Body, Mind and Self in Hume’s Critical Realism.
Title:
Body, Mind and Self in Hume’s Critical Realism.
Author:
Wilson, Fred.
ISBN:
9783110327076
Personal Author:
Physical Description:
1 online resource (553 pages)
Series:
Philosophische Analyse / Philosophical Analysis ; v.22
Philosophische Analyse / Philosophical Analysis
Contents:
Acknowledgments -- Note -- Table of Contents -- Introduction -- Chapter OneSelf as Substance -- (1) The Substance Tradition1 -- (2) The Metaphysics of Morals -- (3) Morality and the Substantial Self Untied -- (4) Human Nature Defended -- (5) George Grant: Aristotelian Moral Philosophy Made Modern -- (6) Another Sort of Mind -- (7) Minds as Bundles -- Endnotes to Chapter One -- Chapter TwoNominalism and Acquaintance -- (1) Individuation and Nominalism -- (2) The Principle of Acquaintance in Locke and Hume -- (3) The Appeal to Acquaintance: Empiricism vs. Descartes -- (4) Hume's Nominalism -- (5) Nominalism and Relations -- (6) Nominalism, Causation, Substances and Things -- Endnotes to Chapter Two -- Chapter ThreeFrom the Substance Tradition through Locketo Hume:Ordinary Things and Critical Realism -- (1) Up to Locke -- (2) From Locke to Hume9 -- (3) Hume's Causal Inference to Critical Realism -- (4) The System of the Vulgar as False, Inevitable and Reasonable -- (5) The World of the Philosophers -- (6) Conclusion -- Endnotes to Chapter Three -- The Disappearance of the Simple Self: ItsProblems -- (1) Substance and Self in Locke1 -- (2) The Contents of the Humean Mind -- (3) Explaining Consciousness -- (4) Privacy and Other Minds -- (5) The Problem of the Self in Hume -- Endnotes to Chapter Four -- Chapter FiveHume's Positive Account of the Self -- (1) Mind and Body -- (2) The Bodily Criterion -- (3) Humean Persons -- (4) Becoming Our Selves -- (5) Conclusion - The Final One -- Endnotes to Chapter Five -- Bibliography.
Abstract:
This essay proposes that Hume's non-substantialist bundle account of minds is basically correct. The concept of a person is not a metaphysical notion but a forensic one, that of a being who enters into the moral and normative relations of civil society. A person is a bundle but it is also a structured bundle. Hume's metaphysics of relations is argued must be replaced by a more adequate one such as that of Russell, but beyond that Hume's account is essentially correct. In particular it is argued that it is one's character that constitutes one's identity; and that sympathy and the passions of pride and humility are central in forming and maintaining one's character and one's identity as a person. But also central is one's body: a person is an embodied consciousness: the notion that one's body is essential to one's identity is defended at length. Various concepts of mind and consciousness are examined - for example, neutral monism and intentionality - and also the concept of privacy and our inferences to other minds.
Local Note:
Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, Michigan : ProQuest Ebook Central, 2017. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest Ebook Central affiliated libraries.
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