Contents -- Preface -- Chapter 1. Introduction -- 1.1 Motivating Example -- 1.2 Collusion within Porter's Five Forces -- 1.3 Difficulties of Collusion -- 1.4 Environments Requiring Explicit Collusion -- 1.5 Lingering Price Effects of Explicit Collusion -- 1.6 Price Formation Process -- 1.7 Economic Rationale for the Illegality of Explicit Collusion -- 1.8 Cartel Detection -- 1.9 Outline of the Book -- 1.10 Appendix: Factors Affecting the Sustainability of Tacit Collusion -- Part I. Collusion in Practice -- Chapter 2. Narrative of a Cartel -- 2.1 The Story Begins -- 2.2 Initiation of the Cartel -- 2.3 Market Share Division -- 2.4 Price Increases and Announcements -- 2.5 Sales Force Issues -- 2.6 Redistributions -- 2.7 Questions and Answers -- Chapter 3. Narrative of a Bidding Ring -- 3.1 Preamble -- 3.2 The Instruction Begins -- 3.3 Two Motivations for the Ring -- 3.4 Ring Logistics -- 3.5 Ring Membership -- 3.6 Auctioneer's Response -- 3.7 Implementation of Sidepayments -- 3.8 Questions and Answers -- Chapter 4. Narrative of Cartel Detection -- 4.1 Preamble -- 4.2 The Seminar Begins -- 4.3 Taxonomy of Cartel Actions -- 4.4 Economic Evidence of Collusion -- 4.5 Questions and Answers -- Part II. Economics of Cartels -- Chapter 5. Suppression of Rivalry by Cartels -- 5.1 Basics -- 5.2 Buyer Resistance -- 5.3 Model of Price Competition without Buyer Resistance -- 5.4 Collusive Outcomes -- 5.5 Incentives for Cheating -- 5.6 Conclusion -- Chapter 6. Implementation of Collusion by Cartels -- 6.1 The Central Cartel Problem and the Solution -- 6.2 Pricing Structures -- 6.3 Allocation Structures -- 6.4 Enforcement Structures -- 6.5 Conclusion -- 6.6 Appendix: Third-Party Facilitation -- Chapter 7. Beyond the Suppression of Within-cartel Rivalry -- 7.1 Sharing Mutually Beneficial Investments -- 7.2 A Dominant Firm versus a Cartel Acting as a Dominant Firm.

7.3 Direct Actions against Noncartel Firms -- 7.4 Perimeter Forces -- 7.5 Sixth Force of Government -- 7.6 Conclusion -- 7.7 Appendix: Antitrust Exemptions -- Part III. Economics of Bidding Rings -- Chapter 8. Suppression of Interbidder Rivalry by Rings -- 8.1 Role of Auctions and Procurements in Price Discovery -- 8.2 Suppression of Rivalry at an Auction -- 8.3 Ring Composition -- 8.4 Effects of Auction Format and Ring Size -- 8.5 Conclusion -- 8.6 Appendix A: Numerical Example of Leakage at a Sealed-Bid Auction -- 8.7 Appendix B: Numerical Example of Membership and Participation at a Sealed-Bid Auction -- Chapter 9. Implementation of Collusion by Rings -- 9.1 Rings versus Cartels -- 9.2 Ring Secret Deviations -- 9.3 Ring Pricing Structures and Seller Resistance -- 9.4 Ring Allocation Structures -- 9.5 Ring Enforcement Structures -- 9.6 Ring Mechanisms for Standard Auction Types -- 9.7 Efficiency of Allocations -- 9.8 Conclusion -- Chapter 10. Effects of Auction Design on Rings -- 10.1 Auction Transparency -- 10.2 Frequency of Auctions -- 10.3 Record of Bidding -- 10.4 Conclusion -- 10.5 Appendix: Collusion-Proof Mechanisms -- Part IV. Detection of Collusion Using Economic Evidence -- Chapter 11. Plus Factors -- 11.1 Organizing Plus Factors within a Taxonomy of Cartel Structures -- 11.2 Plus Factors Related to Pricing Structures -- 11.3 Plus Factors Related to Allocation Structures -- 11.4 Plus Factors Related to Enforcement Structures -- 11.5 Plus Factors Related to Dominant-Firm Conduct -- 11.6 Differentiating Plus Factors -- 11.7 Super-Plus Factors for Cartels -- 11.8 Response to Detection Based on Super-Plus Factors -- 11.9 Appendix: Additional Price Announcement Graphs -- Chapter 12. Plus Factors for Rings -- 12.1 Two Cautions -- 12.2 Common Issues -- 12.3 Plus Factors for Rings for an Ascending-Bid Auction.

12.4 Plus Factors for Rings for a Sealed-Bid Auction -- 12.5 Changing from Ascending Bid to Sealed Bid -- 12.6 Conclusion -- 12.7 Appendix: Shill Bidding at Russian Oil and Gas Auction -- Chapter 13. Coordinated Effects in Horizontal Mergers -- 13.1 Horizontal Merger Guidelines -- 13.2 Unilateral and Coordinated Effects Analyses -- 13.3 Coordinated Effects Analysis of Hospital Corporation -- 13.4 Conclusion -- References for EC Decisions -- References -- Index of Authors -- Index of Subjects and Cases.