0 Introduction -- 0.1 The Rejection of Neutrality -- 0.2 Why the Rejection of Neutrality is not Enough -- 0.3 Basic Features and Definitions of Perfectionism -- 0.4 Re-conceptualisation of the Differences between Neutralist and Perfectionist Liberals -- 0.5 Summary of the Argument of the Book -- 1 Perfectionism: Some Basic Distinctions -- 1.1 Defining Ethical Perfectionism, Prudential Perfectionism and Political Perfectionism -- 1.2 Why Political Perfectionism Requires an Account of Ethical Perfectionism -- 1.3 Prudential Perfectionism and Objective Goods -- 1.4 Arguments for the Objective List Conception of Well-Being -- 1.5 The Step from Prudential Perfectionism to Ethical Perfectionism -- 1.6 The Step from Ethical Perfectionism to Political Perfectionism -- 1.7 Conclusion -- 2 Perfectionist Goods -- 2.1 Basic Terminology -- 2.2 What Should we include in our List of Objective Goods? -- 2.2.1 Too Sparse -- 2.2.2 Refer to goods that are not fundamental -- 2.2.3 Contain too many goods -- 2.2.4 A Plausible List of Objective Goods -- 2.3 Realizing Goods vs. Opportunities -- 2.4 Agency and Good -- 2.5 Bringing Back Perspective for a Perfectionist Renaissance -- 2.5.1 There is Something about Perspective -- 2.5.2 Endorsement Distinctions -- 2.5.3 Well-being -- 2.6 Does Perfectionism require a Unifying Account of the Good? -- 2.7 Could Perfectionism be based on Cultural Norms or on an Overlapping Consensus? -- 2.8 Is the Lack of Unifying Account Damaging for Political Perfectionism? -- 2.9 Conclusion -- 3 Ethical Perfectionism: Distinctions and Objections -- 3.1 Ethical Perfectionism as a Family of Theories -- 3.1.1 Exclusive vs. Non-exclusive Perfectionism -- 3.1.2 Pluralist vs. Monist Perfectionism -- 3.1.3 Broad vs. Narrow Perfectionism -- 3.1.4 Satisficing vs. Maximising Perfectionism.

3.1.5 Absolute vs. Relative Perfectionism -- 3.2 Consequentialist, Virtue Ethics and Deontological Perfectionism -- 3.3 Is Perfectionism too Self-indulgent? -- 3.4 Praise and Blame -- 3.5 Perfectionism and Positive Value -- 3.6 Conclusion -- 4 The Reasons that Goodness Gives -- 4.1 Prima Facie Arguments -- 4.2 Well-Being and the Function of the State: The Crude Argument -- 4.3 The Service and Well-Being Argument -- 4.4 Is the Humanistic Principle necessary for the Service and Well-Being Argument? -- 4.5 An Objection to the Social Forms Thesis -- 4.6 The Service and Practical Reason Argument: The Explicit Version -- 4.7 An Objection to the Service and Practical Reason Argument: Agentneutral vs Agent-relative Reasons -- 4.7.1 The Objection -- 4.7.2 Agent-relative Reasons in our Lives -- 4.8 The Revised Service and Practical Reason Argument -- 4.9 A Meta-ethical Objection -- 4.10 An Objection to the Service Conception of Authority -- 4.11 Conclusion -- 5 The Consistency Argument -- 5.1 Introduction -- 5.2 Charles Taylor's Argument -- 5.3 Vinit Haksar's Argument -- 5.4 The Consistency Argument -- 5.5 The Protection of Individual Rights and Interests -- 5.5.1 In favour of the Interest Theory -- 5.5.2 Is the Second Premise Really Necessary for the Consistency Argument? -- 5.6 From Protection to Promotion -- 5.6.1 The Consistency Argument -- 5.6.2 Caveats -- 5.6.3 Interpretation of Protection and Promotion -- 5.6.4 The Normative Arbitrariness of the Distinction between Protection and Promotion of Interests -- 5.6.5 In favour of the Consistency Argument -- 5.6.6 Relation to Consequentialism -- 5.7 Conclusion -- 6 The Location of Unfairness -- 6.1 Introduction -- 6.1.1 The Luck Egalitarian Location of Unfairness -- 6.1.2 The Luck Egalitarian Aim -- 6.2 Location of Unfairness.

6.2.1 A Dilemma for the Basic Luck Egalitarian Intuition -- 6.2.2 How can the Fundamentalist Luck Egalitarian attempt to Justify her Position? -- 6.2.3 How the Existing Literature accounts for the Two Forms of luck Egalitarianism -- 6.2.4 Practical Implications -- 6.3 Same Destination, Different Routes -- 6.3.1 The Same Destination, Different Routes Argument -- 6.3.2 Other Instrumental Benefits of Minimising Luck -- 6.3.3 Is Redistribution instrumental to the Promotion of Responsibility? -- 6.4 The Luck Egalitarian Response -- 6.4.1 Attempting an Account of the BLEI -- 6.4.2 The Impact on one's Level of Advantages -- 6.4.3 The Normative Distinction between Negative and Positive Value -- 6.5 The Location of Unfairness -- 6.5.1 Inconsistency -- 6.5.2 What Justice Requires: Promoting the Conditions for Responsibility -- 6.5.3 Justice Requires Structural Changes -- 6.5.4 An Account of Responsibility -- 6.5.5 The Practice of Responsibility Promotion -- 6.6 The Luck Egalitarian Response -- 6.6.1 The Good Luck Objection -- 6.6.2 The Feasibility Objection -- 6.7 Responsibility -- 6.7.1 Two thought experiments -- 6.7.2 'She did it her way' or the Prudential Value of Responsibility -- 6.8 Conclusion -- 7 Conclusion -- 7.1 Three Distinctive Features -- 7.1.1 Ethical Perfectionism -- 7.1.2 Positive Arguments -- 7.1.3 Luck Egalitarianism -- 7.2 Objections -- 7.2.1 Autonomy -- 7.2.2 Moral Equality -- 7.2.3 Pragmatic Objections -- 7.3 Final Thoughts -- Bibliography.