Contents -- Introduction -- Mirage Realism Revisited -- 1 Introduction -- 2 The one over many problem -- 3 Devitt's charge of mirage realism -- 4 The one over many problem and Armstrong's world of states of affairs -- 5 Instantiation as partial identity -- 6 The one over many problem and the Platonic view of universals -- Ostrich Nominalism or Ostrich Platonism? -- 1 What is it like to be an ostrich? -- 2 The argument from gross facts -- 3 The harlot argument -- 4 The truthmaker argument -- 5 Sketch for a Platonic theory of predication -- 6 Concluding remarks -- In Defense of Transcendent Universals -- 1 Armstrong's ontological method -- 2 Armstrong's primary critique of transcendent realism -- 3 A reply to the primary critique -- 4 "How can distinct particulars have the same properties?" -- 5 Arguments, not explanations -- Armstrong and Tropes -- 1 Universals and tropes -- 2 Tropes and substances -- 3 Armstrong's objections to trope nominalism -- 4 Answers to the objections -- 5 Some advantages of trope nominalism -- 6 Remaining problems for the trope nominalist -- 7 Conclusion -- Tropes: For and Against -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Tropes and the one over many -- 3 Armstrong on what is the 'best' version of the trope view -- 4 Armstrong on why there are no tropes -- 5 Piling, swapping, and 'Hochberg's argument' -- 6 Laws of nature and resemblance -- Facts: An Essay in Aporetics -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Facts as contingently existing concreta -- 3 The truth-maker argument for facts -- 4 Butchvarov's objections to realism about facts -- 4.1 An argument from imperceivability -- 4.2 An argument from impossibility of reference -- 4.3 The Paradox of the Horse and the Paradox of Snow -- 5 Problems with the concretist conception of facts.

5.1 The collision of the compositional and necessitarian models -- 5.2 Problems with the compositionalist model -- 5.3 Necessitarianism and the collapse of Armstrong's fact ontology -- 6 Facts as abstract objects: Reinhardt Grossmann -- 6.1 The localization argument against concrete facts -- 6.2 The 'bare particular' objection to abstract facts -- 7 Concluding aporetic postscript -- Armstrong's Hidden Substantialism -- 1 Introduction: Is Factualism a Truth of Armstrong's Ontology? -- 2 States of a airs and the problem of universals -- 3 States of a airs and the problem of truth -- 4 The categorial clash between factualism and the victory of particularity -- 5 Concluding remarks: the ontological consequences of the clash -- Persisting Particulars and their Properties -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Transdurantism -- 3 Objects as property bundles -- 4 Objects as substrata with properties -- 5 Location relations -- 6 Explanation and identity -- Armstrong on Dispositions and Laws of Nature -- 1 Dispositions, ontologically speaking -- 2 Was Armstrong's account su ciently realist? -- 3 Powers, actualism and degrees of being -- 4 Potency and act -- 5 Laws to the rescue? -- 6 Tendencies -- 7 Conclusion -- Recombination for Combinatorialists -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Constituents of states of a airs -- 3 Recombination for combinatorialists -- 4 Rebutting the trickle-down objection -- 5 Rebutting the objection from alien possibilities -- 6 Conclusions -- Who's Afraid of Non-Existent Manifestations? -- 1 Introduction -- 2 The argument -- 3 Armstrong vs. powers -- 4 Getting rid of non-existent manifestations -- 5 Some miscellaneous concerns about Meinongianism -- Armstrong on Truthmaking and Realism -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Truthmaking and realism -- 3 Truthmaking as ontologically neutral -- 4 Realism can stand on its own.

From Translations to Truthmakers -- 1 Translations -- 2 Truth conditions -- 3 Dispositions -- 4 Truthmakers -- 5 Functionalism -- 6 Physicalism -- 7 Beliefs and desires -- Armstrong's Supervenience and Ontological Dependence -- 1 Introduction -- 2 The basics of Armstrong's ontology -- 3 The no distinctness proposal -- 4 Supervenience and ontological dependence -- 5 Supervenience as neither su cient nor necessary for ontological dependence -- 6 Cases of asymmetric supervenience -- 7 Cases of symmetric supervenience -- 8 Instantiation and Bradley's regress -- Naturalism as a Background Metaphysics -- 1 Understanding Armstrong's naturalistic position -- 2 The under-determination of the thesis -- 3 The negative content -- 4 The positive content -- 5 Is the a priori back? -- Index.