Cover -- Contents -- Acknowledgments -- Introduction (João Fonseca / Jorge Gonçalves) -- I. The Background -- II. The Essays -- Part I. Metaphysics and Personal Identity -- Part II. Epistemology and Phenomenology -- Part III. Cognition, Psychology, Neuroscience -- Part IV. Ontology and Taxonomy -- References -- Part I. Metaphysics and Personal Identity -- Animalism and the Remnant-Person Problem (Eric T. Olson) -- Introduction -- 1. -- 2. -- 3. -- 4. -- 5. -- 6. -- 7. -- 8. -- 9. -- References -- Will I ever be a Cyborg? (Rui Vieira da Cunha) -- 1. Introduction -- 2. A Cyborg Thought Experiment -- 3. Olson's Animalist View -- 4. Back to the Cyborg -- 5. Conclusion -- References -- Part II. Epistemology and Phenomenology -- How Consciousness explains the Self (Klaus Gärtner) -- Justifying the Connection -- What is Consciousness? -- What is the 'Self'? -- The relation between a concept of Consciousness and a concept of the 'Self' -- Conclusion -- References -- Self-Knowledge, Introspection and Memory (António Marques) -- References -- Imagination as a Bodily Pattern: thinking about Sartrean's account of Consciousness (Clara Morando) -- Hypnagogic Images -- References -- Feelings and the Self (Dina Mendonça) -- Part I: Situations and the Self -- i. Situated approach to emotions -- ii. Self and The Pattern of Emotional Activity -- Part II: Some Emotions and the Implicated Self -- i. Fear -- ii. Love -- iii. Pride -- iv. Jealousy -- Conclusions -- References -- Part III. Cognition, Psychology, Neuroscience -- De Se Attitudes and Semiotic Aspects of Cognition (Erich Rast) -- Overview -- Puzzles of De Se Attitudes -- Assessment of the Thought Experiments -- Semiotic Aspects of Cognition -- Summary and Conclusions -- Figures -- References -- The Division of the Mind: Paradoxes and Puzzles (Vasco Correia) -- 1. Beyond divisionism.

2. The paradoxes of the Freudian account -- 3. Fingarette: "ego" and "counter-ego" -- 4. Pears: the rival "centres of agency" -- 5. Davidson: the mind's "compartments" -- 6. Conclusion: toward a unitary solution -- References -- Empirical and conceptual clarifications regarding the notion of 'Core-Self' from Gallagher's and Merker's Behavioural-Neuroscientific Proposals (João Fonseca) -- I. Introduction: Conceptual Confusions and Methodological Fragmentation -- II. Fundamentals of a Model-Theoretical Framework for Behavioural Neuroscience -- III. Hierarchical taxonomy of psychological concepts: introducing 'Nested Concepts' -- IV. Redefining Merker's and Gallagher's proposals for Core-self -- IV.1 Core-Self' as a Theoretical Concept in Behavioural Neuroscience -- IV.2 Merker's upper brainstem proposal -- IV.3 Gallagher's cortical motor forward model proposal -- V. Conciliating Merker and Gallagher's proposals: 'Core-Self' as a Theoretical Nested Concept in Behavioural Neuroscience. -- V.1 The 'Explanatory Dilemma' -- V.2 Core-Self as a 'Psychological Domain' of BN. Introducing the 'Nested Concept Hypothesis' -- V.3 Explanatory Unification and the Overcoming of the Dilemma -- Conclusion -- References -- Part IV. Ontology and Taxonomy -- Core Self and the Problem of the Self (Jorge Gonçalves) -- References -- The Reality of the Virtual Self as Interface to the Social World (Robert Clowes) -- Introduction -- Virtual Reality and the Experience of Presence -- The Virtual Self and Pre-Reflective Self Experience -- The Virtual Body and the Minimal Self -- In What Sense is the Self Illusory? -- Presence, the Minimal Self, and Ipseity Disturbance -- Schizophrenia and Social Self Diminishment -- Self Positions: An Extended Virtual Self  ? -- Rethinking the Virtual Self: Actualizing Virtualities -- The Virtuality of the Self and its Ontological Status.

Actualizing Virtualities and the Conceptual Role of Self -- Acknowledgements -- References -- Conceptual Personae of the "attentional self" (Alexander Gerner) -- 1. Introduction -- 1.1 Conceptual personae of the impossible attentional self: Monsieur Teste as the impossible "man" of attention -- 2. Heautoscopic "attentional self" -- 2.1 Italo Calvino's Mister Palomar's development from an aesthetic to an heautoscopic "attentional self" -- From aesthetic to heautoscopic attention -- 2.2 Metzinger's "attentional ghost": the virtual self floating out of the body and the impossible full body illusion -- 2.2.1 The concept of disembodied attentional self in an out-of-body experience (OBE) -- 2.2.2 Virtual Out- of-body experiences and impossible full body illusions -- 3. Outlook -- References -- Notes on Contributors.