Cover -- Contents -- 1. Introduction -- 1.1 The relevance of the topic -- 1.2 The method and scope of the research -- 1.3 The structure of the book -- 2. Definitional and justificatory questions -- 2.1 Defining paternalism -- 2.1.1 The origins of the expression -- 2.1.2 The concept of paternalism -- 2.1.3 The external aspects of paternalism: the system of liberty-limiting principles -- 2.1.4 The internal aspects of paternalism: identifying subcategories -- 2.1.5 State paternalism -- 2.2 Justifying Paternalism -- 2.2.1 Autonomy-based justifications -- 2.2.2 Consequentialist justifications -- 2.2.3 Virtue ethics -- 3. Autonomy-based approaches -- 3.1 Autonomy and paternalism -- 3.1.1 The complex character of personal autonomy -- 3.1.2 Moral autonomy -- 3.1.3 The value of autonomy -- 3.1.4 The 'myth' of autonomy -- 3.2 The harm principle of John Stuart Mill -- 3.2.1 The absolute character of prohibition -- 3.2.2 The utilitarian justification of the harm principle -- 3.2.3 Reconciling Mill's utilitarianism with the harm principle -- 3.2.4 The shift to deontology -- 3.3 Hard cases for the 'soft' paternalist -- 3.3.1 Physical protection -- 3.3.2 Health regulation and dangerous substances -- 3.3.3 Euthanasia -- 3.3.4 Human dignity and paternalism -- 3.4 Liberal neutrality and paternalism -- 4. Alternative approaches -- 4.1 The emergence of virtue ethics -- 4.2 Paternalism and virtues -- 4.3 Perfectionism -- 4.3.1 Perfectionist ethics -- 4.3.2 Perfectionist politics -- 4.3.3 Perfectionism and paternalism -- 4.3.4 The liberal perfectionism of Joseph Raz -- 4.4 Paternalism as caring -- 4.4.1 Care and virtues -- 4.4.2 Outlining a care-based approach to paternalism -- 5. Applications -- 5.1 Paternalism in the jurisprudence of the Hungarian Constitutional Court -- 5.1.1 Preliminary remarks -- 5.1.2 Decisions concerning homosexuality.

5.1.3 Drug policy and paternalism -- 5.1.4 Decision on sterilisation -- 5.1.5 Euthanasia -- 5.1.6 The compulsory vaccination of children -- 5.2 Moral paternalism and the European Court of Human Rights -- 5.2.1 Legal moralism -- 5.2.2 The protection of morals in the European Court of Human Rights -- 6. Conclusion -- 6.1 At the intersection of two conflicting principles -- 6.1.1 Autonomy -- 6.1.2 Benevolence and interconnectedness -- 6.2 The changing interpretation of the harm principle -- 6.3 Liberal neutrality -- 6.4 Lessons learned from case law -- 6.5 Beyond principles -- Bibliography.