Engineering the Financial Crisis : Systemic Risk and the Failure of Regulation.
Title:
Engineering the Financial Crisis : Systemic Risk and the Failure of Regulation.
Author:
Friedman, Jeffrey.
ISBN:
9780812205077
Personal Author:
Physical Description:
1 online resource (223 pages)
Contents:
Cover -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Table of Contents -- List of Figures and Tables -- Glossary of Abbreviations and Acronyms -- Introduction -- Chapter 1: Bonuses, Irrationality, and Too-Bigness: The Conventional Wisdom About the Financial Crisis and Its Theoretical Implications -- Chapter 2: Capital Adequacy Regulations and the Financial Crisis: Bankers' and Regulators' Errors -- Chapter 3: The Interaction of Regulations and the Great Recession: Fetishizing Market Prices -- Chapter 4: Capitalism and Regulation: Ignorance, Heterogeneity, and Systemic Risk -- Conclusion -- Appendix I: Scholarship About the Corporate-Compensation Hypothesis -- Appendix II: The Basel Rules off the Balance Sheet -- Notes -- References -- Index -- Acknowledgments.
Abstract:
This study examines the role of the Basel Accords-a set of international standards regulating bank capital-in the global financial crisis. It argues that because the accords were so widely adopted, they effectively homogenized the banking industry, increasing the systemic risk they were intended to prevent.
Local Note:
Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, Michigan : ProQuest Ebook Central, 2017. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest Ebook Central affiliated libraries.
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