_GoBack -- Foreword -- Reader information and acknowledgments -- Some commonly used abbreviations -- Introduction -- General purpose and method: beyond dogmatics -- General object: federalism -- 1. -- Influence and the toolbox concept: -- Some preliminary considerations pertaining to method -- 1.1 Methodological problems pertaining to the object of the inquiry -- 1.2 The toolbox concept -- 2. -- Belgian federalism: A cursory overview -- 2.1 A doubly stratified federal structure -- 2.2 Bipolar and centrifugal federalism institutionalized -- -- 2.3 The Constitutional Court situated in the Belgian federal system -- 3. -- The Belgian Constitutional Court and federalism -- 3.1 Different ways of examining (case-)law -- 3.2 "Foundational" principles -- 3.2.1 Conferral -- 3.2.2 Material exclusivity -- 3.2.3 Territorial exclusivity -- 3.3 "Incidental" principles in the toolbox -- 3.3.1 Specific "(con)textual" constraints -- 3.3.2 Proportionality -- 3.3.3 Federal loyalty -- 3.3.4 Implied powers -- 3.3.5 Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) -- 3.4 Interaction in the Constitutional Court's toolbox -- 4. -- European influence on Constitutional Court case law -- 4.1 Preliminary observations -- 4.2 European law and the Constitutional Court -- 4.3 European law as a streamlining tool -- 4.3.1 European law as a (quasi) political tool for evacuation of conflict -- 4.3.2 European law as an argumentative tool in the context of the EMU -- 4.3.3 European law as an argumentative tool reinforcing cooperation -- 4.4 Rule of law values and the limits of instrumentalization by the Constitutional Court -- 4.4.1 Authoritative texts -- 4.4.2 Precedent -- 4.4.3 Coherence, with the example of coherent EMU-principles -- 4.5 More explanatory value? Two caveats -- 5. -- Three partial explanations and the road ahead.

5.1 Integration of European law in constitutional jurisprudence -- 5.2 The (ever) expanding Europe -- 5.3 Diversity in unity: autonomous concepts -- 5.4 The road ahead -- Conclusion.