Cover image for Who Disciplines Bank Managers?.
Who Disciplines Bank Managers?.
Title:
Who Disciplines Bank Managers?.
Author:
Maechler, Andrea M.
ISBN:
9781452783352
Personal Author:
Physical Description:
1 online resource (47 pages)
Series:
IMF Working Papers
Contents:
Contents -- I. Introduction -- II. Related Literature and Hypothesis -- III. Methodology and Data -- A. Methodology -- B. Variable Selection -- C. Dataset -- IV. Bank Performance Prior to Executive Turnover -- V. Multivariate Analysis -- VI. Conclusions -- References -- Figure -- 1. Histogram of Total Assets -- Tables -- 1. Descriptive Statistics, Differences of Means and Medians, and Correlations -- 2. Percentage Changes in Bank Performance Prior to Executive Turnover -- 3. Conditional Logit Models for Different Sources of Discipine -- 4. Key Variables of Interest by Percentile of Z-Score -- 5. Changes in Bank Performance After Executive Turnovers (Treatment Group) -- 6. Changes in Bank Performance After Executive Turnovers (Treatment and Control Group) -- 7. Changes in Bank Performance After Executive Turnovers (Matching on Propensity Scores, Treatment, and Control Group -- Appendices -- I. Measuring Bank Soundness Using the Z-Score -- II. Overview of Data and Sources -- III. Turnovers in Small and Medium Sized U.S. Banks 1990-2007 -- IV. Robustness Checks.
Abstract:
We bring to bear a hand-collected dataset of executive turnovers in U.S. banks to test the efficacy of market discipline in a ''laboratory setting'' by analyzing banks that are less likely to be subject to government support. Specifically, we focus on a new face of market discipline: stakeholders'' ability to fire an executive. Using conditional logit regressions to examine the roles of debtholders, shareholders, and regulators in removing executives, we present novel evidence that executives are more likely to be dismissed if their bank is risky, incurs losses, cuts dividends, has a high charter value, and holds high levels of subordinated debt. We only find limited evidence that forced turnovers improve bank performance.
Local Note:
Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, Michigan : ProQuest Ebook Central, 2017. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest Ebook Central affiliated libraries.
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