voluntary Behavior.

9.4. TDC: THE CHALLENGES FOR RESEARCH -- 9.4.1. Consciousness: Unitary or Multidimensional? -- 9.4.2. Conscious Intention and Voluntary Action -- 9.4.3. A Broader Context for Voluntary Action -- 9.4.4. TDC and Emergence -- 9.4.5. A Non-human Model System for TDC -- 9.5. CONCLUDING REMARKS -- DISCUSSION -- REFERENCES -- 10. Consciousness and the Global Neuronal Workspace Hypothesis: From Bottom-Up to Top-Down Causation and Vice Versa G. Auletta and I. Colagè -- 10.1. INTRODUCTION -- 10.2. GENOME, BRAIN AND DEVELOPMENT -- 10.3. NEURAL ARCHITECTURE IN MAMMALS -- 10.4. THE EVOLUTIONARY ORIGIN OF CONSCIOUSNESS -- 10.5. THE GLOBAL NEURONAL WORKSPACE HYPOTHESIS AND CONSCIOUS ACCESS -- 10.6. EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE -- 10.7. PMC AND THE DEFAULT MODE -- 10.8. A LARGER CONTEXT -- 10.9. CONCLUSION -- DISCUSSION -- REFERENCES -- 11. Computation, Representation and Physicalism P. Jacob -- 11.1. INTRODUCTION: TOP-DOWN CAUSATION AND PHYSICALISM -- 11.2. METHODOLOGICAL NATURALISM -- 11.3. CRTM: A VERSION OF METAPHYSICAL NATURALISM -- 11.4. CHOMSKY ON SEMANTIC EXTERNALISM -- 11.5. CHOMSKY ON PHYSICALISM -- 11.6. CONCLUSIONS -- DISCUSSION -- REFERENCES -- 12. Overall Discussion -- SESSION I -- SESSION II -- SESSION III -- SESSION IV -- SESSION V -- Postface M. Jeannerod (1935-2011): A Personal Note G. Rizzolatti -- Appendix I The History of this Volume -- Appendix II The Lyon Document: Top-Down Causation in Cognitive Science? -- A. TOP-DOWN CAUSATION: SOME GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS -- B. TOP-DOWN CAUSATION IN COGNITIVE SCIENCES -- C. FINAL SUGGESTIONS -- Author Index -- Subject Index.