International Relations under Risk: Framing State Choice -- Contents -- Preface and Acknowledgments -- 1. Competing Models of Decision Making -- INTRODUCTION -- COGNITION AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY -- PROSPECT THEORY -- ASSESSMENT -- CHAPTER SUMMARY -- 2. Prospect Theory andInternational Relations -- INTRODUCTION -- ARGUMENTS AGAINST PROSPECT THEORY -- PROSPECT THEORY AND THE STUDYOF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS -- CONCLUSION -- 3. The Use of Power -- INTRODUCTION -- STATUS QUO, SUBJECTIVITY, AND DECISION FRAMES -- POWER AND COERCION -- MILITARY DETERRENCE -- ECONOMIC THREATS -- TWO-LEVEL ECONOMIC THREAT MODEL -- THE FAILURE OF SANCTIONS -- CONCLUSION -- 4. Cooperation -- INTRODUCTION -- PROPOSITIONS ON NEGOTIATION AND COOPERATION -- COOPERATION AND THE PRISONER'S DILEMMA -- IS COOPERATION RISKY OR SAFE? -- STRATEGIC CHOICE -- COOPERATION AND THE TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONS -- CONCLUSION -- 5. A Unified Theoryof Preferences -- INTRODUCTION -- THE GAINS DEBATE -- THE PROBLEM OF FIXED PREFERENCES -- CONSTRUCTIVISM AND THE GAINS DEBATE -- UNIFYING PREFERENCES -- POWER, PREFERENCES, AND STRATEGIES -- CONCLUSION -- 6. The European Community -- BACKGROUND -- FOREIGN POLICY IN A COMMUNITY -- THE DECISION FRAME PRIOR TO VIENNA -- NEGOTIATING AT VIENNA: 1982-1985 -- RELATIVE OR ABSOLUTE GAINS? -- THE FORMATION OF A LOSSES FRAME -- THE EUROPEAN GAMBLE -- CONCLUSION -- 7. The United States -- BACKGROUND -- BANNING CFCS PRIOR TO A DECISION FRAME -- AMERICAN PASSIVITY -- THE ALLIANCE FOR CFCS -- AN INADVERTENT LOSSES FRAME -- THE MOVE TO MULTILATERALISM:VIENNA AND MONTREAL -- CONCLUSION -- 8. Conclusions -- PREFERENCES AND FRAMES -- REALISM AND COOPERATION -- RISK ACCEPTANCE, COOPERATION, AND REGIME DESIGN -- POWER, LEVERAGE, AND DOMESTIC WIN-SETS -- THE "OZONE HOLE" -- THE PROMISE OF A COGNITIVE RESEARCH PROGRAM -- Notes -- References.

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