Cover -- Table of Contents -- Acknowledgements -- Introduction -- Chapter 1: Relevance Theory: a cognitive model of communication -- 1.1 Introduction -- 1.2 Cognitive goals and relevance -- 1.3 The mind's massive modularity -- 1.4 Cognitive effects and relevance -- 1.5 Ostension, cognitive environment, manifestness and the Communicative Principle of Relevance -- 1.6 RT and intentions -- 1.7 How ostensive-inferential communication works in practice -- 1.8 Inference to the intended interpretation and context construction -- 1.9 Concluding remarks -- Chapter 2: Explicatures: how far do interpreters go? -- 2.1 Introduction -- 2.2 The explicit-implicit divide: the relevance-theoretic approach -- 2.3 The nature of explicatures -- 2.4 Problems with free enrichment -- 2.5 The enrichment fallacy? -- 2.6 Contextual cognitive fix instead of free enrichment -- 2.7 How contextual cognitive fix works -- 2.8 Shallower interpretations -- 2.9 Contextual cognitive fix and ad hoc concepts -- 2.10 Concluding remarks -- Chapter 3: Within and beyond implicature -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 Implicature: a relevance-theoretic construal -- 3.3 Implications vs. implicatures -- 3.4 Underdeterminacy vs. indeterminacy -- 3.5 From strong to weak communication or the other way round? -- 3.6 Poetic effects: the case of aphorisms -- 3.7 Implicit communication: whose meaning is it? -- 3.8 From communication to parallel (though diverse) thinking -- 3.9 Concluding remarks -- Chapter 4: Relevance and the miracle of communication -- 4.1 Introduction -- 4.2 RT, contextualism and pragmaticism -- 4.3 The miracle of communication argument -- 4.4 Inferencing and modularity -- 4.5 Communication and mind-reading -- 4.6 The miracle worker: the relevance-theoretic comprehension module -- 4.7 Personal vs. subpersonal levels in pragmatics.

4.8 Contextual cognitive fix: comprehension efficiency revisited -- 4.9 Concluding remarks -- Conclusion -- References -- Index.